

附件2:

浙江大学优秀博士学位论文申请表

论文题目		中国空军美国志愿队筹建问题研究（1940-1942）			
论文英文题目		Research about the Preparation and Organization of American Volunteer Group of Chinese Air Force (1940-1942)			
作者学号	作者姓名	获得博士学位日期	论文涉及的研究方向		
11404070	徐亮	2024年12月30日	抗日战争史、中美关系史		
作者电话	作者邮箱	现工作或学习单位			
15167115151	825482937@qq.com	浙江工商大学马克思主义学院			
一级学科或专业学位类别代码	一级学科或专业学位类别名称	二级学科或专业学位领域代码	二级学科名称或专业学位领域名称		
0602	中国史	060205	中国近现代史		
主导师姓名	陈红民	主导师研究方向	中华民国史		
导师组其他成员姓名 ^①	无	导师组其他成员研究方向	无		
申请学位时论文的总体评价		优秀（5）个	良好（0）个	其他（0）个	
与作者攻读博士学位期间及获得博士学位后一年内单位的代表性成果 ^②	序号	成果名称 ^③	成果出处 ^④	获得年月 ^⑤	查询信息 ^⑥
	1	《抗战为什么赢：中国人民伟大的抗日战争》	江苏人民出版社	2021年9月	ISBN 978-7-214-26493-0
	2	《战时合作的“中间人”：中国战区青年译员与美军的相处》	《史学月刊》	2020年3月	2020年第3期
	3	《“权宜之计”：美国援华志愿航空队之改编》	《抗日战争研究》	2019年4月	2019年第1期

	4	《外国民众对中国抗战的支持（1937—1941）——以国际宣传处档案为中心》	《民国档案》	2020 年 8 月	2020 年第 3 期
	5				
论文主要创新点	<p>一、研究视角的创新。本研究以马克思主义唯物史观为指导思想，坚持以全面、发展的眼光看待历史问题。积极吸取前人研究成果，对西方学者文章尽可能地搜罗引用，确保对西方学界研究动态与观点有清晰的认知，以此作为研究的基础与起点。同时将中文学界在抗战史、中美关系史的研究成果，与飞虎队研究叙述相结合。从宏观层面扩大视野，从空军史、志愿队史、中美关系史的大势来研究美国志愿队，从而扩充并完善美国志愿队筹备与组建的历史叙事。同时拓宽研究对象，范围涵盖飞行员、地勤人员以及中方人员，亦包括中央飞机制造厂的对接部门。细化和填补研究美国志愿队筹建问题中的前人所忽视的细节——包括志愿队计划提出的交涉情形，招募团队构成与过程，物资困难等具体问题。在中国空军美国志愿队组建过程中，英国也扮演了支持的角色，这是过去研究中所忽略的，也是本研究的重要内容。</p> <p>二、研究史料的突破。本研究深挖史料，收集并运用中英文各方档案文献，以提供坚实的基础。作者因访学美国之便，得以获取若干有关飞虎队的第一手史料。主要包括美国斯坦福大学胡佛档案馆藏“陈纳德资料”、“居里资料”、“史迪威资料”、“宋子文资料”、“孔祥熙资料”、“中国国防供应公司资料”，哥伦比亚大学藏“飞虎队口述史资料”以及美国国家档案馆、罗斯福图书馆所收藏的电子档案，同时也搜集了英国国家档案馆藏《英国外交部档案：中国，1919—1980》与大英图书馆缅甸事务部资料。本研究尽量结合运用英文史料与中文资料。在各自语言学界中，这些材料绝非新颖，但两相结合的研究尚属少见。本研究运用“陈纳德资料”等英文“旧史料”，结合中国第二历史档案馆、台北“国史馆”等所挖掘中文“新史料”，力求能重新思考既有的历史问题，检验旧说，更进一步产生新的观点。</p> <p>三、研究的学术价值。细化美国志愿队组建问题的研究，有助于更好地认知组织细节与计划全貌。在抗日战争史与中美关系史的大背景下，历史学者关注如何打败日本，盟国如何战略合作这样的大方向上的问题，美国志愿队只是一个注脚。而本研究将视野聚焦到“志愿队计划是什么”、“如何实现计划”、“实现得怎么样”，就能将研究视野下移，在盟国军事合作细节上，提供更多的历史价值与借鉴意义。长期以来，飞虎队的通俗作品层出不穷，然多为“新瓶装旧酒”，英雄主义叙事浓烈。本研究以整体研究的视角，为抗战通俗作品提供新的视角与借鉴，打破英雄主义与集体主义叙事的矛盾。陈纳德与飞虎队的研究，现阶段仍作为特殊的二战“符号”，长久以来有着极大的魅力，逐步演变成官方叙事模式下的“战时神话”。其背后所寓含中美战时友谊的基本论调，亦成为美国对华援助的“光辉形象”。重构和解析这个“神话”，并且探讨其与中美关系的起伏关系，为“飞虎队”找到合适的历史定位。</p>				

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3	《“权宜之计”：美国援华志愿航空队之改编》	《抗日战争研究》	2019.03	1/1/0	是	CSSCI (本文被知网双语数据库 全文翻译收录)	4	第六章
4	《外国民众对中国抗战的支持（ 1937 — 1941）——以国际宣传处档案为中心》	《民国档案》	2020.08	2/2/1	是	CSSCI	4	第一章
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中国人民伟大的 抗日战争

陈红民 赵晓红 徐亮 钟健 著

抗战为什么赢

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二〇二三年十二月二十日

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战时合作的“中间人”： 中国战区青年译员与美军的相处*

徐 亮

【摘 要】太平洋战争爆发后，中美开展紧密的军事合作，在中国战区大量征调青年译员成为重要一环。译员服务于美军的工作特殊性，使美方可影响到译员的待遇水平；但译员也面临地位不明、管理混乱以及职责不清等诸多问题。中美之间在文化与体制上的“隔阂”，使译员与美军的相处存有冲突。国民政府既要防止译员成为美方的工具，同时也要保障译员的“人格”以维护中国之“国格”。作为战时合作的“中间人”，盟军机制里的中国青年译员是中国近代史上最独特的翻译群体，同时也体现了战时青年参与抗战的重要形式。

【关键词】译员；抗日战争；中美军事合作；战时青年

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太平洋战争爆发后，随着中国加入世界反法西斯同盟，中国战场的盟军人数剧增，在沟通、训练、协同作战等方面，需要大批翻译人员。早在美国援华志愿航空队筹备与训练期间，国民政府即着手培训大量翻译人员。蒋介石对此极为重视，把“美志愿队翻译员之准备”列为要务^①，并提出“招考译员”的要求^②。军事委员会先后成立“军事委员会战地服务团干部训练班”和“军事委员会外事局译员训练班”，至1945年，全国陆续征调译员近5000人。

对于译员在抗日战争中的活动，经历者回忆性文章较多。有关译员的研究主要侧重译员对中美军事合作的作用，基本认为青年译员的活动，对盟国之间军事合作有着不容忽视的贡献，是反法西斯同盟胜利不可或缺的因素^③。本文以抗日战争期间中国战区美军中的青年译员为对象，从中方、美方以及译员群体互动关系切入，重点探讨其在与美军相处时的多重身份与特殊性。在盟军因素介入下，中方与译员群体的管理与待遇问题，呈现出复杂性。关注译员群体与美方相处时的“隔阂”与“冲突”，以及中国政府的应对与努力。将中方、美方以及译员群体三方关系予以清晰全面的梳理，才能对战时译员群体的特殊性有更深刻的思考与探究。

一 合作之利：译员待遇的盟军因素

作为战时中美合作的关键一环，译员服务期间的待遇，因时而异。早期为鼓励在校青年争当译员的积极性，“工资待遇定得比较高……比普通军政人员高出许多”^④。尤其为飞虎队培养的译员薪水

* 基金项目：国家社会科学基金重大项目“蒋介石资料数据库建设”（15ZDB048）。

① 《蒋介石日记》（手稿本），1941年6月15日。斯坦福大学胡佛档案馆藏（下同）

② 抗战期间，“译员”有多种称呼，包括“译官”“翻译官”等，本文统一用“译员”以概之。

③ 闻黎明：《关于西南联合大学战时从军运动的考察》，《抗日战争研究》2010年第3期，第5~18页；左平：《抗战时期盟军中的中国译员》，《社会科学研究》2013年第1期，第167~172页；廖七一：《抗战时期重庆翻译研究》，天津：南开大学出版社2015年版，第175~194页；魏善玲：《抗战后翻译官出国留学的波折与示鉴》，《山东大学学报》2017年第5期，第134~140页；肖志兵、孙芳：《抗战时期中国翻译官的身份与角色》，《外国语文》2018年第5期，第120~126页。

④ 言乃克：《翻译官训练班二三事》，中国人民政治协商会议湖南省株洲市郊区委员会文史资料研究委员会编：《株郊文史》第1辑，株洲：株洲市郊区文化局1989年版，第100页。

非常高,“赚的工资又比大学教授还高”^①,不少人因高薪而充任译员。随着征调译员规模扩大,其薪资相对物价上涨水平,便大幅下降。战地服务团译训班第五届译员征调办法规定:“学员毕业后之薪给,依受训时之成绩,暂定为国币一百四十元至二百元,其他津贴悉依照所属或服务机关之津贴规定。”^②1943年“通译官共分四个等级:自同中尉到同中校,月薪450到750元”,“连津贴在内每月约5千元”^③。因通货膨胀急剧恶化,1945年3月译员待遇已经“膨胀”到“一级月支一万五千元,二级一万三千元,三级一万一千元,四级九千元,五级八千元”^④。译员们犹叫苦不堪,常有“领到了补发的半年工资,因通货膨胀,已所得无几”的情形^⑤。然而与战前的翻译人员以及战时其他军政人员相比,青年译员一个显著特点,便是其待遇深受盟军合作之利。

1943年年初,军委会驻滇干训团步兵总队译员表示昆明物价高昂以致生活维艰,认为目前每月仅七八百元所得,不堪维持最低生活^⑥。译员们要求提高待遇,认为“履履不堪以理,发肤不得以洁,狼狽从公,与外人相较,虽明知有碍观瞻而失国体之处,但为经济拮据所限,是固非不知为国求体面”^⑦,意在说明提升译员个人形象,可维护国人在外邦之印象。与美方自雇人员相比,译员们指出“华德士准将所雇之翻译王某月薪六千元(美金一百元),即办公室之一打字员许某月薪亦有四千一百卅元(美金七十元)(四月份)”,而译员每日工作八小时,甚至有时九小时或十小时,待遇太低,影响积极性^⑧。但在外事局看来,译员每月所得有一千多元,“较一般军职人员待遇,已属优异”,维持最低生活应当困难不大,指出“国家抗战六年,财政艰难,个人生活应力求节约”,对其“最低”生活费的“高昂”予以批评,甚至表示“倘有不守纪律故意捣乱者”,采取“从严法办”^⑨。

此时美方人员对译员待遇的意见给外事局带来了极大压力,美国驻中缅印军总部褒恩上校来函指出:“虽明知不便提高各译员之薪饷,然因鉴于事实上确有改善彼等待遇之必要……如彼等因生活不能安定,对于现状表示不满,势必难望彼等负起此整日繁重之任务……按照现行彼等薪饷标准,彼等所入实较该地一班苦力之收入为低”^⑩。译员的薪水收入,尚比不上当地普通的劳工收入,这给了外事局“似未便再事搁置”的理由,政府部门处理时间效率如果太低,恐“外人有不信任中国政府之事实与言论”^⑪。于是外事局局长商震即向军政部何应钦致函,请求“津贴各该员伙食费每人每月国币一千元以资救济”,“切实解决译员生活困难及不负美方之殷切期望”^⑫。

作为国际反法西斯战争的重要战场,中国战区的青年译员,除在国内与盟军合作外,更有派驻印度参与中国远征军驻印部队的工作,其待遇稍高于国内。以1943年为例,“翻译人员……现定分为五级,一级翻译月支国币薪俸300元,余各递减50元。在印另给印币津贴一级月支120卢比,余各递减10卢比。”^⑬在译员待遇一节上,因其与盟军相处,多了一些便利。驻扎印度的译员在要求提升待遇时,便讲到“因与美军终日相处,为联络感情不免酬应”,“职等俱身受高等教育,匪不知国家财政之艰难,惟以服务有关国军训练,联络中美两国感情,责任綦重,似此终日惶惶,将来难免貽误”。^⑭早在大规模征调译员前,蒋介石就曾指示对各国顾问译员,“略加津贴并制衣费,对于其生活与服装如夜餐、

① 许渊冲:《追忆逝水年华》,北京:外语教学与研究出版社2011年版,第214页。

② 《军事委员会战地服务团征调大学生充任外籍军事译员及招待办法》,四川大学档案馆藏,国立四川大学2872卷,第77页。转引自左平:《抗战时期盟军中的中国译员》,《社会科学研究》2013年第1期,第170页。

③⑤ 杨毓骧:《二战中印缅战场中国译员》,昆明:云南飞虎队研究会2008年印制,第3、193页。

④ 《译员待遇标准,外事局新厘定》,《新新新闻》,1945年3月29日,第5版。

⑥ 《军委会驻滇干训团步兵总队全体译员报告》(1943年5月11日),中国第二历史档案馆藏,档号:七六三-76-28。译员们以当时昆明物价为标准,列出每月最低生活费用表,总费用达4250元。

⑦⑧⑪ 《炮训班全体译员之报告》(1943年5月11日),中国第二历史档案馆藏,档号:七六三-76-22。

⑨ 《外事局局长商震为步兵总队译员请改善待遇一案批示》(1943年5月20日),中国第二历史档案馆藏,档号:七六三-76-26。

⑩ 《美国驻中缅印军总部褒恩上校一九四三年四月十二日来函译文:请改善驻昆译述人员薪津待遇案》(1943年4月12日),中国第二历史档案馆藏,档号:七六三-76-36。

⑫ 《外事局为驻昆译员生活困难拟津贴伙食费每人每月一千元可否呈请核示》(1943年5月3日),中国第二历史档案馆藏,档号:七六三-76-32。

⑬ 《军政部致外事局核定遣印翻译人员及炮兵军官待遇由》(1943年2月19日),中国第二历史档案馆藏,档号:七六三-76-6。

⑭ 《派印全体译员1943年11月4日报告》(1943年11月4日),中国第二历史档案馆藏,档号:七六三-76-46。

礼服等约须与其他顾问相等，不失国体也”^①。在后续译员待遇调整中，蒋介石也指出“其待遇不妨酌予提高”，“可另给津贴，使绝对防止其向外员索取津贴之事”^②。外事局更将“绝对禁止接受外员津贴”列入管理条例^③。如是观之，美方对译员待遇的提升有着积极之影响。

战时国民政府的经济因局势而不断恶化，加以通货膨胀对物价的影响，使战时众多公职岗位的待遇低问题成为难以消弭的“顽疾”。译员群体虽屡为待遇问题而发声，但因其与美军相处交往的相对“优势”，使其待遇相较于战时中国的公职群体，实属较优之行列。

二 相处之弊：译员的管理问题与身份矛盾

译员身为中美合作的“中间人”，其管理体系并不稳定。译员经专门培训结业后，其分配地区及比例，需要根据美军所列数字，“审酌缓急情形，予以适当分派”，除了留在重庆、昆明等地训练班与军事学校的译员，大多数是随军行动的译员，“常由美方先行办理，事后通知外事局登记备案”^④。由于战事的进展，美军各分队频繁调动，外事局难以实时得知所属译员位置。至1944年年底，译员人数剧增，为统驭督导起见，外事局决定在美军各机关派遣高级人员，连同擅长汉语的美籍联络员，就地负责处理各该区分之译员事务，“其下并视实际情况，编组若干小队，以军校毕业而工作良好之译员充任领队，期其层层负责，便捷处理”^⑤。

管理上的问题，亦给译员的薪金发放带来麻烦。以在云南省服务的译员为例，昆明办事处对随美军工作的译员行动失去掌握，难以及时发饷。“由于部队的流动性大，普通有迟到三四月以后才到手的，最快也要在一个月以后。”^⑥这样，在译员薪金发放的管理上，“监守自盗”、“冒领”他人薪金的案件亦不鲜见。为解决此类问题，译员的薪饷先由所在美军单位按月发给，“派在国内盟军服务者，伙食与盟军一律先由盟方负责供应，按月向我方总结算清还”，由外事局“于每月初领给总数，交盟方高级司令部具领，月终按实有人数结算发给”^⑦。

译员身份的另一重矛盾，便是其职责划分不清晰。盟军协同作战中，相互沟通是最重要的一环，而译员却不时肩负翻译以外的多项任务。前线译员与美军士兵相处，当对职责的认知有所偏差，矛盾冲突便时有发生。保山地区盟军译员曾集体上书，认为“译员为我政府之官吏，并非美方雇佣之侍役。职等除工作重要外，实代表国家之令誉。奈何于正当之职守外，复遭非理之虐待，压迫，诟骂以至于驱逐”^⑧。其中列举下述各例：1.廿一野战医院之译员柳克裕除繁重工作外，时受虐待、辱骂，并有数次不予饮食。2.配属第二军之译员出于无奈，自行背负盐、米、被服，徒步只身而回。3.译员赵某派在惠通桥附近供应站工作，被迫为美兵洗衣，因不从而被遣回。4.译员严克成在惠通桥附近被美兵迫令搬运货物，因不从而被遣回。5.译员吴存亚在火线上被迫与美兵一同站岗护卫美军官，不服从亦被驱回^⑨。以上事实表明，译员因职责不清而受到美方过分对待，也是战时译员生活的重要矛盾所在。

在管理层面，美军官兵有无处置中国译员之权力成为相当尖锐的问题。译员蔡祖康，本在昆明炮兵训练班汽车组任职。1943年9月，美方参谋处调赴滇西顺宁等地，蔡随领队爱克斯上尉等四人任翻译工作。因临时通知，蔡仓促起程，临行身无分文。9月10日，在云南某山区中，美军需要架设无线电，领队命蔡祖康过河架线，蔡却认为该河既深又阔，不能越过便返回队中。美军领队即认为蔡不配合工作，令其离队。蔡祖康认为该领队一时误会，并明知蔡“囊空如洗，有意出言恐吓，于是寻言解

① 《蒋中正电示徐永昌对各国总顾问译员略加津贴及制衣费》（1939年7月11日），台北“国史馆”藏，“蒋中正总统文物”，档号：002-010300-00025-009。

② 《蒋中正电商震等研拟译员统一训练与提高待遇津贴方案》（1943年8月24日），台北“国史馆”藏，“蒋中正总统文物”，档号：002-070200-00019-009。

③ 《外事局商震呈译员整理案》（1943年9月30日），中国第二历史档案馆藏，档号：七六三-76-42。

④ 《军事委员会外事局译员征集训练及分配考核的工作报告》（1944年10月18日），中国第二历史档案馆藏，档号：七六三-33-2。

⑤ 《军事委员会外事局译员分配及管理办法》（1944年12月24日），中国第二历史档案馆藏，档号：七六三-31-10。

⑥ 又新：《译员生活》，《中学生》第86期，1945年，第46~48页。

⑦ 《军事委员会外事局调整译员待遇暂行办法》（1945年1月1日起施行），中国第二历史档案馆藏，档号：七六三-442-58。

⑧⑨ 《保山全体译员报告书》（1944年7月21日），中国第二历史档案馆藏，档号：七六三-61-22。

释，却始终无分辩之余地”。当时美军就将蔡祖康弃于荒野，进退无路，在行商帮助下，蔡方才脱险^①。对于此事，经过蔡向中国管理当局申诉。

而美军认为蔡祖康报告“与事实不符”，爱格斯少校在报告中多予反驳^②。美国陆军办事处窦恩上校向中方施压，认为译员蔡祖康不服从命令，请求予以严办，甚至执行枪决。昆明办事处姚楷认为此案事关军法，必须先请示候办。窦恩上校坚决表示应即将蔡祖康送入监狱惩处。姚楷便回应可暂行拘押，报局核办后再审判定罪。窦恩上校回应“纸上空谈，无济于事，每次潜逃之译员，只见信件往返，而无任何处分”，仍坚持请将蔡即行送入监狱或就地枪决^③。在美方坚持下，昆明办事处在1943年10月16日关押蔡祖康。此事传出，昆明炮兵全体译员群情激奋，集体上书，声称“然考事实，则美方所称各节当讹，而蔡君之蒙屈受罚，实无可讳言也”，“职等为蔡君深感不平，且推及己身，亦不寒而栗，盖是间美方仍直接派遣译员赴各地，现待出发者，颇有人在，如史上校言在印有为洋人枪杀野外归报失踪之译员，今不论是种传说，而仅就蔡君所遇言，则职等派随外出险途中之太无保障，当非杞人之忧”^④。

在姚楷与译员的声援下，外事局做出下述判断：“(1)依印度办事处所订之章法，向美总部交涉。(2)本案似应向美总部力争，此后不应再有同样事件发生。(3)商订美教官负责办法纵有口角不许虐待。(4)昆明办事处以后必须有相当之准备金，如译员急于出发并须派人送款备用。”外事局并且认为，应取消昆明办事处与美方所订规定，美教官无权处罚与禁闭译员^⑤。但美军总部坚持认为蔡违抗军命^⑥，该报告以史迪威名义发出，对此中方最终由外事局商震下令将蔡祖康免职，此事终落帷幕^⑦。因译员“弃职潜逃”事例渐多，史迪威提出译员“逃亡酌量情形，如非重大，可否就近授权本部法办”^⑧，最终未被中方采纳。

译员身处在美军与中方之间，管理混乱，有时身份得不到保证。译员何宗义就因美军及昆明办事处先后排斥被迫自杀。何宗义赴前线工作，在1944年7月初突然被美方遣回，即到昆明请求重新分派工作。昆明办事处主任戴昭然“不问来由，即横加辱骂，继则即予禁闭”。何宗义悲愤失望，便在禁闭室内选择自杀。而戴昭然封闭消息，告诫在处职员不可外传，并令来访新闻记者不得发表。译员们指“戴主任平日对译员之态度有如狱吏之与囚犯，译员有所询问，动辄口出恶言，继以辱骂，倘加申辩，即诬有反动嫌疑，或禁闭或下狱，并以军法从事威胁译员”。延宕译员薪金称为“怕开小差”，译员不能领得食米称为“所领之米不敷”^⑨。最后此事为蒋介石所知，即令“将戴昭然克扣译员薪饷军米一案具报，并依法严拟处分”^{○穿璠}。

与美军合作译员是中国近代史上特殊又庞大的翻译群体，亦是战时军政人员中与美军相处最为密切者。战时除官方身份的译员外，美方亦曾大量自行雇用翻译人员。该群体虽然待遇较好，然在美方眼中的地位甚低。蒋介石曾在日记中提出“美国聘去译员，应改正待遇与军人身份”^{○穿璠}，以统一译员

① 《蔡祖康报告》(1943年10月14日)，中国第二历史档案馆藏，档号：七六三-57-3。

② 《爱格斯少校对译员蔡祖康一案之报告》，《美国驻中缅印军总部一九四三年十二月卅日备忘录》(1943年12月30日)，中国第二历史档案馆藏，档号：七六三-57-1。

③ 《姚楷呈为译员蔡祖康派在前方巡回视察组工作因不服从命令请予严办等由》(1943年10月20日)，中国第二历史档案馆藏，档号：七六三-57-2。

④ 《昆明炮兵队全体译员呈为美方驻昆负责人窦恩上校无理扣押译员蔡祖康恳请迅予秉公伸白事》(1943年10月31日)，中国第二历史档案馆藏，档号：七六三-57-4。

⑤ 《国民政府军事委员会外事局昆明办事处为呈核译员蔡祖康报告一件由》(1943年10月21日)，中国第二历史档案馆藏，档号：七六三-57-3。

⑥ 《史迪威致商震关于译员蔡祖康被美军虐待乙案之覆文》(1943年12月30日)，中国第二历史档案馆藏，档号：七六三-57-1。

⑦ 《外事局局长商震令三级译员蔡祖康该员着即免职》(1944年1月17日)，中国第二历史档案馆藏，档号：七六三-57-5。

⑧ 《史迪威电蒋中正谓潜逃译员潘志良情节若非重大可否就近授权该部法办》(1944年3月25日)，台北“国史馆”藏，“蒋中正总统文物”，档号：002-090105-00009-080。

⑨ 《陶正一致外事局为译员何宗义被迫自杀恳予调查真相依法惩究而保障人命由》(1944年10月26日)，中国第二历史档案馆藏，档号：七六三-59-2。

○穿璠 《蒋中正谕何浩若请将戴昭然克扣译员薪饷军米一案具报并依法严拟处分办法》(1944年11月17日)，台北“国史馆”藏，“蒋中正总统文物”，档号：002-060100-00194-017。

○穿璠 《蒋介石日记》(手稿本)，1945年6月18日。

的管理,加强其训练。战时临时体制下,译员管理体系始终处于不稳定的状态,这也不可避免地导致其在与盟军相处时产生冲突与矛盾。

三 “人格”与“国格”:译员与美军的相处

抗战之前,中国的翻译人员,地位低微,被认为“几乎所有译者都有可能是叛逆者——政治上的叛逆者,通番卖国、勾结外夷”,这使得翻译人员常受猜疑^①。中国战区的成立,意味着中国近代史上第一次与外国结成“平等”的盟友关系,但译员的身份未必得到合作双方的“平等”认识。中西文化的“隔阂”根深蒂固,而中国在国际上“积弱”已久,美国官兵在无形中显露出自身的优越感及对中方人员的“偏见”。部分译员回忆指出,当时译员与美军士兵冲突的重要原因,便是两种文化与两个时代间的鸿沟所导致的^②。围绕着“人格”与“国格”,译员与盟军相处中呈现出多个面向,译员的“人格”既需要保护,也需要提升。

1. 译员“人格”与美军相处时的矛盾

1945年5月,军事委员会外事局昆明办事处炮训班译员,曾因周末往市区的交通车问题,引发一场罢工风潮。该处译员,每周日都有三辆车的名额前往市区休息。5月11日,美方通告本周日只能派车一辆。中方译员邓队长宣布以抽签办法为确定人选。全体译员得悉后提出质问。邓队长无法应付,只好请译员自行选派代表与美方交涉。美方柯文德上校向译员解释,起初还只是说为“车少人多不敷分配”,进而忽言:“(1)炮兵训练处没有译官,吾等仍可照常上课;(2)中国经济已将崩溃,若无美国帮助早已崩溃;(3)现在你们这班译官危害中国,比日本危害中国更甚;(4)如果你们不与我们合作,我可以制止炮兵一切器材入口供给;(5)现在你们所有一切装备都是我们美国发给的。”在译员们听来,以上数语,不仅侮辱译员“人格”,更是侮辱中国形象,群愤激起,提议一面罢工,一面请示上峰后再行复工^③。

昆明办事处对此次事件分析指出,该处译员“平常言行不检,礼貌不周,纪律不严肃,工作不负责,且又骄傲,因此引起美方官员对译员印象不良”,这次事件的主因是“美方少派交通车,引起译官不明大义,纯以自私享受为动机,向美方无理争论,遂引动美官员之怨言而刺击译官羞恶之心”。按照昆明办事处的指示,译员应“激发爱国情绪,励勉努力工作”,“生活修养做人处世,应本牺牲个人以国家利益为前提与盟军合作,不可因私人享受而影响合作情感”。而对于美方柯文德上校上列五项言语的解释及意见,柯文德解释其五项说话时均加以“假若”二字,并承认后悔此言^④。最终中方认为对于译员平时言行礼貌纪律应设法予以纠察,即所谓“自尊自重,方能被人尊重,否则以自尊自大且自暴自弃,又何敷他人之尊敬”。对于美方官员向译员发言,应函请美方慎重,“以勿刺击译官羞恶之心”^⑤。

除待遇不周外,中方驻印度兰伽地区的译员施祖荫,因“怠工”而被美国一名上尉军官殴打,当地全体译员群情激奋发起罢工。外事局叶南在报告中指出,他与美方马克樸将军商议解决“殴打施案”。该将军称如确有明证,对肇事上尉自当予以惩处。然而译员们并不满意,有“少数捣乱生事份子召集开会,并强迫各同事签字,不签字则以武力对待,结果签名者卅八人”,即派代表往见马克樸,对“施案”提出“为何延不解决”之质问。马克樸相当不悦,严词相拒,译员即提出“限期解决施案,否则举行罢工”。马克樸向译员“列举尚无结果原因及美国法律之根据,同时表示一向对译员甚优待,但如译员不自爱擅行罢工破坏工作,则只有请示重庆以及华盛顿最高当局”。叶南闻知此事,赶回镇压,向马克樸表示歉意,同意将主动分子加以处分^⑥。“施案”交军事法庭处理,而美方最终称肇事上尉是神经错

① 王宏志:《“叛逆”的译者:中国近代翻译史上所见统治者对翻译的焦虑》,台湾《翻译学研究集刊》2010年第13辑,第1~55页。

② 陆以正:《微臣无力可回天——陆以正的外交生涯》,台北:天下远见出版股份有限公司2002年版,第54页。

③ 《美训处炮训班译官鼓动风潮之罢工原因》(1945年5月),中国第二历史档案馆藏,档号:七六三-58-76。

④ 《美训处炮训班译官鼓动风潮事件之判断》(1945年5月),中国第二历史档案馆藏,档号:七六三-58-76。

⑤ 《外事局昆明办事处为呈报处办美训处炮训班译官鼓动风潮事请鉴核由》(1945年6月1日),中国第二历史档案馆藏,档号:七六三-58-76。

⑥ 《叶南呈外事局函》(1943年6月10日),中国第二历史档案馆藏,档号:七六三-51-6。

乱，希予谅解，最终以道歉了事^①。

由此可见，处理译员与美方关系，一直是中方要考虑的问题。本着精诚合作的态度，中方尽量“谦让”于盟友，在大部分译员事件中，中方多以安抚译员，处理“过激分子”，而向美方表示歉意。但正如译员代表“国家与民族形象”，其“人格”之捍卫，亦是维护“国格”。而中美在综合国力上的差异，使得中方很难以强硬态度，只能“大事化小”以解决。

2. 译员本身素质与国家形象

随着抗战后期译员征调数量的不断增加，译员本身的素质如不能保证，也影响着国人在外邦面前的形象。驻印度的译员，身处异国他乡，蒋介石就曾向外事局严正通令“据报驻印兰加翻译人员赌风甚盛，各翻译人员宿舍雀牌扑克时有所闻，足予外人不良印象等情，特电严禁为要”^②。

译员的管理不够严格，其服务所在部队长官无权约束，如不加引导，则青年译员亦有不良之行径。曾有报告指出“(1) 服务第八师之美军官兵行为过于浪漫，每日翻译官作向导，昼夜嫖娼，且有以金钱引诱强迫民女陪宿之事发生，翻译官无知自尊自大任意暴露国家弱点，导引美军相为，民众对此极表愤懑，无法制裁至为可虑；(2) 服务美方之我翻译人员，有少数人行为浪漫，妄自尊大，任意暴露国家弱点，不知将优点向美军官兵宣扬，亟应有设法纠正之必要”^③。对此，军委会外事局决定，除了通令各译员应束身自爱不得有亵荡浪漫之行为外，各译员服务单位之主官及美籍联络人员，有权管理其生活行动^④。抗战尾声之际，盟军深入中国内地，译员常常成为盟军官兵在中国活动的“向导”，某种程度上为国民政府所担忧。有地方向国民政府汇报称，某译员带着盟军士兵任意拍照，当地“各种陋恶习俗（如小脚妇女、迎神、褴褛乞丐等）不一而足”，如果“任盟友任意拍照，实有伤国体，若不从严取缔，影响国家尊严甚大”^⑤。因而决定：1. 通令全国各宪军警机关对于翻译人员引导盟军人员破坏法权事项严加取缔查禁。2. 于译员训练课程中加入政治外事警察常识^⑥。

译员介于中国与盟军之间的特殊身份，加上平时管理上的困难，使得译员本身的“人格”平等与中国国际形象之维护，成为译员培训与工作期间的重点。1943年4月19日，陈诚便曾代表国民政府“集合译员讲话，勉以注意国格及人格”^⑦。抗战后期美军驻华司令魏德迈则曾在译员训练班讲话时指出，“由于人类有着一些共同的不可避免的弱点，间或在某种情况之下，会使一些疑惑、不满，以及其他有毒的烟雾存在，会使两大民族间不幸的事情中途发生”，因此需要中美双方携手去解决这些问题^⑧。

蒋介石在译员训练班成立之初便非常重视，不时前往译员训练班训话点名，甚至出席毕业典礼^⑨。蒋对译员在中方与盟军之间的定位，提出其个人之期望，指出“译员既然担负了国军和盟军的联络责任”，一方面要将中方的优点与习性介绍于盟军，“使他们能够尊敬我们国家，信赖我们军队”；同时“又必须将盟国官兵生活、行动、精神、思想的特征，切实注意研究，介绍于国军”。此外，蒋还指出译员应趁中美合作之际，“增强盟邦对于国军的信赖，要使我们中国与盟邦的合作，圆满无间”，“更进一步来作东西文化与思想的媒介”^⑩。蒋介石指出，译员的工作，绝不是曾经的“翻译”或“通事”，单纯

① 《戴笠报告，情渝零八九号》（1943年6月15日），中国第二历史档案馆藏，档号：七六三-51-6。

② 《国民政府军事委员会据报驻印兰加翻译人员赌风甚盛仰速严禁》（1944年4月29日），中国第二历史档案馆藏，档号：七六三-31-52。

③ 《国民政府军事委员会政治部抄送第八师美军官兵及我翻译人员不法行为情报》（1945年6月5日），中国第二历史档案馆藏，档号：七六三-31-90。

④ 《外事局拟办第八师美军官兵及我翻译人员不法行为》（1945年6月5日），中国第二历史档案馆藏，档号：七六三-31-90。

⑤ 《宪兵司令部呈为取缔盟军翻译人员破坏国家法权特建议三项》（1945年10月20日），中国第二历史档案馆藏，档号：七六三-31-112。

⑥ 《外事局拟复“取缔盟军翻译人员破坏国家法权特建议三项”》（1945年10月27日），中国第二历史档案馆藏，档号：七六三-31-111。

⑦ 陈诚：《陈诚回忆录——抗日战争》，北京：东方出版社2009年版，第353页。

⑧ 陈白水：《外事一例：最近魏德迈将军在译员训练班》，《外事评论》1945年创刊号，第20~21页。

⑨ 蒋在日记中多次将此列为要事而记之，可见其个人对此之重视[详见《蒋介石日记》（手稿本），1944年3月5日、8日、11日、19日，1945年3月25日，1945年4月2日，1945年7月5日]。

⑩ 陈白水：《军队译员之使命》，秦孝仪编：《“总统”蒋公思想言论总集》卷二十一“演讲”，台北：“中央”文物供应社1984年版，第56~60、60页。

的作语言文字的传译，成为依赖外国人的附属品^②。当译员因文化隔阂与国家地位而受到美方的不正当对待时，保障译员的“人格”，即是维护“国格”。而同时，如果译员处处卑躬屈膝，为盟军“无差别服务”，同样也是自毁“国家形象”，其纪律与行为也受到国民政府之约束。

四 结 语

译员群体从军，是全民族抗战的重要内容；而译员作为战时合作的“中间人”，也是中美军事合作的友好见证。在与盟军相处的特殊背景下，译员的待遇与身份地位，有着特殊性与矛盾性。中方、美方以及译员群体，在军事合作中形成微妙的三角关系。处在中方与美方之间，译员对战时合作的贡献有目共睹。在中方与译员群体的关系中，美方因素使得译员在待遇问题上存有“互动”之利，但也因美军的流动性，使中方对译员的管理存有不周乃至“混乱”处。而在美方与译员群体的相处中，双方不仅在地位上有着不平等，且因文化之“隔阂”，于日常生活中时有冲突。中方则一方面需要在盟友前维护译员“人格”，另一方面也需要提升译员自身素质，以保证国家形象。

译员是战时青年参与抗战的重要形式^③。透过其与盟军相处，可知战时青年的复杂性。译员的“人格”如得不到保证，身份地位得不到盟友的尊重，则青年因爱国热情奋发，必将导致与盟军相处时的冲突与矛盾。然而，亦有部分译员，为利益所驱使，与盟友“过于靠近”；或是畏惧前线而“弃职潜逃”。这些不良印象，也会使得中国国家形象受损。回顾战时规模浩大的译员群体，在肯定其为中美军事合作的积极作用之余，也应正视其与盟友相处时的“利”与“弊”。此外，通过译员在与盟军相处时的生活状态，可从中下层视角，更全面地了解战时从军群体的历史面貌，以及丰富盟国合作的细节与经验，值得学界进一步探讨。

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“Intermediaries” in the Wartime Cooperation: The Interactions Between Young Interpreters and the U.S. Troops in the China Theatre

Xu Liang

Abstract: After the outbreak of the Pacific War, China and the United States carried out close military cooperation, and a large number of young interpreters were recruited as an important part of this cooperation. The special nature of the interpreters' service to the U.S. troops allowed the U.S. to be able to influence the interpreters' salary, but interpreters also faced the problems of ambiguous status, disorganized management and unclear responsibilities. Cultural and institutional barriers between the Allies engendered conflicts between the interpreters and the U.S. troops. The Nationalist government managed not only to prevent the interpreters from becoming the tool of the United States, but also to protect the "personal dignity" of the interpreters so as to safeguard the "national dignity" of China. As the "intermediary" of wartime cooperation, the young interpreters of the Allies are the most unique translation group in modern Chinese history. They also reflect the important form of wartime youth's participation in the war of resistance.

Keywords: Interpreters; War of Resistance Against Japan; China-US Military Cooperation; Youth in Wartime

【责任编辑 翁有为】

③ 西南联大在汇报知识青年从军时，在计算人数时，将“空军人员”“译员”列于普通“青年军”之前，足见译员的优先度与重要性。参见《西南联大征委会电复联大合格青年人数简历统计》（1945年2月19日），中国第二历史档案馆藏，档号：七八一-128-18。



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“权宜之计”：美国援华志愿航空队之改编

徐 亮

内容提要 太平洋战争爆发后，美国援华志愿航空队在人员补充与武器补给上面临困难，有改编之必要。改编过程中，陈纳德的军衔与指挥权问题成为中美协商的焦点。中方对陈纳德的信任，使马格鲁德谋求指挥权的提案未能通过；为了获得美方更多的援助与支持，最终由毕塞尔担当驻华美国空军的负责人。美方对志愿队纪律与个人意愿的忽视，使志愿队队员改编的结果并不如意；而对中缅战场后续空军的调动，使志愿队改编后的空中力量不增反减。作为“权宜之计”，志愿队改编使中方得以减轻相应的财政负担，而美方则以相对小的人员与武备在中缅战场实现军事部署。纵观整个改编过程，中方高层、美国军方以及陈纳德之间的互动影响了之后中美军事合作的走向。

关键词 援华志愿航空队 中美空军合作 陈纳德 蒋介石

1941年12月7日，日本偷袭珍珠港，太平洋战争拉开帷幕，中国正式与美国并肩作战。相较于政治、经济的联系与合作，抗战后期中美两国军事合作显得尤为直接和突出。击败日本军队以取得战争胜利，是两国利益最大的交集，是构建和推动双方关系的基础和动力。

中美空军合作是双方军事合作最直接的一环。^① 合作包括联合指挥、协同作战、情报搜集、部队整训、后勤供给等多方面，目标是打破日军的空中封锁，逐步赢得战场制空权。现有的研究成果中，对美国驻华空军“飞虎队”的研究最为突出，描述性的通俗作品层出不穷，但严谨的学术研究尚显单薄，且以美方学者所著传记居多。^② 大部分的著作与文章，常以“飞虎队”一词概称由陈纳德（Claire Lee Chennault）统率的美国援华空军。以时段而论，陈纳德率领的空军分为三个不同的阶段：美国援华志愿航空队（1941—1942.7，以下简称为“志愿队”）、美国驻华空军特遣队（1942.7—1943.7）、美国陆军第十四航空队（1943.7—1945）。第一阶段隶属于中国空军，后两阶段方属于美

^① 据学者研究，抗战期间驻华美军最多时达10万人以上，但主要是航空作战部队与空运部队。参见阮家新《抗战时期驻华美军部署及作战概况》，《抗日战争研究》2007年第3期。

^② 陈纳德本人在二战结束后不久，于1949年出版过一本自传与回忆录性质的书，即 Claire L. Chennault, *Way of a Fighter* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Son, 1949)。相关传记主要有 Martha Byrd, *Chennault, Giving Wings to the Tiger* (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1987); Jack Samson, *The Flying Tigers: The True Story of General Claire Chennault and the U. S. 14th Air Force in China* (New York: Doubleday, 1987); Daniel Ford, *Flying Tigers: Claire Chennault and the American Volunteer Group* (Washington and London: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1991); Wanda Cornelius and Thayne R. Short, *Ding hao, America's Air War in China, 1937 - 1945* (Gretna: Pelican Publishing Company, 1980); Sam Kleiner, *The Flying Tigers: The Untold Story of the American Pilots Who Waged a Secret War against Japan* (New York: Viking, 2018); 等。

军序列。前后性质的差异与变化,体现了中美战时军事援助与合作关系的演变过程。

志愿队的建立酝酿于1940年底,1941年8月正式建队。由于飞机装备运输以及人员训练等工作耗费时日,直至太平洋战争爆发之前,志愿队并未执行作战任务。1941年12月20日,志愿队在昆明上空打响首战,随后以优异战绩在大洋两岸赢得“飞虎队”的美名。1942年7月4日,志愿队被改编为美国陆军第十航空队第二十三战斗机大队,实际存在与参与战斗的时间尚不足一年。

志愿队从中国空军编制改为美军编制,对于中美军事合作(尤其是空军合作)有着重要的意义。目前学术界研究志愿队建立的著述较为详细,但对其改编问题,尚无专文研究。^①对于改编的过程与结果,有美国学者的评价较为负面,认为改编给志愿队造成的问题,比日本人对志愿队的威胁还大。^②另有学者认为,因为志愿队队员不愿继续留在中国,而使得志愿队被第十航空队所取代。^③因此,考察志愿队改编的背景、经过与结果,显得非常必要。

本文依托美国斯坦福大学胡佛研究院档案馆藏“陈纳德档案”“蒋介石日记”“宋子文档案”“居里文件”,台北“国史馆”藏“蒋介石档案”等,以及中外学者相关研究成果,梳理志愿队改编的全过程,并重点探讨中、美两国高层与志愿队本身(主要是陈纳德)三方对改编的态度与措施,进而探讨中美两国在大战略上的分合,以及对战时中美军事合作的影响,希冀对相关课题的研究有所补益。

一、志愿队改编的提出

欲探求志愿队改编的深因,必先析其本质。一支军队的运转,须依靠人员、武器、后勤等几大要素。从人员要素来讲,志愿队的指挥官为美国退役军人、中国空军顾问陈纳德,其在指挥作战上有很大的自主权,但受中国航空委员会^④节制,听命于蒋介石的最高指挥。从志愿队队员构成来看,无论战斗机作战人员,还是负责维修的地勤人员,都是从美国招募而来,在法律层面上,这些人都是中国中央飞机制造厂的“雇员”,与美国军方“并无关系”。尤其是升空作战的飞行员,有高额薪水与奖金。^⑤

武器装备上,志愿队当时的主要武备为P-40型战斗机(代号“战斧”),由中国政府出资购买,从美国海运至缅甸组装后投入使用。但中方自身没有生产该型战机的能力,只能为战斗机提供维修,此外志愿队的武器零件、弹药与燃油,均有待美国的后续补给援助。

一支部队的日常开支与后勤补给是维持运转的重要部分。虽然中国可利用美方提供的租借资

^① 主要研究论文有顾学稼、姚波《美国在华空军与中国的抗日战争(1941年8月—1945年3月)》,《美国研究》1989年第4期;金光耀:《宋子文与陈纳德和战时美国驻华空军》,王建朗、梁景河主编:《近代中国、东亚与世界》下卷,社会科学文献出版社2008年版;王跃如:《太平洋战争时期的中美空军合作》,硕士学位论文,西北师范大学文史学院,2009年;深町英夫:《奢侈的保镖?——飞虎队的日常生活》,王建朗、梁景河主编:《近代中国:政治与外交》下卷,社会科学文献出版社2010年版;徐飞:《二战期间美国政府对“飞虎队”态度的演变》,硕士学位论文,安徽大学历史系,2014年。

^② Keith Ayling, *Old Leatherface of the Flying Tigers* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1945), p. 166.

^③ Chi-Hsin Kang, *The Military Modernization of China in the War against Japan: Impacts of American Aid and US-China Military Cooperation* (Ph. D. Dissertation, St. John's University, 2015), p. 46.

^④ 中国航空委员会为抗战时期中国空军最高指挥机构,蒋介石任委员长,周至柔担任主任并负责常务工作。

^⑤ 合同规定的条件是,飞行员月薪600美元,中队长750美元,地勤人员不低于250美元,外加每月30美元津贴、差旅费和每年30天带薪休假,免费住宿。击毁一架日本飞机奖励500美元。参见陈香梅《陈纳德与飞虎队》,学林出版社1988年版,第62页。

金获取武器与物资,但所有志愿队的人员开支必须由中方以现金支付。^① 1941年9月初,志愿队组建不久,国民政府存于纽约中国银行的志愿队专用资金便已所剩无几。^② 蒋介石迫切希望能在租借资金内加以解决,他曾致电宋子文称:“美空军志愿队经费可否由租借案内拨发,抑仍须由我国支付?”^③但美国政府避免此时与日本冲突,不愿担负直接指挥派遣之名,宋子文只得回应“该队经费,故不得不仍由我方担任,惟有俟情势发展,再作进一步之办法”。^④

由是可知,对于志愿队本身而言,补给距离过长是其致命软肋。无论招募人员,抑或后续的武器供应,皆需从美国装船海运,远涉重洋,耗费时日,且情况复杂。1941年8月成立的志愿队,原定为第一志愿队。为扩大志愿队的规模,中方积极与美方协商确定第二、第三志愿队的方案。在罗斯福总统的支持下,第二志愿队将有82名轰炸机飞行员和359名地勤人员,且地勤人员已在1941年11月21日从加州出发。^⑤ 计划中第三志愿队是一支战斗机大队,以上两支大队将有269架战斗机与66架轰炸机,实力远超现有的第一志愿队。^⑥ 在英美尚未正式参战之前,英军亦曾计划一个战斗机中队、一个轰炸机中队以“志愿人员”的身份加入美国志愿队,补充其人员与武器上的缺口。^⑦

志愿队运转的隐患还在于美国军方的态度。美国军方起初对志愿队并不赞成,在志愿队组建后,美国陆军参谋长乔治·马歇尔便试图控制志愿队的指挥权。1941年7月15日他曾表示“中国政府应同意美驻华空军代表团的团长将是对美志愿队能否作战的唯一决断人”。^⑧ 尽管中方最终选择陈纳德为指挥官,马歇尔仍在8月30日强调,“(1)志愿队能否作战应由美国军事代表团或另一特别指定的代表团来决定;(2)志愿队应由美国有经验的航空人员指挥和担任”。^⑨ 隶属于中国空军编制的志愿队相对于美国正规军具有一定“独立性”,但在许多方面受限于美国军方。例如陈纳德通过劳克林·居里(Lauchlin Currie)向美国陆军航空队要求增派一些参谋人员到志愿队时,美国陆军航空队司令阿诺德(Henry Harley Arnold)在拒绝之际,对让参谋人员以“平民身份”服务表示保留意见。^⑩

珍珠港事件爆发后,美国正式参战,与中国结为军事同盟,这极大地改变了志愿队的运转情况。鉴于开战后日军在太平洋和东南亚迅速取得优势,美国陆军部估计日军会对美国西海岸产生威胁,一时间风声鹤唳。作为第二志愿队主要装备的轰炸机当时仍在美国加州等待空运,很快就被美军以战争急需的名义抢先征用了。正在前往缅甸途中的两批飞行员也先后被澳大利亚等地的美国驻军紧急征用。^⑪ 此后在美军中征募志愿队队员已完全不可能,这都是以往陈纳德等人没有意料到

① 曹嘉涵:《抗战时期中美租借援助关系》,东方出版中心2015年版,第110页。

② T. V. Soong to R. C. Chen, September 6, 1941, Hoover Institution Archives, T. V. Soong papers, Box 2, folder 2.

③ 《蒋中正电询宋子文中国空军美志愿队经费可否由租借案内拨发抑由中国支付》(1941年11月21日),台北,“国史馆”藏,蒋中正“总统”文物档案,002/020300/00025/010。

④ 《宋子文致蒋介石报告美航空志愿队开支浩大电》(1941年11月22日),吴景平、郭岱君编:《宋子文驻美时期电报选(1940—1943)》,复旦大学出版社2008年版,第132页。

⑤ Daniel Ford, Flying Tigers, Claire Chennault and the American Volunteer Group, p. 94.

⑥ Memorandum from Roosevelt for the Secretary of the Navy, September 30, 1941, Hoover Institution Archives, Lauchlin Bernard Currie papers, Box 2, folder 8.

⑦ Claire L. Chennault, Way of A Fighter, p. 120.

⑧ Jack Samson, The Flying Tigers, p. 91.

⑨ Marshall to Currie, August 30, 1941, Hoover Institution Archives, Lauchlin Bernard Currie papers, Box 2, folder 8.

⑩ Arnold to Currie, December 3, 1941, Hoover Institution Archives, Lauchlin Bernard Currie papers, Box 2, folder 5.

⑪ 当然,美国军方在征召这批志愿队员时,补发其在中国中央飞机制造厂的薪水,直到1941年12月31日。参见 R. W. Bonneville to Currie, December 22, 1941, Hoover Institution Archives, Lauchlin Bernard Currie papers, Box 2, folder 5.

的情况。^① 而英军先前承诺的援助美国志愿队的计划,也随着英国参战而取消。

日本对英美宣战后,整个大洋航线不再安全,由美国本土向缅甸与中国运输物资的难度陡增。此时脱离在美军编制外的志愿队,如同一支“孤军”,如得不到人员补充与武器支援,将会不断的战斗中消耗殆尽。

居里^②是协助组建志愿队并积极活跃于中美两方的重要顾问。1941 年 12 月 8 日,居里向美国总统罗斯福建言将志愿队改编为正规军,向缅甸方面提供物资和人员。^③ 罗斯福于 12 月 9 日要居里向陆军提出改编一事。^④ 在得到军方回应后,居里便在给美国驻重庆的军事代表团团长马格鲁德(John Magruder,也译“麦克鲁德”“麦克罗德”)的电文中指出,改编可使志愿队“获得稳定增长的飞机、补给和人员供应”,“如果仍在陆军编制之外,则达成此目标绝无可能”。^⑤

珍珠港事件前,马格鲁德也曾提议用美国陆军部队加强志愿队,但军方并不支持,直到美国参战一周,马歇尔才正式授权马格鲁德来处理改编一事。^⑥ 马格鲁德立刻于 12 月 12 日在电报中邀请陈纳德及志愿队回归美军编制。^⑦

陈纳德一知改编之事,便致信宋美龄探询蒋介石的看法。陈纳德表示改编可使中方节省金钱,便于加强队伍,亦有利于严格执行纪律。同时他指出美方或将给志愿队指派一名不熟悉中国情况的指挥官。^⑧ 志愿队在 12 月 20 日昆明打响首战,随后又在仰光之战取得优异的战绩。陈纳德建议马格鲁德向美国军方请求飞机、人员以及零件的补充,以保持志愿队的战斗效率。^⑨

由是观之,志愿队改编的初衷,在于解决志愿队在物资与人员补充上的短缺问题,以加强中缅战场的空中力量。然而有关改编后的指挥权问题,却成为影响进程的关键。志愿队指挥官陈纳德的个人因素,以及中方对改编的不同意见,都使志愿队的改编问题复杂化,以致延宕数月,对中美军事合作亦有影响。

二、马格鲁德方案与陈纳德军衔问题

在志愿队改编的最初阶段,时任美国驻华军事代表团团长马格鲁德举足轻重。马格鲁德军事代表团,是太平洋战争爆发前美国对华租借事务发展以及远东军事局势激化下组建的。在美方看来,马格鲁德军事代表团的主要职能在于“协助中国政府,按租借法案意图取得相应之国防军事援助,并保证其得到最有效的利用”。^⑩ 而中方对其期许则有不同。1941 年 7 月,当美国政

① Claire L. Chennault, *Way of A Fighter*, p. 124.

② 居里在 1939—1945 年任罗斯福总统的行政助理和经济顾问。1941 年和 1942 年两度作为总统代表到中国,指导《租借法案》在中国的实施。

③ Memorandum for the President, December 8, 1941, Hoover Institution Archives, Lauchlin Bernard Currie papers, Box 2, folder 2.

④ Memorandum for Lauchlin Currie, December 9, 1941, Hoover Institution Archives, Lauchlin Bernard Currie papers, Box 2, folder 2.

⑤ Currie to Magruder, December 12, 1941, Hoover Institution Archives, Lauchlin Bernard Currie papers, Box 1, folder 29.

⑥ Gordon K. Pickler, *United States Aid to the Chinese Nationalist Air Force, 1931 - 1949* (Ph. D Dissertation, The Florida State University, 1971), p. 162.

⑦ Daniel Ford, *Flying Tigers: Claire Chennault and the American Volunteer Group*, p. 107.

⑧ Chennault to C. J. Chow for Madame Chiang, December 16, 1941, Hoover Institution Archives, Chennault papers, Box 1, folder 13.

⑨ Jack Samson, *The Flying Tigers*, p. 129.

⑩ 马格鲁德《马格鲁德致参谋长备忘录》(1941 年 8 月 22 日),章伯峰、庄建平主编:《抗日战争》第 4 卷,“外交”上册,四川大学出版社 1997 年版,第 490 页。

府表示愿意派送一个高级军事代表团访问中国时,蒋介石立刻回复,希望代表团能够包括上校以上军阶的空军军官,其任务是帮助中国建立空军。^① 宋子文与马格鲁德谈话中强调中国“所缺乏者,唯飞机及军械耳”,希望马格鲁德能帮助美国军方更准确地了解中国的需求,从而“俾得尽量供给武器,迅速运到中国”。^② 1941年10月27日,蒋介石与马格鲁德首次见面时便提出希望美国派遣多名空军军官来帮助中国建立一个新空军^③,更进一步表示愿授权美国军官来负责组建工作。^④

太平洋战争爆发后,马格鲁德军事代表团的使命与权限面临新的变数。马歇尔此前曾授意马格鲁德关注“志愿队及其补给问题”,并在珍珠港事件后授权马格鲁德负责志愿队的改编工作。

马格鲁德遇到的首要难题,便是如何安排陈纳德的位置。志愿队自酝酿与筹建起,就与陈纳德密不可分。当志愿队旗开得胜之后,陈纳德更是声名鹊起,无论中美两方均不可忽视其作用。不同于首次来华的志愿队队员,陈纳德早以“上校”身份为国民政府效力了四年之久。^⑤ 而他本身却仅以“美国陆军上尉”的军衔退役,如果回归正规军,其身份将成难题。^⑥

1941年12月12日,马格鲁德给陈纳德的电报中邀请志愿队回归美军编制。然而陈纳德没有想到马格鲁德并未提及其军衔问题,而改编后的驻华空军也并非由陈纳德指挥。^⑦ 因此,当宋美龄请陈纳德参与商议改编之事,他以“气管炎复发卧床”为由拖延时间,并指出“鉴于问题复杂”,志愿队不宜编入美国陆军航空队,“志愿队当下的地位更能发挥作用。驾驶员均一致愿受我领导和蒋委员长的监督”。^⑧

马格鲁德在1941年12月31日向陆军部正式提案,志愿队纳入陆军航空队,改编成第二十三战斗机大队。马格鲁德提案中,主要可分为两大部分,一个是志愿队的指挥权问题,一个是志愿队队员改编问题。关于前者,马格鲁德提出将由他本人来担任改编后的美国驻华空军指挥官;关于后者,马格鲁德提案中指出志愿队队员可一次性获得合同与军队薪水之间的差额补偿。那些拒绝接受改编,或者“不符合陆军标准”的人员,可由中国的飞行员和地勤人员取代,“俾以民主阵线互助与团结精神昭示于世”。^⑨

马格鲁德谋求驻华空军指挥权,不仅让陈纳德诧异,更遭到中方的反对。12月31日,马格鲁德面见蒋介石提出志愿队改编方案,而蒋介石当场拒绝了马格鲁德的要求。蒋在日记中记道:“麦

① 《宋子文电蒋中正美军官团决先派航空运输炮兵专家以麦克鲁德为领袖》(1941年7月31日),台北,“国史馆”藏,蒋中正“总统”文物档案,002/020300/00032/054。

② 《宋子文致蒋介石函稿》(1941年9月4日),吴景平、郭岱君编:《宋子文驻美时期电报选(1940—1943)》,第111页。

③ 《蒋介石、宋美龄与马格鲁德谈话记录》(1941年10月27日),秦孝仪主编:《中华民国重要史料初编——对日抗战时期》第3编,“战时外交”(1),台北,中国国民党中央委员会党史委员会1981年版,第467—473页。

④ 《蒋介石与马格鲁德谈话记录》(1941年10月31日),秦孝仪主编:《中华民国重要史料初编——对日抗战时期》第3编,“战时外交”(1),第474—478页。

⑤ 陈纳德的“上校”称号,最初是美国路易斯安那州州长授予的荣誉头衔。参见 Sam Kleiner, *The Flying Tigers: The Untold Story of the American Pilots Who Waged a Secret War Against Japan*, pp. 175 - 176。

⑥ 陈纳德曾回忆到,1940年他回美国期间,曾提出重回陆军航空队服役的申请,但当时美国陆军航空队司令阿诺德将军为他提供的职位仅是一名炮兵学校教官,军衔只提升为“少校”,这是陈纳德无法接受的。参见 Claire L. Chennault, *Way of A Fighter*, p. 95。

⑦ 马格鲁德给陈纳德电文的草稿中,也为陈纳德的军衔犯难。他本让陈纳德以“准将或上校”的军衔回到现役,但在拍发之前予以删除。参见 Daniel Ford: *Flying Tigers: Claire Chennault and the American Volunteer Group*, p. 107。

⑧ Chennault to C. J. Chow for Madame Chiang, December 30, 1941, Hoover Institution Archives, Chennault papers, Box 1, folder 13。

⑨ 《美国志愿队空军编入美国军队条件译文》(1942年1月19日),秦孝仪主编:《中华民国重要史料初编——对日抗战时期》第2编,“作战经过”(3),台北,中国国民党中央委员会党史委员会1981年版,第555—556页。

克罗达(即马格鲁德)为美国来华空军指挥系统问题,主张由其本人直接指挥,余谓凡在中国领土内之任何军队,皆应归中国统帅部之指挥,彼不为然,余则非此不可,彼乃电询华盛顿意旨再定,余谓即使华盛顿与彼意见相同,余亦不赞成也。”^①从中方来讲,蒋介石与宋子文都仍倾向由陈纳德来领导中美联合空军。^②

陈纳德深知志愿队必须要得到人员与武器的补充,但他对此有“改编”之外的方案。1942年1月12日,他向宋子文指出,志愿队需要每周6架战斗机以及10名飞行员的补充。对于正规军与志愿队的差异,陈纳德也提出新补充的人员不必“退出现役”,只需与中国中央飞机制造厂签订相应合同即可。^③陈纳德又致函马格鲁德,指出改编会“引起志愿队作战效率的下降,很可能长达四到六个月之久”,此外他极为自信地表示,鉴于他对中国战场的了解,他应被任命为美国陆军航空队的一名将级军官和中国空军指挥官——既能领导志愿队,又能领导未来的美国驻华空军。^④

1942年1月19日,马格鲁德再次向蒋介石表示,美国陆军部拟定由他本人来担任中国与缅甸地区美国空军司令官。^⑤为了让蒋介石放心,马格鲁德借马歇尔来电指出“美国志愿空军之创立,原为援助中国之用,将来该队改编为美国正式空军后,其任务一仍旧贯,依然用之于中国而为中国服务”。在这一改编方案中,志愿队改编后将成为“美国驻中国与缅甸之正式空军”,马格鲁德提出“其驻在中国者,余当听委座之命令,而驻在缅甸者,余则听魏菲尔(Archibald Percival Wavell)将军之命令”。^⑥对此,蒋介石在与宋子文商议时表示不满:“(1)美国驻华之空军,随时移用于缅甸,其职务与地区皆不能划分,必至两方不能运用。(2)中国与缅甸既为两个战区,麦君究听何人命令,必致双方为难。(3)陈纳德为空军专家,如此组成是否所愿,亦一问题。(4)中甚愿美国选派高级将领来华助战,而麦君非空军专家,中美空军人员皆不能引起信仰也。”^⑦以“一人受中英两个统帅之指挥,并任二个战区之职务,再以陆军人员指挥空军”^⑧,这是蒋介石所不能接受的。

为了让陈纳德同意改编,马格鲁德更向蒋介石表示,陈纳德“在此次危局间之伟大贡献,我人均有同感,其所表现军事领袖之素质,已获得一致之钦佩。故此次改编,决无减少彼地位重要性之意”。宋美龄则当面向马格鲁德提出“如改编有非实行不可之势,则彼(陈纳德)主张,彼个人须升任少将^⑨,盖统率在华之美国空军,彼实为惟一适任之司令,倘彼官级仍为上校,恐威仪不彰,有碍职务之执行”。马格鲁德则表示如果自己担任中缅美军司令,提升陈纳德军衔不是难事,马格鲁德个人决无强迫改编之意,但是陈纳德“如坚持反对态度,恐彼之地位,将受不良影响”。马格鲁德还指出“彼倘遵正轨发展,空军司令自当属彼无疑。本人知美国尚有空军军官五六人,能担任此项司

① 《蒋介石日记》(手稿),1941年12月31日,斯坦福大学胡佛研究院档案馆藏,下同。

② 《宋子文电蒋中正中国空军美志愿队改编为美国正式空军办法》(1942年1月1日),台北,“国史馆”藏,蒋中正“总统”文物档案,002/020300/00025/013。

③ Chennault to T. V. Soong, January 12, 1941, Hoover Institution Archives, Lauchlin Bernard Currie papers, Box 2, folder 4.

④ Jack Samson, *The Flying Tigers*, p. 135.

⑤ 吕芳上主编:《蒋中正先生年谱长编》第7册,台北,“国史馆”2015年版,第15页。

⑥ 魏菲尔将军是当时英军驻印度缅甸最高指挥官。《蒋中正接见马格鲁德商谈中国空军美志愿队改编后仍用于中国一事》(1942年1月19日),台北,“国史馆”藏,蒋中正“总统”文物档案,002/020300/00025/015。

⑦ 《蒋中正电示宋子文与美详商麦克罗德不任中缅战区美国空军司令官》(1942年1月20日),台北,“国史馆”藏,蒋中正“总统”文物档案,002/010300/00047/009。

⑧ 《蒋中正电宋子文请美国遣派中国战区统帅部联军参谋部长》(1942年1月21日),台北,“国史馆”藏,蒋中正“总统”文物档案,002/020300/00016/044。

⑨ 此处“少将”,实为美军“准将”军衔。

令职务，但无一能如希诺德(陈纳德)上校之胜任愉快者”。^①言下之意，即陈纳德并非陆军部唯一的选择。马格鲁德为加大自己的话语分量，指出美国军方为便利进行改编起见，已授权他广大的行政权限。^②然而蒋氏夫妇坚持为陈纳德说话，要求保证其指挥地位，并对马格鲁德心生反感。在蒋介石多次拒绝后，马格鲁德也无奈地向陆军部报告，“陈纳德很可能是唯一具备资格和经验，并能够有效地指挥中美空军作战的人”。^③

让蒋介石对马格鲁德失望的还在于其作为驻华代表时的抓权表现以及部分报告的失真。^④1942年1月5日，马格鲁德向陆军部呈交的报告，在未提供事实凭据下，便预测中国政府将和日本安排停战，让美国单独对抗日本，同时指出蒋介石打算囤积美援，“以准备战后的军事行动”。^⑤有学者认为这种报告亦可能是马格鲁德在抓权失败后凭空杜撰，发泄心头之愤，利用自己特殊身份公报私仇。^⑥

随着蒋介石正式出任中国战区最高统帅，中美军事合作不断升温。蒋介石为加深合作关系，提议由美国选派高级将领担任新组建的中国战区联军参谋长。美国军方也希望通过派遣更高权限的将领来华，以推进中美军事合作，维持中国战场。^⑦涉及志愿队改编与美国空军来华问题上，美国军方高层决定把空军方面的负责人纳入中国战区参谋长领导班子之中。1942年1月23日，美国陆军部部长史汀生(Henry Lewis Stimson)在致宋子文的信中指出，陆军部驻中国首席代表的高级助手应包括一名来自航空队的将官，“这名将官的职责之一是指挥驻华美国空军，并帮助组训中国空军，同时负责中国战区总司令部的空军作战行动”。^⑧

为了更好地推进中美空军合作，蒋介石曾要求美国同时选送两位军官来华，一位是陆军军官，做联军参谋长；另一位是陆军航空队军官，前来主持中国的空军事务。^⑨故而蒋介石在美方“另派空军高级军官”一事上，认为“仍由美政府决定，中国自无异议”，但透过宋子文向美方婉商，“陈(纳德)对中国空军感情与合作精神，必为任何新来之高级人员所不能及。如美国此时无适当高级之空军军官来华，则暂由陈纳德充任此职，亦甚相宜”。^⑩1月29日，史汀生表示美方“十分赞同这样的安排，陈纳德也将适时晋升为准将”。^⑪

① 《蒋中正接见马格鲁德再度商谈美国空军志愿队改编事》(1942年1月26日)，台北，“国史馆”藏，蒋中正“总统”文物档案，002/020300/00025/016。

② 吕芳上主编：《蒋中正先生年谱长编》第7册，第21页。

③ Magruder to Adjutant General for AMMISCA, January 29, 1942, 转引自 Martha Byrd, Chennault: Giving Wings to the Tiger, p. 141.

④ 马格鲁德曾一度要求宋子文将援华租借物资拨给美国军事代表团支配，但遭到拒绝。参见曹嘉涵《抗战时期中美租借援助关系》，第144页。

⑤ Magruder to War Department, January 5, 1942, Foreign Relations of the United States Series(Hereafter FRUS), 1941, Vol. IV, pp. 769 - 771.

⑥ 齐锡生：《剑拔弩张的盟友——太平洋战争期间的中美军事合作关系 1941—1945》，社会科学文献出版社2012年版，第55页。

⑦ 参见齐锡生《剑拔弩张的盟友——太平洋战争期间的中美军事合作关系 1941—1945》，第63—83页。

⑧ 《史汀生致宋子文》(1942年1月23日)，吴景平、林孝庭主编：《宋子文与外国人士往来函电稿(1940—1942)》，复旦大学出版社2009年版，第171页。

⑨ Letter from Soong to Mr. John J. McCloy, Assistant Secretary of War, January 6, 1942. Verifax File 2817, Item 2625, MFA, 转引自齐锡生《剑拔弩张的盟友——太平洋战争期间的中美军事合作关系 1941—1945》，第68页。

⑩ 《蒋中正电宋子文如美国此时无适当高级空军军官来华则暂由陈纳德充任》(1942年1月28日)，台北，“国史馆”藏，蒋中正“总统”文物档案，002/020300/00025/017。

⑪ 《史汀生致宋子文》(1942年1月29日)，吴景平、林孝庭主编：《宋子文与外国人士往来函电稿(1940—1942)》，第175页。

至此,马格鲁德提案随着其本人话语权的下降而搁浅,而陈纳德则将回归美军“现役”,并且得到晋升。然而志愿队改编后指挥权仍未能得到确定,改编工作仍在继续商讨中。

三、陈纳德指挥权与改编方案之确定

马格鲁德提案阶段,志愿队改编在于解决志愿队的补员以及物资问题,而随着中美军事合作的深入,志愿队作为一支存在于中国、缅甸战场的有生力量,其改编问题被纳入美国的全局战略部署加以考量。

1940年6月27日,尚未参战的美国便已明确提出“先欧后亚”“先德后日”的战略构想:美国“应在太平洋采取完全的防卫行动,而在大西洋方面做主要努力”。^①1942年2月15日,罗斯福和时任其首席外交顾问的霍普金斯(Harry Lloyd Hopkins)^②探讨新加坡沦陷后的形势。霍普金斯提出“两翼说”,即“右翼基础于澳大利亚和新西兰,左翼则在缅甸、印度和中国”^③,而美国的防务重心更侧重于澳大利亚一侧。这既影响了志愿队的改编,更影响了美国在中缅印战场空中力量的投入。

作为中国的盟友,美国应当派遣一支正规部队进入中国战区,共同抗击日本。但碍于“先欧后亚”的大战略部署,以及中缅战场交通线的困难,美国大量派兵在短期内难以实现。美国驻华大使高斯(Clarence Edward Gauss)在报告中指出,“军事援助,特别是在航空方面的援助,可能会产生比军事利益更大的心理影响。美国在中国的军事行动是不够的,美国空军即使有限,也会给中国提供积极的证据——证明我们正在为中国和我们自己共同战斗”。他提议“不论美国志愿队是否并入正规军,其人员和设备方面的力量需保持不变,并应逐步增加”。^④而当美国军方体系进入中国后,他们感到如果让这些纪律性低、又拿着高薪的志愿队队员继续存在,就会极大地打击普通士兵的士气。^⑤因此,改编志愿队成为美国军方整体战略规划的必要步骤。^⑥

经过美国陆军部的协商,以及中方的认可,约瑟夫·史迪威出任中国战区盟军参谋长一职,中美军事合作进入新阶段。与史迪威一同前往中国战区的参谋中,克莱顿·毕塞尔(Clayton Bissell,也译“毕赛尔”“俾索威”)作为空军高级参谋将成为美国驻华空军的直接负责人。这意味着史汀生此前保证陈纳德指挥美国驻华空军的承诺并未兑现。

志愿队新的改编方案中,毕塞尔总揽大局,陈纳德得到美国驻华战斗机队和轻型轰炸机队的指挥权,不包括重型轰炸机队。居里告知陈纳德“尽管军方对你态度不错,但毕塞尔能取得军方更多的合作”。^⑦与史迪威、马格鲁德纯陆军的出身不同,毕塞尔是正规的陆军航空队军官,在有关战斗

① 韩永利:《战时美国大战略与中国抗日战场:1941—1945年》,武汉大学出版社2003年版,第35页。

② 霍普金斯在二战期间,任罗斯福的首席外交顾问,并在《租借法案》的制订与实施中扮演着重要角色。

③ Grace Person Hayes, *The History of the Joint of Staff in world war II, The War against Japan* (Maryland, The United States Naval Institute Press, 1982), p. 89.

④ The Ambassador in China (Gauss) to the Secretary of State, March 7, 1942, FRUS, 1942, China, p. 27.

⑤ Wesley M. Bagby, *The Eagle-Dragon Alliance, America's Relations with China in World War II* (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1992), p. 72.

⑥ 太平洋战争前,美国除在中国有志愿队外,也在加拿大与英国有空军志愿队。这些部队在美国参战后立刻被收编进正规军。参见William M. Smith, *Mercenary eagles: American Pilots Serving in Foreign Air Forces Prior to United States Entry into the Second World War, 1936 - 1941* (Ph. D Dissertation, University of Arkansas, 1999), pp. 226 - 230.

⑦ Currie to Chennault, February 4, 1942, Hoover Institution Archives, Lauchlin Bernard Currie papers, Box 1, folder 4.

机战术观点上与陈纳德截然不同, 对其成见颇深。^① 陈纳德未能接受这一安排, 他声称取消他在中国战区的空军指挥权, 对各方均无好处。陈纳德建议陆军部挑选一位能与之融洽工作的人, 若仍是毕塞尔在任, 他将“深感失望”, 并以健康不佳为由选择辞职。^②

史迪威在获知自己前往中国的使命时, 便知志愿队改编之事。1942年2月9日, 居里在华盛顿向阿诺德转达陈纳德对改编的意见。史迪威在日记中提到, “看来马歇尔曾答应过蒋介石, 陈纳德可以担任高级空军指挥官”。史迪威对陈纳德不遵守纪律的做法表示不满, 他支持毕塞尔“排在陈纳德之上”。史迪威在日记中道出了美国军方恼火的原因——“由中国人告诉美国, 谁能和谁不能当我的部下”——这种中方干涉美国人事安排的情况, 使美国陆军部极为厌恶与反感^③, 而陈纳德与蒋介石的亲密关系更让陆军部对其动因产生怀疑。^④

对于美国军方在空军人事上的变动, 中国高层亦有新的看法。1942年2月5日宋子文在密电中向蒋介石告知美国军方及史迪威的意见, 指出美方认为“反攻日本时, 空军根据地必在中国”, 志愿队及中国空军须有适合的指挥官, 以备将来调遣空军赴华共同作战。美方认为“以陈纳德之技能、经验、资望, 及与美空军之关系, 能否胜任, 殊未可必”^⑤, 即由毕塞尔担任联军总部最高级空军职位主持一切是较为妥当的。

对于中方而言, 志愿队的改编并非一支空军部队的改编, 更涉及后续空军入驻中国战区的问题。为更大程度上调动美国的军事援助, 宋子文向蒋介石表示毕塞尔“确与美空军各高级将领关系极深, 声望素著, 为将来种种着想, 失此机会, 此人不能赴华, 殊觉可惜”。^⑥ 希望能借美国高级空军军官的到来, 使得中国得到美国更多的空军援助, 能有正规空军入驻中国战区。

蒋介石与陈纳德之关系, 并不似美方以及外界所言一般完全一致。陈纳德在蒋身边工作多年, 对蒋的许多做法并不认同。^⑦ 蒋介石对陈纳德同样也是就事论事, 绝非一味推崇。1942年3月4日, 蒋与陈纳德在腊戍商谈空军侦察敌情与以后在缅甸空军使用计划时就曾认为“彼人滞碍, 不能负重任也”。^⑧ 故蒋并非坚持让陈纳德担任美国驻华空军指挥。

因此, 中方表示接受美方的决定。居里通过宋子文转发了一封电报给陈纳德, 表示“阿诺德对志愿队也十分赞赏”, “毕塞尔能从军队中调取物资, 这对大规模行动来说是至关重要的”, “中国的利益不仅要求有良好的物质支援, 也要有良好的策略”。^⑨ 在美方与中方都做出决定的情况下, 陈纳德只能选择妥协, 他向宋子文和居里回信, 他愿“以任何身份, 在一个能最有效地进行战斗的组织内效劳”。^⑩

1942年3月, 史迪威和毕塞尔相继抵达重庆后, 马上和蒋介石夫妇进行正式会晤。蒋介石表

① Claire L. Chennault, *Way of A Fighter*, p. 171.

② Jack Samson, *The Flying Tigers*, p. 151.

③ 约瑟夫·史迪威著, 林鸿译:《史迪威日记》, 北方文艺出版社2014年版, 第17、39页。

④ Martha Byrd, *Chennault Giving Wings to the Tiger*, p. 142.

⑤ 《宋子文致蒋介石密告美方囑意俾索威担任联军最高空军职位电》(1942年2月5日), 吴景平、郭岱君编:《宋子文驻美时期电报选(1940—1943)》, 第147页。

⑥ 《宋子文致蒋介石密告美方囑意俾索威担任联军最高空军职位电》(1942年2月5日), 吴景平、郭岱君编:《宋子文驻美时期电报选(1940—1943)》, 第147页。

⑦ Daniel Ford, *Flying Tigers: Claire Chennault and the American Volunteer Group*, pp. 194 - 195.

⑧ 《蒋介石日记》(手稿), 1942年3月4日。

⑨ Minister Soong to Chennault, February 10, 1942, Hoover Institution Archives, Chennault papers, Box 2, folder 9.

⑩ Chennault to T. V. Soong, February 15, 1942, Hoover Institution Archives, T. V. Soong papers, Box 61, folder 19.

示毕塞尔“空军职务已由史将军决定，并不与陈纳德冲突”^①，史迪威遂在向马歇尔提交的形势评估报告中表示相信“陈纳德的问题可以得到圆满解决，志愿队也能够合理的时间内接受改编”。^②史迪威认为改编计划“首要的原则就是在改编期间保持志愿航空队的最大效率”，关于陈纳德在新体制中的位置问题，史迪威建议将毕塞尔和陈纳德都提升为美国陆军准将，但陈纳德军衔的生效日期在毕塞尔之后一天，以此表示两者地位的差异。^③

1942年4月1日，在宋美龄陪同下，蒋介石与史迪威、陈纳德、马格鲁德共同讨论志愿队的改编问题。各方都同意陈纳德在志愿队改编后继续指挥驻华美军战斗机与轻轰炸机部队。关于志愿队的解散日期，陈纳德提议定为7月16日，毕塞尔提议定为7月1日，后遵照宋美龄建议决定为1942年的7月4日。^④志愿队改编方案留给陈纳德三个月的缓冲期来适应新的战争布局，毕塞尔则承诺“对于该队改编之后继续维持其效率问题”，5月初将有33名有驾驶P40型飞机熟练经验的士兵到达中国。^⑤可以说，让中方与陈纳德愿意牺牲志愿队独立性的最重要一点，就是在7月4日正式改编以前，志愿队既保持中国空军的身份，又能得到美国军方的后勤支援。毕塞尔表示：“目前美空军对中国之支援，将尽速加强美国志愿队之实力，俾直接援助缅甸前线之中国军队，并尽速完成驻印度美国空军第十军之组织，以阻止日本切断对中国空航之计划。”^⑥

四、“意料之外”：志愿队队员的改编与中国战场空军力量变化

改编方案在各方协商下得以确定。解决陈纳德军衔与指挥权之后，志愿队改编便再度回到其本质问题，那便是人员补充与武器援助。然而，在志愿队队员的改编以及后续增援上，其成效却不及中美双方之设想。

（一）志愿队队员的改编

志愿队中的战斗机飞行员、机组成员、地勤人员，皆以合同的形式受雇于中国中央飞机制造厂。志愿队成员丰厚的薪水与击落敌机的奖酬，使这群队员不惜冒险、追逐名利。在脱离了正规军烦琐的教条规章后，志愿队的纪律问题很快就成为尾大不掉的难点。而随着战事不断恶化，志愿队队员的心态亦发生变化。

志愿队还在训练之际，蒋介石便已经注意到志愿队“内部精神之散漫与复杂”，故“令美志愿军注意纪律”。^⑦陈纳德在管理上的松散，纵然可以更大程度地提升队员的积极性，但一旦战事焦灼，甚至陷入不利局面，这种纪律会产生不利的影响。按陈纳德的說法，仅仅在珍珠港事件爆发前，就有12名飞行员及6名其他勤务人员被开除；珍珠港事件爆发后，又有10名飞行员和37名勤务人

① 《宋子文电蒋介石与马歇尔晤谈史迪威为其最有能力之将材谅解重用》（1942年3月12日），台北，“国史馆”藏，蒋中正“总统”文物档案，002/020300/00016/049。

② Daniel Ford, *Flying Tigers: Claire Chennault and the American Volunteer Group*, p. 250.

③ 在美国军队体制中，同军衔的军官，一般以晋升时间顺序来决定上下级。

④ 按陈纳德的回忆，他认为史迪威和毕塞尔坚持改编在4月30日前完成，应当是其刻意抹黑之意。参见 Claire L. Chennault, *Way of A Fighter*, p. 171.

⑤ 《宋美龄与马格鲁德史迪威陈纳德等会商中国空军美志愿队改编之各项问题》（1942年4月1日），台北，“国史馆”藏，蒋中正“总统”文物档案，002/020300/00025/019。

⑥ 《毕塞尔致蒋介石备忘录：美国空军援华及阻止日本切断对华空运计划等》（1942年4月18日），台北，“国史馆”藏，蒋中正“总统”文物档案，002/020300/00020/006。

⑦ 《蒋介石日记》（手稿），1941年10月5日、12月7日。

员被“不名誉开除”，其中最主要原因是临阵怯懦。^①

志愿队队员在纪律上的问题，直接影响到志愿队作战人员的收编情况。事实上，陈纳德早在志愿队改编之初，便预计志愿队队员宁可辞职也不愿被改编接纳，志愿队将面临解散，而陆军部将无法用同样有效的组织取代它。^②

1942年4月，志愿队改编的消息正式公布，作为战斗人员，队员们自然不知道中美高层关于改编的细节。部分队员认为陈纳德追逐自己的军衔与前途，牺牲了志愿队队员的利益，以致发生了一起“飞行员叛乱”的事件。^③ 陈纳德严厉表示，这些队员都会得到“不光荣退伍”的名声。这场“叛乱”行动并未闹大，但整个部队的士气与作战积极性大为下降。之后仍旧有不少的飞行员与地勤人员通过各种方法离开美国志愿队。^④ 陈纳德被迫向陆军部“强烈请求总统向美国志愿队所有成员发出倡议，要求他们坚守岗位，同时承诺尽早增援”，并且承认“队伍现在已师老兵疲，精神和士气都很低落”。^⑤ 很多队员都因战斗艰辛、气候与食物不适，导致身心俱疲。这一切都为志愿队队员的改编情况蒙上阴影，而这种“意外”，是中美双方都未能估计到的。

1942年5月21日，毕塞尔和陈纳德在昆明接见志愿队的飞行员和地勤人员。对于不接受改编的队员，他们和中方签的合同将于7月4日解除，并得到包含假期工资在内的酬劳和500美元的旅费。对于接受军队改编的队员，可以拿到和离队者相同的酬劳，外加军队薪水与合同报酬之间的差额。^⑥

大多数来华的志愿队队员，在战前的身份为预备役军官。假若改编后，能正式成为美军正规军官，他们不排斥继续加入第二十三战斗机大队作战。但是，毕塞尔未能“审时度势”，首先指出所有志愿队飞行人员于归并美军后，可取得的最高军衔仅为“预备役少校”，至于地勤人员则只能够成为技术士官。^⑦ 当志愿队队员欲争取正规军的待遇时，却受到毕塞尔的威胁，声称一旦志愿队士兵回到美国本土时，就会立即被征召为陆军步兵。如此一来，无论飞行员还是地勤人员都对归并陆军的安排丧失信心。

陈纳德在取得军方的正式编制后，在收编志愿队队员上也选择“冷眼旁观”，既有看毕塞尔出丑之意，也为了减缓自己与军方的紧张关系。最终，志愿队队员的改编情况堪称糟糕，史迪威向陆军部评价这一改编过程时讲到，“美国军队正用缺乏战斗经验的人员取代久经沙场的美国志愿队……事实上，正是志愿队的队员在战火蔓延、形势危急的情况下纷纷离队回国。他们把个人利益置于国家利益之上，这不能得到宣传”。^⑧

美方对志愿队队员情况的忽视，以及毕塞尔、陈纳德改编策略的失误，使得整个志愿队仅有5位飞行员同意继续留在中国，另有27名无线电员、机工长、文职人员与后勤人员加入驻华特遣队。仅靠32名老队员，再加上少许抵达中国的陆军飞行员，使得第二十三战斗机大队难以形成足够的战斗力。按陈纳德的描述，“(改编后的)驻华空军特遣队完全是在战斗声中拼凑而成”，“不得不为

① Claire L. Chennault, *Way of A Fighter*, p. 152.

② Martha Byrd, *Chennault Giving Wings to the Tiger*, p. 138.

③ 总计24名飞行员，包括6名空战英雄联名上书：“我们这些来自美国志愿队的签字者，希望能够结束我们与中央飞机制造厂签署的合约，并结束我们在美国志愿队的职务。” Daniel Ford, *Flying Tigers: Claire Chennault and the American Volunteer Group*, p. 300.

④ 许剑虹：《飞虎雄风：中国空军美国志愿援华航空队战史》，武汉大学出版社2015年版，第147页。

⑤ Daniel Ford, *Flying Tigers: Claire Chennault and the American Volunteer Group*, p. 304.

⑥ Jack Samson, *The Flying Tigers*, p. 192.

⑦ 当时史迪威交代毕塞尔可以授予志愿队人员的最高为“上校”军衔，毕塞尔却未能执行。

⑧ Daniel Ford: *Flying Tigers: Claire Chennault and the American Volunteer Group*, p. 362.

“争抢每一个人、每一个电花塞头和每加仑汽油而奋斗”。^①不少美国学者在论及志愿队改编时，都批评了毕塞尔低效而缓慢的组织水平，影响了改编的结果。^②

(二) 志愿队改编与中国战场空军力量的变化

在中缅战场上，志愿队是不可忽视的空中力量。正如陈纳德改编时提到的，“一旦着手改编，此项军队，欲恢复其原来之战斗力，必待三个月至六个月之后”；蒋介石也坚持志愿队的改编不应以牺牲现有战斗力为代价。^③但当中方同意志愿队改编的方案后，美方却并没有按照约定满足中国战区空中力量的需求。

1942年3月5日，为应对缅甸丢失对整个远东防御体系产生的负面影响，美国在印度组建第十航空队，执行在中缅战场的空中作战。其“最终作战目的，是攻击日本通过中国海的交通线和直接攻击日本本土”。^④就在志愿队一面作战一面改编之际，德意联军在隆美尔(Erwin Rommel)的率领下直逼埃及腹地，中东方面出现危机。在“先欧后亚”的大战略下，为加强空军力量，美方从中缅印战场抽调了3个空军机队增援中东地区：第1个机队原计划以中国为基地对日实行轰炸作战，但在6月初被派往了埃及；第2个机队正是在印度的第十航空队；第3个机队，则是1942年1月许诺分配给中国的33架A-29型轻轰炸机，被派到埃及担任守卫任务，理由是这批援华飞机离开美国时受阻，要到6月底才能发运——这几队涉及支持中国战场的空军调动未经中国战区总司令蒋介石的同意，甚至也没有与之商议。^⑤

在中国的质疑下，罗斯福表示“中国局势甚吃紧，空军援助至关重要，余等虽一致赞成维持中国、印度原来空军计划，但埃及与苏联南部同时告急，实无法增拨……无论如何必当补足前定一百架飞机……本年夏季战事确是最危急之时，但余与丘相以至诚之心同情中国……绝无丝毫漠视之理……克服缅甸已有准备计划”。^⑥蒋介石为此责问史迪威，“罗斯福总统来电明言已令将美国空军第十军由印度调来中国作战。想令出必行，岂容擅改。若谓埃及局势严重……我浙赣态势亦至危急”，“事件之转变，足证中国战区未被重视……予深愿详知，英、美是否尚以此中国战区为同盟国之战区耶？”^⑦这反映出美国虽重视中国的战略地位，却没有作出更大投入的政策意向。

1942年7月4日，重新组建的美国驻华特遣队在投入战斗时仅有49架飞机，这与中方以及陈纳德同意改编时得到的承诺相比颇有差距，数量甚至少于太平洋战争爆发时的援华志愿队。在指挥权方面，由于美国陆军只允许每个战区拥有一支航空队，驻华空军特遣队便成为驻印度第十航空队的下辖部队。中国战场的空军，反受到数千里外新德里司令部的节制，其作战效率大受影响。而第十航空队的工作人员与装备，更是难及1942年美军的最低标准。^⑧当新德里发表志愿队改编消

① 杰克·萨姆森著，石继成、许忆宁译：《陈纳德》，东方出版社1990年版，第188页。

② James Larry Durrence, Ambassador Clarence Gause and United States Relations with China, 1941 - 1944 (Ph. D Dissertation, University of Georgia, 1971), p. 109.

③ 《蒋中正接见马格鲁德再度商谈美国空军志愿队改编事》(1942年1月26日)，台北，“国史馆”藏，蒋中正“总统”文物档案，002/020300/00025/016。

④ Grace Person Hayes, The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in World War II, The War against Japan, p. 203.

⑤ 韩永利：《战时美国大战略与中国抗日战场：1941—1945年》，第127页。

⑥ 《外交部长宋子文自华盛顿呈蒋委员长报告与罗斯福及丘吉尔情形电》(1942年6月22日)，秦孝仪主编：《中华民国重要史料初编——对日抗战时期》第3编，“战时外交”(3)，第163—164页。

⑦ 《蒋委员长在重庆接见中国战区联军参谋长史迪威谈话纪录》(1942年6月26日)，秦孝仪主编：《中华民国重要史料初编——对日抗战时期》第3编，“战时外交”(3)，第168页。

⑧ Todd Eric Jahnke, By Air Power Alone: America's Strategic Air War in China, 1941 - 1945 (Master Dissertation, University of North Texas, 2001), p. 27.

息时,连史迪威都向蒋介石表示此举“实属不幸”,认为志愿队改编之事不应发表,因为中国战场空中力量减弱一旦公开,会导致日军趁机大规模突袭。^①

简言之,中国战区的空中力量,在经历半年多的鏖战以及志愿队改编之后,不仅在数量上未能得到补充,甚至在人员素质上亦有所倒退。^② 无论是志愿队队员的改编,抑或后续增援部队的调动,都在美方“意料之外”。这既是美方的失误,也是其实施“先欧后亚”战略,忽视中国战场的必然结果。志愿队改编成驻华空军特遣队后,中方及陈纳德向美方争取更多的飞机物资,成为下一阶段中美空军合作的主题。

五、余论

1941 年底,太平洋战争的爆发让中美两国正式成为盟友。中美同盟是中国近代史上第一次真正意义上的军事同盟关系,中国政府在处理军事合作、协同作战方面,缺少足够的经验与对策。通过考察志愿队半年多的改编过程,我们对志愿队的性质可以有更深入的认知,更可获悉中美两国在军事合作上的重心与策略,亦可由此窥视两国盟友关系的弱点所在。

对于志愿队本身而言,接受改编实属必然。志愿队成立之初,由于各种装备欠缺与人员素质不高,甚至陈纳德在开战之初也对其前景期望不大。^③ 志愿队配备的 P-40 型机过于老旧,许多零件早已停止生产,补充极为困难。^④ 美国对日宣战后,全军进入战时状态,再想从美国军队中招募“志愿人员”已无可能,如无后续支援,这支部队将不断战斗减员,直至衰亡。此外,美国军方获得了租借物资的主导权,那么志愿队只有“改编”回归美军编制,方能有持续作战之可能。

当然,在如此窘迫的情境中,志愿队取得如此优异的战绩便显得更为可贵。陈纳德与志愿队员们的血汗付出,让中美双方都意识到这是一支不可小觑的军事力量。尽管志愿队队员多数未能接受改编而离开中国,使人诟病其“雇佣兵”本性,但据学者研究,归国的队员大多数又回到前线作战。^⑤ 由此可见收编失败的责任更多在于美军自身。

陈纳德在改编中展现出对指挥权的渴望,以及对改编本身的抵制,遭到美国陆军部与同僚的非议。倘若陈纳德未能获得将官军衔,无法确保指挥权,那么他在被陆军征召后,有可能被指派到其他战场。这对他施展才华以及个人前途上而言,无疑是不利的。^⑥ 事实证明,陈纳德留在中国战场指挥,对中美双方都大有裨益。

对于美国军方而言,改编志愿队既是统一指挥的必然需求,同样也满足美国在远东地区的战略部署。开战初期美国无论兵力还是物资分配上,都难以满足中缅印战场的需求。美国志愿队取得

① 《蒋委员长在重庆接见史迪威嘱其将保持中国战区最低限度之需要三项编入中国战区军事活动总计书中谈话纪录》(1942 年 6 月 29 日),秦孝仪主编:《中华民国重要史料初编——对日抗战时期》第 3 编,“战时外交”(3),第 171—172 页。

② 按陈纳德的回忆,陆军部以“军事机密”为由隐瞒了志愿队改编过程不光彩的一面。例如 1945 年 1 月,陆军部在提交众议院军事事务委员会的报告中坚称志愿队原有的 250 名成员有 220 名改编加入了美国正规军。参见 Claire L. Chennault, *Way of A Fighter*, p. 178。

③ Claire L. Chennault, *Way of A Fighter*, p. 124。

④ 王正华:《抗战时期外国对华军事援助》,台北,环球书局 1987 年版,第 255 页。

⑤ 据研究,志愿队解散时共有 220 名成员,其中 187 人回到了美军现役,占总人数的 85%。参见 Daniel Ford, *Flying Tigers: Claire Chennault and the American Volunteer Group*, pp. 378-379。

⑥ 陈纳德曾在回应志愿队队员拒绝改编时指出,“志愿队员拒绝改编,因为他们喜欢中国,并害怕志愿队或志愿队长官被调派到其他战场”,此处可见其心声。参见 Chennault to T. V. Soong, January 12, 1942, Hoover Institution Archives, Lauchlin Bernard Currie papers, Box 2, folder 4。

出乎意料的战果^①,使收编这支部队成为美方“投资”最少的方案——既有现成的飞机,又有现成的作战人员,改编志愿队成为“权宜之计”。

对于中方而言,在美国无法派出陆军增援的情况下,中方对空军援助的需求极为迫切。1941年马格鲁德军事代表团刚抵达重庆,蒋介石便一再强调“中国今日所最急要者,仍为空军”。^②宋子文得知美国要使毕塞尔的指挥权高于陈纳德时,就指出接受毕塞尔有利于美军更好的援助。^③中方在明白美国“先欧后亚”战略难以变更之际,寻求“美空军多派数大队来华助战”亦成为“权宜之计”。^④

此外,志愿队改编有利于缓解中方的财政压力。至1942年1月中旬,缅甸中央飞机制造厂的资金已濒临枯竭,而志愿队队员未领到上年12月的薪水。^⑤2月17日,缅甸中央飞机制造厂监理官钱昌祚致信宋子文,要求再向仰光中央飞机制造厂拨发40万卢比,其中包括志愿队队员2月的工资^⑥,甚至陈纳德本人也曾向宋子文致电询问志愿队击落战机一架500元奖金的发放问题。^⑦如果志愿队未改编进入美军编制,其资金运转对财政上捉襟见肘的国民政府而言,显然是不小的负担。

从结果来看,志愿队改编的成效对于中美双方而言,并非最佳。对于美方而言,志愿队队员大多数选择回国而非接受改编,使得美方必须重新派员加以补充。而对于中方而言,解决志愿队“扩大与补充之困难问题”,其实是中方对于中美空军合作的最低目标。“专事扩充该队,我国空军将无充实之望”^⑧,中方希望美国在改编志愿队的同时,希望能有更多的飞机、人员与物资援助中国空军,以从根本上增强中国战区的空中力量。而当美国空有承诺而未能兑现,使中国仍处于困境,失望之际便有矛盾滋生,进而导致两国合作之危机。^⑨

在美国志愿队改编的过程中,有两种因素对后续中美军事合作产生影响。

其一,“陈纳德因素”对中美相互信任的影响。在改编过程中,陈纳德显现出对权力与地位的需求与渴望。在中方看来,这是对陈纳德几年来在华工作的嘉奖,是对其领导志愿队取得辉煌战果的肯定,因此陈纳德谋求美国驻华空军最高长官以及“准将”军衔,蒋介石等人表示赞许与支持。^⑩但从美国军方来看,陈纳德纵然成绩斐然,但终究是“体制”外的人。尤其是陈纳德背后有中国高层的撑腰,使军方并无好感,且担心无法掌控改编后的驻华空军,坚持要“体制”内的军官来担任驻华空军的长官。

① 有不少军事专家认为,志愿队在战斗中最多不过维持三周。参见 Wanda Cornelius and Thayne R. Short, Ding hao, *America's Air War in China, 1937 - 1945*, pp. 119 - 120.

② 《蒋介石、宋美龄与马格鲁德谈话记录》(1941年10月27日),秦孝仪主编:《中华民国重要史料初编——对日抗战时期》第3编,“战时外交”(1),第467—473页。

③ 《宋子文致蒋介石密告美方囑意俾索威担任联军最高空军职位电》(1942年2月5日),吴景平、郭岱君编:《宋子文驻美时期电报选(1940—1943)》,第147页。

④ 《宋子文致蒋介石盼对史迪威万分忍耐以免耽搁时期电》(1942年6月),吴景平、郭岱君编:《宋子文驻美时期电报选(1940—1943)》,第170页。

⑤ Chennault to T. V. Soong, January 19, 1942, Hoover Institution Archives, T. V. Soong papers, Box 2, folder 3.

⑥ C. T. Chien to T. V. Soong, February 17, 1942, Hoover Institution Archives, T. V. Soong papers, Box 2, folder 3.

⑦ Chennault to T. V. Soong, February 7, 1942, Hoover Institution Archives, Chennault papers, Box 2, folder 7.

⑧ 《宋子文电蒋中正中国空军美志愿队改编为美国正式空军办法》(1942年1月1日),台北,“国史馆”藏,蒋中正“总统”文物档案,002/020300/00025/013。

⑨ 齐锡生:《剑拔弩张的盟友——太平洋战争期间的中美军事合作关系(1941—1945)》,第712页。

⑩ 甚至在陈纳德固执地回绝美方的改编方案时,宋美龄为之辩解称(陈纳德)上校赋性固执,但其固执,确具理由。余等识彼,已历五年,故知之甚稔。彼不计个人利益,但有所主张,必坚持贯彻”。参见《蒋中正接见马格鲁德再度商谈美国空军志愿队改编事》(1942年1月26日),台北,“国史馆”藏,蒋中正“总统”文物档案,002/020300/00025/016。

纵观志愿队改编的过程，军方愈是施压，陈纳德便更加“倒向”蒋介石；而中国政府愈是为陈纳德向美方“说话”，则美国对陈纳德的观感每况愈下。^①如此反复，导致美国军方对中国方面的偏见与日俱增。蒋介石为陈纳德争取独立指挥权的措施，本意是为了增强中国战场的空军战斗力，但却意外地加剧了他与史迪威之间的冲突，以及美国军方对他的误解。

其二，“空军模式”对中美陆军合作的影响。对于美方所言，在空军合作上的“相对顺利”蒙蔽了决策层。在志愿队改编与中美空军合作过程中，中国曾提议让陈纳德既充任美国驻华空军司令，同时整训并领导中国空军协同作战。^②美国军方认为，在美国军事装备、训练战术以及军官素质都优于中国的时候，中国愿意将军队的领导权交出，建设一支由美国人重新改造和组织的中国军队。^③当史迪威在缅甸战场上取得中国远征军指挥权后，美国人愈发认为“获得”中国军队的领导权，才能帮助中国提升军队战斗力。这种由“空军模式”演绎到陆军层面的“一厢情愿”，毫无疑问将会触怒中国政府，最终导致更大的危机。

综上所述，美国援华志愿航空队的改编，是各方不断协商下所做出的“权宜之计”，在某种程度上满足了各方的基本诉求，解决了太平洋战争初期中国战场缺少盟军协作的问题。但作为中美战时空军合作的序幕，此次改编已暗含各方不同的利益诉求与行事策略。从志愿队首战，到正式改编的7个多月的时间里，中国高层、美国军方、陈纳德之间的互动，为之后几年中美军事合作的“曲折起伏”埋下伏笔。

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（责任编辑：高莹莹）

^① 正如前文所讲，蒋介石与中方并非坚持要让陈纳德担任驻华空军的最高指挥，但双方的亲密关系还是让美方产生偏见与反感。

^② 还在1942年1月初，宋子文就曾提出让陈纳德兼任中国空军的总司令，同时指挥中美空军作战。参见 T. V. Soong to Madame Chiang, January 6, 1942, Hoover Institution Archives, T. V. Soong papers, Box 37, folder 15.

^③ 邹说著，王宁、周先进译：《美国在中国的失败：1941—1950年》，上海人民出版社2016年版，第36页。

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“An expedient measure”: the reorganization of the American Volunteer Group

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【Abstract】 After the outbreak of the Pacific War, since the American Volunteer Group of the Chinese Air Force faced difficulties in personnel replenishment and weapon supply, it was necessary for it to be reorganized. During the reorganization process, Chennault’s military rank and command issues became the focus of China-US negotiations. China’s trust in Chennault caused Magruder’s proposal for commanding power to be unsuccessful. To gain more assistance and support from the US, China finally agreed that Bissell served as the commander of the US Air Force stationed in China. The US’s neglect of the discipline and personal wishes of members of the American Volunteer Group made the redeployment of these members unsatisfactory. The transfer of the follow-up air force in the battlefields of China and Myanmar also led to the decrease of the strength of the reorganized Volunteer Group. As an “expedient measure,” the reorganization of the American Volunteer Group allowed China to reduce its corresponding financial burden and it also enabled the US to achieve military deployment in the battlefields of China and Myanmar with relatively small numbers of personnel and armaments. Throughout the reorganization process, the interaction among Chinese high-level officials, the US military, and Chennault had influenced the development of the China-US military cooperation.

【Keywords】 the American Volunteer Group;China-US air force cooperation;Claire Lee Chennault;Chiang Kai-shek;

On December 7, 1941, Japan launched a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, which marked the beginning of the Pacific War and the official military cooperation between China and the US. Compared with political and economic ties and cooperation, the military cooperation between China and the US in the late period of the Chinese War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression was particularly direct and prominent. Defeating the Japanese army to win the war was the greatest common interest of China and the US, and also the basis and driving force for building and promoting the bilateral relations between the two countries.

The China-US air force cooperation was the most direct link between the military cooperation of two sides. ⁽¹⁾ The cooperation included joint command, coordinated operations, intelligence gathering, military training, and logistics supply with the goal of breaking the air blockade of the Japanese army and gradually gaining the air control in the battlefield. Among the existing research results, the research on the Flying Tigers of the US Air Force is the most prominent, and descriptive popular works keep coming out. However, rigorous academic studies still fall short, and most of them are biographies written by American scholars. ⁽²⁾ Most of the works and articles often generally refer to the American Volunteer Group led by Claire Lee Chennault as the Flying Tigers. In terms of the phase of time, the air force led by Claire Lee Chennault went through three different phases: American Volunteer Group in the Chinese Air Force (1941–1942.7, hereinafter referred to as the American Volunteer Group), the China Air Task Force (1942.7–1943.7) and the 14th Air Force (1943.7–1945). In the first phase, the air force belonged to the Chinese Air Force, and in the latter two phases, it belonged to the US forces. The differences and changes in the nature of the force reflect the evolution of military assistance and cooperation between China and the US in wartime.

The establishment of the Volunteer Group was considered at the end of 1940 and officially decided in August 1941. Due to the time spent on aircraft equipment transportation and personnel training, the American Volunteer Group did not perform combat missions until the outbreak of the Pacific War. On December 20, 1941, the American Volunteer Group started the first battle in Kunming, and then won the reputation of “Flying Tigers” on both sides of the ocean with excellent combat records. On July 4, 1942, the American Volunteer Group, which had actually existed and participated in the battle for less than a year, was reorganized into the 23rd Fighter Group of the 10th US Army Air Forces (hereinafter referred to as the 10th Air Force).

the American Volunteer Group was once subordinated to the Chinese Air Force and then to the US Army. This change was of great significance to China-US military cooperation (especially air force cooperation). At present, the academic research of the establishment of the American Volunteer Group is quite detailed, but there is no special research on its reorganization. ⁽³⁾ Some American scholars gave rather negative comments about the process and results of the reorganization, and they believed that the problems caused by the reorganization to the American Volunteer Group were greater than the threat of the Japanese to it. ⁽⁴⁾ Some other scholars maintained that it was because members of the American Volunteer Group were not willing to stay in China, that the Group was replaced by the 10th Air Force. ⁽⁵⁾ Therefore, it is necessary to examine the background, process and results of the reorganization of the Volunteer Group.

Based on “Chennault papers,” “Chiang Kai-shek diaries,” “Tse-ven Soong papers” and “Lauchlin Bernard Currie papers” stored in the Hoover Institution Library and Archives at Stanford University, “Chiang Kai-shek’s Archives” in the “Academia Historica” in China’s Taipei, and relevant research of Chinese and foreign scholars, the study goes through the whole process of the reorganization of the American Volunteer Group, and mainly focuses on the attitudes and measures taken by high-level officials of China and the US and also the American Volunteer Group itself (mainly Chennault) towards the reorganization, so as to explore the division and agreement on general strategies between China and the US in as well as their influence on US-China military cooperation during the war. The study is expected to help the research of related topics.

1 Proposal of the reorganization of the American Volunteer Group

To explore the root of the reorganization of the American Volunteer Group, its essence must first be analyzed. The operation of an army depends on several major factors such as personnel, weapons, and logistics. In terms of personnel, the commander of the American Volunteer Group was Chennault, an US veteran and consultant of the Chinese Air Force. He had great autonomy in commanding combats, but was controlled by the China Aviation Commission ⁽⁶⁾ and subject to the highest command of Chiang Kai-shek. From the perspective of the composition of the American Volunteer Group, both staffs of fighters and ground crews responsible for maintenance were recruited from the US. At the legal level, these people were just “employees” of China’s Central Aircraft Manufacturing Company, and “had nothing to do with” the US Army. Especially the pilots who would fight in the air had high salaries and bonuses. ⁽⁷⁾

In terms of weapons, the American Volunteer Group was mainly equipped with P-40 fighters (codenamed “Battleaxes”) at that time which were purchased by the Chinese government, shipped from the US to Myanmar for assembly and put into use. However, China was not capable to produce this type of fighter aircraft and could only provide maintenance for it. In addition, components of weapons, ammunition, and fuel for the American Volunteer Group were all subject to the follow-up assistance from the US.

The daily expenses and logistics of an army are important for maintaining its operations. Although China could use the loan funds provided by the US to obtain weapons and materials, all personnel expenses of the American Volunteer Group must be paid by China in cash. ⁽⁸⁾ At the beginning of September 1941, shortly after the formation of the American Volunteer Group, the Nationalist Government’s special fund for it deposited in the Bank of China in New York was running low. ⁽⁹⁾ Chiang Kai-shek eagerly hoped that the problem could be resolved with the loaned fund. He called Tse-ven Soong and asked, “Can the expenditure of the US Air Force Volunteer Group be covered by the loaned fund or should it still be paid by China?” ⁽¹⁰⁾ Nevertheless, in order to avoid conflicts with Japan, the US was unwilling to bear the name of direct command of this Group. Therefore, Tse-ven Soong could only respond, “We have no choice but to pay for the outlay of the Group by ourselves; we can only wait to see the development of the situation, and then take further measures accordingly.” ⁽¹¹⁾

It can be seen that for the American Volunteer Group itself, the excessive supply distance was its fatal weakness. Both the recruited personnel and the subsequent supply of weapons needed to be shipped from the US. It was time-consuming and complicated. The American Volunteer Group established in August 1941 was originally decided to be the First Volunteer Group. To expand its size, China actively negotiated with the US to determine the plans for the Second Volunteer Group and the Third Volunteer Group. With the support of President Roosevelt, the Second Volunteer Group would have 82 bomber pilots and 359 ground crew members who set off from California on November 21, 1941. ⁽¹²⁾ The Third Volunteer Group in the plan was a fighter brigade. The above two volunteer groups were planned to have 269 fighters and 66 bombers, which were more powerful than the existing First Volunteer Group. ⁽¹³⁾ Before the UK and the US officially entered the war, the British Army also intended to allow a fighter squadron and a bomber squadron to join the American Volunteer Group as “volunteers” to fill its gaps in personnel and weapons. ⁽¹⁴⁾

The hidden hazard in the operation of the American Volunteer Group also lay in the attitude of the US military. The US military initially disapproved of the American Volunteer Group. After the formation of the group, George Marshall, the Chief of Staff of the US Army, tried to control the command of it. On July 15, 1941, he stated that the Chinese government should agree that the head of the US Air Force delegation to China would be the sole determinant of whether the American Volunteer Group could fight. ⁽¹⁵⁾ Although China finally chose Chennault as the commander, Marshall stressed on August 30 that (1) whether the American Volunteer Group could fight should be determined by the US military delegation or another specially designated delegation; (2) the American Volunteer Group should be composed of and directed by experienced aviation personnel in the US. ⁽¹⁶⁾ The American Volunteer Group which was affiliated with the Chinese Air Force had certain “independence” compared with the regular US military, but was limited in many ways by the US military. For example, when Chennault asked the US Army Air Force to send additional staff to the American Volunteer Group through Lauchlin Currie, Henry Harley Arnold, the Commander of the US Army Air Force, refused and showed a qualified opinion towards the staff serving in the Group with “civilian identity.” ⁽¹⁷⁾

After the Pearl Harbor incident broke out, the US officially entered the war and formed a military alliance with China, which greatly changed the operation situation of the American Volunteer Group. In view of the rapid superiority of the Japanese army in the Pacific and Southeast Asia after the war, the US Department of the Army estimated that the Japanese army would pose a threat to the US west coast, which caused a great suspicion of danger in the army. Bombers, which were the main equipment of the Second Volunteer Group, were waiting to be airlifted in California at the time, and were then quickly used by the US military in the name of war emergency. The two batches of pilots en route to Myanmar were also urgently requisitioned by the US garrison in Australia and other places. ⁽¹⁸⁾ It had been completely impossible to recruit members for the American Volunteer Group in the US military since then. This was unexpected for Chennault and other people. ⁽¹⁹⁾ The plan that the British Army had previously promised to assist the American Volunteer Group was also cancelled as the UK entered the war.

After Japan declared war on the UK and the US, the entire ocean route was no longer safe, and transporting supplies from the US to Myanmar and China became noticeably more difficult. At this time, the American Volunteer Group that was out of the US military establishment was like a “solitary army.” Without

the replenishment of personnel and weapon support, it would be exhausted in continuous battles.

Currie ⁽²⁰⁾ was an important consultant who assisted in the formation of the American Volunteer Group and was active in both China and the US. On December 8, 1941, Currie made a suggestion to the US President Roosevelt to reorganize the American Volunteer Group as a regular army in order to provide supplies and personnel to the Myanmar army. ⁽²¹⁾ Roosevelt asked Currie to present this issue to the Army on December 9. ⁽²²⁾ After receiving a response from the military, Currie stated in a telegram to John Magruder, the head of the US military delegation in Chongqing, that the reorganization would allow the American Volunteer Group to get a steady increase in aircraft, supplies, and personnel, and if it was still outside the US Army, it would be impossible to achieve the goal. ⁽²³⁾

Before the Pearl Harbor incident, Magruder also proposed to strengthen the American Volunteer Group with the help of the US Army, but the US military did not support it. It was not until the week after the US entered the war that Marshall officially authorized Magruder to handle the reorganization of the American Volunteer Group. ⁽²⁴⁾ Magruder immediately invited Chennault and the American Volunteer Group to return to the US military establishment in a telegram on December 12. ⁽²⁵⁾

As soon as Chennault knew about the reorganization, he wrote to Madame Chiang to inquire about Chiang Kai-shek's opinions about it. Chennault said that the reorganization would save money for China, strengthen the American Volunteer Group, and help strictly enforce discipline. At the same time, he pointed out that the US might assign a commander who was not familiar with China's situation to the American Volunteer Group. ⁽²⁶⁾ The American Volunteer Group started their first combat in Kunming on December 20, and subsequently achieved an excellent result in the battle of Yangon. Chennault suggested that Magruder should ask the US military for the replenishment of aircraft, personnel, and parts to maintain the effectiveness of the American Volunteer Group. ⁽²⁷⁾

From this point of view, the original intention of the reorganization of the American Volunteer Group was to solve the shortage of materials and personnel in order to strengthen the air power in China and Myanmar battlefields. However, the issue of command after the reorganization had become the key to influencing the process. The personal factors of Commander Chennault and different opinions held by the Chinese officials on the reorganization had complicated the issue of the reorganization of the American Volunteer Group, causing it to last for several months and have an impact on China-US military cooperation.

2 Magruder’s plans and Chennault’s rank issue

In the initial phase of the reorganization of the American Volunteer Group, Magruder, the then head of the US military delegation to China, played a significant role. The Magruder military delegation was formed before the outbreak of the Pacific War due to the concern of the US over the development of lean lease business in China and the intensification of the military situation in the Far East. In the US's view, the main function of the delegation was to help the Chinese government in obtaining the corresponding military defense assistance in accordance with the *Lend-lease Act*, and ensure that the assistance was used most effectively. ⁽²⁸⁾ However, China held different expectations. In July 1941, when the US Government expressed its willingness to send a high-level military delegation to China, Chiang Kai-shek immediately responded that he hoped that the delegation could include Air Force officers from the rank of colonel and above whose mission was to help China build an air force. ⁽²⁹⁾ Tse-ven Soong emphasized that China “merely lacks aircraft and ordnance” in a conversation with Magruder, hoping that Magruder could help the US military to understand China's needs more accurately so that the US will “quickly ship as many weapons as possible to China.” ⁽³⁰⁾ On October 27, 1941, when Chiang Kai-shek met Magruder for the first time, he proposed that the US send several Air Force officers to help China build a new air force, ⁽³¹⁾ and further expressed his willingness to authorize these officers to take charge of the formation work. ⁽³²⁾

After the outbreak of the Pacific War, the mission and authority of the Magruder military delegation had new changes. Marshall had previously instructed Magruder to pay attention to “the American Volunteer Group and its supply issues,” and authorized Magruder to take charge of the reorganization of the American Volunteer Group after the Pearl Harbor incident.

The first difficulty that Magruder encountered was how to arrange Chennault's position. The American Volunteer Group had been inseparable from Chennault since its preparation for establishment. After its victory, Chennault became even more famous. Neither China nor the US should ignore its role. Unlike the members of the American Volunteer Group who came to China for the first time, Chennault had served the Nationalist Government for four years as a “colonel.” ⁽³³⁾ However, he himself retired under the rank of “Captain of the US Army.” If he returned to the regular army, his position might be a tough problem. ⁽³⁴⁾

On December 12, 1941, Magruder sent Chennault a telegram inviting the American Volunteer Group to return to the US Army. However, Chennault did not expect that Magruder did not mention the issues of his rank, and the reorganized Air Force stationed in China was also not under his command. ⁽³⁵⁾ Therefore, when Madame Chiang asked him to participate in the discussion of the reorganization, Magruder delayed the time on the grounds of having to stay in bed because of “a relapse of tracheitis.” He also pointed out that in view of the complexity of the problem, the American Volunteer Group should not be incorporated into the US Army Air Force, and “it can play a better role under current conditions. The pilots are unanimously willing to be led by me and supervised by President Chiang.” ⁽³⁶⁾

Magruder formally proposed to the US War Department on December 31, 1941 that the American Volunteer Group be included in the Army Air Corps and changed into the 23rd Fighter Group. Magruder's proposal can be divided into two parts. One is the command of the American Volunteer Group, and the other is the reorganization of members of the American Volunteer Group. As for the former, Magruder proposed that he would serve as the commander of the reorganized US Air Force stationed in China. Regarding the latter, Magruder suggested that members of the American Volunteer Group could receive an one-time compensation for the difference between the contract and the military salary. Those who refused to accept the reorganization, or “do not meet the US Army's standards,” could be replaced by Chinese pilots and ground staff. In this way, “the spirit of mutual assistance and solidarity of the democratic front is demonstrated to the world.” ⁽³⁷⁾

Magruder's pursuit of command of the Air Force stationed in China not only surprised Chennault, but also met with opposition from China. On December 31, Magruder had a meeting with Chiang Kai-shek and proposed an Volunteer Group reorganization plan, but Chiang Kai-shek rejected the request on the spot. Chiang wrote in his diary, “In terms of the command issue of US Air Force in China, Magruder proposes to command it directly by himself. I state that any army in China's territory should under China's control. He did not agree and I insist. He says he needs to enquire about the Washington's opinion before making decisions. I reply that even if Washington has the same view as him, I still disagree.” ⁽³⁸⁾ From the Chinese side, Chiang Kai-shek and Tse-ven Soong still preferred Chennault to lead the China-US Joint Air Force. ⁽³⁹⁾

Chennault knew that the American Volunteer Group must be supplemented by personnel and weapons, but he had a plan about it other than “reorganization.” On January 12, 1942, he pointed out to Tse-ven Soong that the American Volunteer Group needed a supply of six fighters and ten pilots per week. Regarding the differences between the regular army and the American Volunteer Group, Chennault also proposed that the

newly added personnel did not need to “retire from current duty,” but only needed to sign a corresponding contract with China Central Aircraft Manufacturing Company. ⁽⁴⁰⁾Chennault then wrote to Magruder, stating that the reorganization which might take as long as four to six months would cause the reduction of the operational efficiency of the American Volunteer Group. In addition, he expressed with great confidence that in view of his understanding of the Chinese battlefield, he should be appointed as a general-class officer of the US Army Air Force and the commander of the Chinese Air Force, who could lead both the American Volunteer Group and the future US Air Force stationed in China. ⁽⁴¹⁾

On January 19, 1942, Magruder once again told Chiang Kai-shek that the US War Department had intended to designate him as the commander of the US Air Force in China and Myanmar. ⁽⁴²⁾To reassure Chiang, Magruder pointed out through Marshall’s telegram that the establishment of the American Volunteer Group was originally to aid China, and after it was reorganized into the official US Air Force, its mission would remain consistent, and would still be to provide service for China. In this reorganization plan, the American Volunteer Group would become the official air force of the US stationed in China and Myanmar. Magruder also mentioned that those stationed in China should follow the orders of Chiang Kai-shek, while those in Myanmar should be controlled by General Archibald Percival Wavell. ⁽⁴³⁾ In this regard, Chiang Kai-shek expressed his dissatisfaction when discussing with Tse-ven Soong that, “(1) The US Air Force stationed in China can be relocated to Myanmar at any time. If its duties and regions cannot be divided, both parties will not be able to use it. (2) Since China and Myanmar are both battlefields, the issue of whom Magruder should report to will be a tough question for both sides. (3) Chennault is an air force expert. Whether such a composition is desired by him is also a question. (4) China is very willing that the US sends a senior military officer to China to help with the war. However, Magruder is not an air force expert, so it is hard for both the Chinese and the US Air Force personnel to believe in him.” ⁽⁴⁴⁾ “One person is in the charge of two commanders from China and the UK, serving in two battlefields, and then commanding the Air Force as an Army staff.” ⁽⁴⁵⁾ This was unacceptable to Chiang Kai-shek.

To make Chennault agree to the reorganization, Magruder also told Chiang Kai-shek that “I approve of Chennault’s great contribution in this crisis, and qualities of a military leader he has shown has also been unanimously admired. Therefore, this reorganization has no intention of reducing the importance of his position.” As for Madame Chiang, she pointed out to Magruder to his face that “if the reorganization is inevitable, then he (Chennault) advocates that he must be promoted to Major General. ⁽⁴⁶⁾This is because that he is the only competent person to command the US Air Force in China. If his official rank is still a colonel, it may hinder the execution of his duties.” Magruder said that if he was the commander of the US Army in China and Myanmar, it would not be difficult to raise Chennault’s rank. He stated that he himself had no intention of forcing the reorganization, but “if Magruder insists on holding a negative attitude, his position will be affected.” Moreover, Magruder also pointed out that “If Chennault agrees with reorganization, he will undoubtedly be the commander of the Air Force. I know that there are still five or six Air Force officers in the US who can serve as commanders, but none of them is as good and happy to take charge as Chennault.” ⁽⁴⁷⁾ The implication was that Chennault was not the only option of the US War Department. To increase the weight of his say, Magruder claimed that the US military had granted him extensive administrative power to facilitate the reorganization. ⁽⁴⁸⁾ However, Chiang Kai-shek and his wife insisted on speaking for Chennault, demanding to keep his commanding position, and having repulsion to Magruder. After being repeatedly rejected by Chiang Kai-shek, Magruder also reluctantly reported to the War Department that Chennault was likely to be the only one who had the qualifications and experience and could effectively command American and Chinese air forces. ⁽⁴⁹⁾

What also disappointed Chiang Kai-shek with Magruder was his grab for power as a representative in China and the distortion of some of his reports. ⁽⁵⁰⁾ On January 5, 1942, in a report submitted by Magruder to the War Department, without providing factual evidence, he predicted that the Chinese government would arrange a truce with Japan to make the US confront Japan alone, and pointed out that Chiang Kai-shek intended to hoard US aid supplies “in order to prepare for post-war military operations.” ⁽⁵¹⁾Some scholars believed that this report might also be fabricated by Magruder after he failed to seize power to vent his indignation, and use his special identity to seek revenge. ⁽⁵²⁾

As Chiang Kai-shek officially served as the supreme commander-in-chief in the Chinese battlefield, military cooperation between China and the US was heating up. To deepen the cooperative relationship, Chiang Kai-shek proposed that the US appoint a high-ranking military officer as the chief of staff of the newly formed joint force in the Chinese battlefield. The US military also hoped to advance China-US military cooperation and maintain the Chinese battlefield by sending military officers with higher authority to China. ⁽⁵³⁾ In relation to the reorganization of the American Volunteer Group and the arrival of the US Air Force in China, senior US military officials had decided to include the commander of the Air Force into the leaderships of the Chief of Staff in the Chinese battlefield. On January 23, 1942, Henry Lewis Stimson, the Secretary of the US War Department stated in a letter to Tse-ven Soong that senior assistants of the Chief Representative of the War Department to China should include an officer from the air force. He said that one of the responsibilities of such an officer was to command the US Air Force stationed in China, help organize the training of the Chinese Air Force and take charge of the Air Force operations of the general headquarters in the Chinese battlefield. ⁽⁵⁴⁾

To better promote China-US air force cooperation, Chiang Kai-shek had asked the US to send two officers to China at the same time. One was an army officer who would serve as the chief of staff of the joint army, while the other was an army air force officer who would preside over China’s air force affairs. ⁽⁵⁵⁾ Therefore, with regard to the issue that the US “will send another senior Air Force officer to China,” Chiang Kai-shek maintained that, “it is still up to the US government, and China has no objection.” However, he gave a tactful suggestion to the US through Tse-ven Soong that, “Chennault’s feelings for the Chinese Air Force and his spirit of cooperation are definitely greater than any new senior personnel. If the US does not have a suitable senior Air Force officer to China at this time, it will be very appropriate for him to fill this post.” ⁽⁵⁶⁾ On January 29, Stimson stated that the US greatly agreed with such an arrangement, and Chennault would be promoted to Brigadier General in due course. ⁽⁵⁷⁾

At this point, Magruder’s proposal was suspended as his own right of speech diminished, while Chennault would return to the “active duty” of the US Army and be promoted. Nonetheless, who should command the American Volunteer Group after its reorganization still had not been decided, and the reorganization work was still under discussion.

3 Determination of Chennault’s command and reorganization plan

When Magruder proposed to reorganize the American Volunteer Group, he mainly focused on solving the problem of the supply of personnel and materials. With the deepening of China-US military cooperation, the reorganization issue of the American Volunteer Group which was an effective strength in the battlefields of China and Myanmar, was incorporated into the overall strategic deployment of the US for consideration.

On June 27, 1940, the US, which had not yet joined the war, had clearly put forward the strategic concepts of “Europe first and then Asia” and “first Germany and then Japan,” that was, the US should take complete defensive actions in the Pacific, and make major efforts in the Atlantic. ⁽⁵⁸⁾ On February 15, 1942, Roosevelt and his chief diplomatic adviser then, Harry Lloyd Hopkin, ⁽⁵⁹⁾ discussed the situation after the fall of

Singapore. Hopkins put forward the “two-wing theory,” that was, the right wing was based on Australia and New Zealand, and the left wing was on Myanmar, India, and China. ⁽⁶⁰⁾ The defense focus of the US was more on the Australian side. This not only affected the reorganization of the American Volunteer Group, but also affected the US investment in air force in the battlefields of China, Myanmar and India.

As an ally of China, the US should send a regular force into the Chinese battlefield to fight against Japan together. However, due to the “grand strategy” and the difficulties in the transport in the battlefields of China and Myanmar, it was hard for the US to send a large number of troops in a short term. Clarence Edward Gauss, the US ambassador to China, stated in a report that military assistance, especially assistance, for air force, might have a greater psychological impact than military benefits; the United States had not taken enough military action in China; even if the US air forces were limited, they would provide China with positive evidence that they were fighting for China and themselves. He proposed that regardless of whether the American Volunteer Group was incorporated into the regular army, its personnel and equipment should remain unchanged and be gradually increased. ⁽⁶¹⁾ When the US military system entered China, the American side felt that if these Volunteer Group members with low-discipline but high salaries continued to exist, it would greatly damage the morale of ordinary soldiers. ⁽⁶²⁾ Therefore, reorganizing the American Volunteer Group became a necessary step in the overall strategic planning of the US military. ⁽⁶³⁾

After consultations with the US Army, and with China’s approval, Joseph Stilwell assumed the post of Chief of Staff of the allied forces in the Chinese battlefield, and China-US military cooperation entered a new stage. Among the staff who traveled to China with Stilwell, Clayton Bissell, the Air Force’s senior staff would be the direct leader of the US Air Force in China. This meant that Stimson’s previous promise of ensuring Chennault’s command of the US Air Force in China was not fulfilled.

In the new reorganization plan of the American Volunteer Group, Bissell took the overall picture, and Chennault gained command of the US fighter and light bomber fleets stationed in China, excluding the heavy bomber fleet. Currie told Chennault that although the military held a good attitude towards him, Bissell could get more cooperation from it. ⁽⁶⁴⁾ Unlike Stilwell and Magruder who just came from the Army, Bissell was a standard Army Air Force officer, who was quite different from Chennault in terms of tactics on fighters, and had deep-rooted prejudice against Chennault. ⁽⁶⁵⁾ Chennault could not accept this arrangement. He claimed that the cancellation of his air command in the Chinese battlefield was not good for all parties. Chennault advised the War Department to select a person who would work well with him. If Bissell was still in office, he would be “deeply disappointed” and chose to resign on the grounds of poor health. ⁽⁶⁶⁾

When Stilwell learned of his mission to China, he knew about the reorganization of the American Volunteer Group. On February 9, 1942, Currie told Arnold Chennault’s opinions on the reorganization in Washington. Stilwell mentioned in his diary that it seemed that Marshall had promised Chiang Kai-shek that Chennault could be a senior air force commander. Stilwell expressed his dissatisfaction with Chennault’s approach of disobeying disciplines, and he supported Bissell to be “ranked above Chennault.” In his diary, Stilwell revealed why the US military was annoyed. It was not for the Chinese to tell the US who could and could not be its subordinates. China’s interference in the US personnel arrangement extremely disgusted the US war Department, ⁽⁶⁷⁾ and the close relationship between Chennault and Chiang Kai-shek also made the Department doubt Chiang’s motivation. ⁽⁶⁸⁾

As for changes in the personnel of the Air Force made by the US military, Chinese senior officials also had new views. On February 5, 1942, Tse-ven Soong informed Chiang Kai-shek of the views of the US military and Stilwell in a confidential telegraph, stating that the US believed that “when it launches counterattacks against Japan, the base of the Air Force must be in China,” and the American Volunteer Group as well as the Chinese Air Force should have suitable commanders in case in the future it would dispatch air forces to China for joint operations. The US maintained that with Chennault’s skills, experience, qualifications, and the relationship with the US Air Force, whether he was competent for the commanding post was uncertain. ⁽⁶⁹⁾ In other words, the US believed that it was more appropriate for Bissell to hold the highest position of the air force at the joint headquarters and take charge.

As far as China was concerned, the reorganization of the American Volunteer Group was not merely a reorganization of an air force, but also involved the subsequent entry of the air force into the Chinese battlefield. To mobilize the US military assistance to a greater extent, Tse-ven Soong told Chiang Kai-shek that “Bissell really has deep relationships with senior military officers of the US Air Force and enjoys great fame. For the sake of future, it is a pity that we lose the chance of having him in China.” ⁽⁷⁰⁾ It was hoped that the arrival of senior US Air Force officers would enable China to receive more air assistance from the US and allow the regular Air Force to enter the Chinese battlefield.

The relationship between Chiang Kai-shek and Chennault was not consistent with what the US and the outside world believed. Chennault worked with Chiang for many years, but he disagreed with many of Chiang’s actions. ⁽⁷¹⁾ Chiang Kai-shek also judged Chennault’s opinions based on different situations, and he did not support him blindly. On March 4, 1942, when Chiang discussed the Air Force’s reconnaissance of enemies and future arrangement plan in Myanmar with Chennault in Lashio, he thought that, “this person cannot bear heavy responsibilities.” ⁽⁷²⁾ Accordingly, Chiang did not insist that Chennault be the commander of the US Air Force in China.

Therefore, China accepted the US decision. Currie forwarded a telegram to Chennault through Tse-ven Soong, stating that “Arnold also highly appreciates the American Volunteer Group,” “Bissell can obtain supplies from the army, which is crucial for large-scale operations,” and “China’s interests require not only good material support, but also good strategies.” ⁽⁷³⁾ When both the US and China had made a decision, Chennault could do nothing but choose to compromise. He wrote back to Tse-ven Soong and Currie, saying that he was willing to “work in any capacity in an organization that can fight most effectively.” ⁽⁷⁴⁾

In March 1942, after Stilwell and Bissell arrived in Chongqing one after another, they immediately held an official meeting with Chiang Kai-shek and his wife. Chiang Kai-shek said that Bissell’s “position in the Air Force has been determined by General Stilwell and will not conflict with Chennault’s.” ⁽⁷⁵⁾ Hence, in the situation assessment report submitted to Marshall, Stilwell stated that he believed Chennault’s issue could be successfully resolved, and the American Volunteer Group could also be reorganized within a reasonable time. ⁽⁷⁶⁾ Stilwell contended that for the reorganization plan, the first principle was to maintain the maximum efficiency of the American Volunteer Group during its reorganization. With regard to Chennault’s position in the new system, Stilwell suggested that both Bissell and Chennault be promoted to the US Brigadier General, but the commencement date of Chennault’s rank should be one day after Bissell, indicating the difference in status between the two. ⁽⁷⁷⁾

On April 1, 1942, accompanied by Madame Chiang, Chiang Kai-shek discussed the reorganization of the American Volunteer Group with Stilwell, Chennault and Magruder. All parties agreed that Chennault would continue to command the fighter and light bomber units stationed in China after the reorganization. Regarding the dissolution date of the American Volunteer Group, Chennault proposed the date of July 16, while Bissell proposed July 1. Then in accordance with Madame Chiang’s suggestion, it was decided to be July 4, 1942. ⁽⁷⁸⁾ The reorganization plan for the American Volunteer Group left Chennault a three-month buffer period to adapt to the new war layout. Bissell also promised to maintain the efficiency of the American Volunteer Group after its reorganization, and 33 airmen who were experienced in flying P40 aircrafts would arrive in China in early May. ⁽⁷⁹⁾ It can be said that the most important reason why China and Chennault

were willing to sacrifice the independence of the American Volunteer Group was that before its official reorganization on July 4, the American Volunteer Group could not only maintain its identity as a Chinese Air Force, but also receive logistical support from the US military. Bissell said that the support of the US Air Force for China would reinforce the strength of the American Volunteer Group as soon as possible, which would directly assist the Chinese military in the frontline of Myanmar and accelerate the organization of the 10th Army of the US Air Force in India, so as to prevent Japan from cutting off air transportation plans of China.” (80)

4 “Beyond expectation”: reorganization of members of the American Volunteer Group and Changes in air force strength in the Chinese battlefield

The reorganization plan was determined through consultation among all parties. After addressing the problem of Chennault’s rank and commanding right, the reorganization of the American Volunteer Group returned to its fundamental issue, that is, personnel supplies and weapon assistance. However, the results of the reorganization and subsequent reinforcements of the American Volunteer Group were not as good as what envisaged by China and the US.

4.1 Reorganization of members of the American Volunteer Group

The fighter pilots, crew members, and ground crew members of the American Volunteer Group were all employed by China Central Aircraft Manufacturing Company in the form of contracts. Their generous salaries and rewards for shooting down enemy aircrafts made them have no hesitation to take risks and pursue fame and fortune. After getting away from the cumbersome dogma of the regular army, the discipline of the American Volunteer Group soon became a real headache. As the war continued to escalate, the mentality of members of the American Volunteer Group also changed.

While the American Volunteer Group was still training, Chiang Kai-shek had noticed that its members were “undisciplined and complicated in their internal spirits,” and thus “he tries to bring their attention to the military discipline.” (81) Chennault’s loose management could increase the enthusiasm of the American Volunteer Group members to a greater extent. However, once the war worsened, or even fell into an unfavorable situation, the American Volunteer Group’s lack of discipline would produce adverse effects. According to Chennault, just before the Pearl Harbor incident broke out, 12 pilots and six other service personnel were expelled, and after the incident, another 10 pilots and 37 service personnel were “dishonorably fired.” One of the main reasons was their cowardice at that critical time. (82)

Discipline issues of the members of the American Volunteer Group directly affected whether they could be incorporated into other forces. In fact, when the American Volunteer Group was reorganized, Chennault had already expected that the members of the American Volunteer Group would rather resign than be reassigned. The American Volunteer Group would disband, but the War Department would not be able to replace it with an equally effective organization. (83)

In April 1942, the news of the reorganization of the American Volunteer Group was officially announced. Certainly, as combatants, the group members did not know the details of the reorganization which were decided by senior officials of China and the US. Some members believed that Chennault sacrificed their interests to chase his own rank and future. This led to a “pilot rebellion” incident. (84) Chennault declared sternly that these members would get the reputation of “being discharged from active military service dishonorably.” The incident did not escalate, but the morale and combat enthusiasm of the entire group was greatly reduced. After that, many pilots and ground crews left the American Volunteer Group through various means. (85) Chennault was forced to propose to the War Department to strongly request the President to issue an initiative to all members of the American Volunteer Group asking them to stick to their posts, and pledging to send reinforcements as soon as possible. He also acknowledged that the volunteer group was tired with rather low spirit and morale. (86) Many members were physically and mentally exhausted due to tough battles, unpleasant climate and food. All these had cast a shadow on the reassignment of members of the American Volunteer Group, and these “accidents” had not been expected by both China and the US.

On May 21, 1942, Bissell and Chennault met with pilots and ground crews of the American Volunteer Group in Kunming. For those who did not accept the reorganization, their contract with the Chinese side would be terminated on July 4, and they would receive remuneration including vacation pay and USD 500 for travel expenses. For those who accepted, they could receive the same remuneration as those who left, plus the difference between the military salary and the salary stipulated in the contract. (87)

Most members of the American Volunteer Group were reserve officers before the war. If, after the reorganization, they could formally become regular US military officers, they would not reject continuing to join the 23rd Fighter Group. However, Bissell failed to “make a correct assessment of the situation.” First of all, he stated that the highest rank that all pilots of the American Volunteer Group could obtain after they were incorporated into the US Army was “Reserve Major,” while the ground crew could only become technical sergeants. (88) When the group members wanted to ask for the treatment that regular army should have, they were threatened by Bissell who claimed that once they returned to the US, they would be immediately recruited as army infantry. As a result, both pilots and the ground crew lost confidence in the arrangements of being redeployed to the US army.

After obtaining an official position in the military, Chennault also chose to “stand by and watch” how members of the American Volunteer Group were redeployed. He, for one thing, wanted to see Bissell make a fool of himself, and, for another, tried to ease the tension between him and the military. In the end, the redeployment of members of the American Volunteer Group was awful. When making comments on the reorganization process to the War Department, Stilwell said that the US military was replacing the battle-hardened members of the American Volunteer Group with personnel who lacked combat experience; in fact, it was those members who had left the group to return to the US in the face of the spread of the war and the crisis; they put their personal interests above national interests, which could not be publicized.” (89)

The neglect of the US of the situations of members of the American Volunteer Group and improper reorganization strategy adopted by Bissell and Chennault caused only five pilots of the entire group to agree to stay in China, and at the same time, 27 radiomen, crew chiefs, non-military personnel and logistics personnel joined the task force in China. With only 32 previous group members, plus a few army pilots who arrived in China, it was difficult for the 23rd Fighter Group to have sufficient combat effectiveness. According to Chennault, the (reorganized) Air Force Task Force in China was utterly pieced together in the sound of war, and it had to fight for gaining every group member, every spark plug and every gallon of gasoline. (90) When discussing the reorganization of the American Volunteer Group, many American scholars criticized Bissell for his inefficient and slow organizational ability, which affected the reorganization results. (91)

4.2 Reorganization of the American Volunteer Group and changes in Air Force Strength in the Chinese battlefield

In the battlefields of China and Myanmar, the American Volunteer Group was the air force that could not be ignored. As Chennault mentioned during the reorganization, once the reorganization was under way, it must take such air force three to six months to restore its original combat effectiveness. Chiang Kai-shek also insisted that the American Volunteer Group should not be reorganized at the cost of existing fighting capacity. ⁽⁹²⁾ However, after China approved of the reorganization plan, the US failed to meet the needs for air forces in the Chinese battlefield as agreed.

On March 5, 1942, to address the negative impact caused by Myanmar’s loss on the entire Far East defense system, the US formed the Tenth Air Force in India to perform air operations on the battlefields of China and Myanmar. Its ultimate combat objective was to attack Japan’s traffic lines which were through the China Sea and also to directly attack Japan. ⁽⁹³⁾ As the American Volunteer Group was being reorganized while fighting the war, the German-Italian coalition led by Erwin Rommel was approaching the hinterland of Egypt, and the Middle East was in crisis. Under the grand strategy of “Europe first and then Asia,” in order to strengthen the air force, the US deployed three Air Force fleets from the battlefields of China, Myanmar and India to reinforce the Middle East. The first fleet originally planned to base itself in China and conduct a bombing operation against Japan, but it was dispatched to Egypt in early June. The second fleet was the 10th Air Force in India. The third fleet, which included the 33 A-29 light bombers promised to be allocated to China in January 1942, was sent to Egypt for a guarding mission, on the grounds that these aid aircrafts were kept back when leaving the US and could not be shipped until the end of June. These transfers of air forces that were involved in supporting the Chinese battlefield had not obtained the consent of Chiang Kai-shek, the commander-in-chief of the Chinese battlefield, and even had not been discussed with him. ⁽⁹⁴⁾

In the face of China’s doubts, Roosevelt replied that the situation in China was quite tough, and air force assistance was also extremely significant; although they agreed unanimously to keep the original Air Force plans for China and India unchanged, Egypt and the southern part of the Soviet Union were in crisis at the same time, making it impossible for US to allocate more reinforcements; whatever happened, a hundred planes ordered before would all be supplied; this war in the summer was indeed critical, but he and Prime Minister Churchill truly sympathized with China, without any slight disregard; they already had plans to overcome problems in Myanmar. ⁽⁹⁵⁾ Chiang Kai-shek also questioned Stilwell, “President Roosevelt has telegraphed his order that the US 10th Air Force should be transferred from India to China. Once an order is given, it must be implemented without being changed. The situation in Egypt is serious. . . but the situation in Zhejiang and Jiangxi is also critical,” “The transfer of Air Forces from China to other battlefields proves that the Chinese battlefield is not valued. . . I would like to know in detail whether the United Kingdom and the US still regard the Chinese battlefield as one of the battlefields of the allies.” ⁽⁹⁶⁾ This reflected that although the US attached great importance to China’s strategic position, it did not intend to make more investment.

On July 4, 1942, the reestablished US Task Force in China had only 49 aircrafts when it entered combat. This was far fewer than what China and Chennault were promised when they agreed to reorganize the American Volunteer Group, and the number was even fewer than that the American Volunteer Group had during the Pacific War. In terms of the commanding right, as the US Army allowed only one air force per battlefield, and the Air Force Task Force in China was subordinated to the 10th Air Force in India. The air force in the Chinese battlefield was constrained by the New Delhi headquarters thousands of miles away, causing its combat efficiency to be greatly affected. Even worse, it was hard for the staff and equipment of the 10th Air Force to meet the minimum standards of the US military in 1942. ⁽⁹⁷⁾ When the news of the reorganization of the American Volunteer Group was released in New Delhi, even Stilwell said to Chiang Kai-shek that the move was “unfortunate.” He believed that this issue should not be made public, because the spread of the message that the air force on the Chinese battlefield weakened would allow the Japanese army to take the chance to conduct large-scale raids. ⁽⁹⁸⁾

In short, after more than half a year of fighting and reorganization of the American Volunteer Group, the Air Force in the Chinese battlefield had not been strengthened in quantity, but even retrogressed in terms of personnel quality. ⁽⁹⁹⁾ Both the redeployment of members of the American Volunteer Group or the subsequent transfer of reinforcements were “beyond expectation” for the US. This was not only a mistake made by the US, but also an inevitable result of its implementation of the “Europe first and then Asia” strategy and its neglect of the Chinese battlefield. After the American Volunteer Group was reorganized into the Air Task Force in China, China and Chennault fought for more aircraft supplies from the US, which became the theme of the next phase of China-US Air Force cooperation.

5 Conclusions

At the end of 1941, the outbreak of the Pacific War made China and the US officially become allies. The China-US alliance was the first real military alliance in the modern history of China. The Chinese government lacked sufficient experience and countermeasures in handling military cooperation and coordinated operations. By examining the reorganization process of the American Volunteer Group which lasted for more than half a year, we can have a deeper understanding of the nature of the American Volunteer Group and learn more about the focus and strategies of China and the US in military cooperation, thereby looking into the weakness of the alliance between these two countries.

For the American Volunteer Group itself, accepting reorganization was inevitable. During its early stage, due to the lack of equipment and low quality of personnel, even Chennault did not hold much expectation for its prospects at the beginning of the war. ⁽¹⁰⁰⁾ The P-40 aircrafts equipped by the American Volunteer Group was rather obsolete, and many parts were difficult to be replenished as they were discontinued for a long time. ⁽¹⁰¹⁾ After the US declared war on Japan, the entire army entered a wartime state. It was no longer possible to recruit “volunteers” from the US Army. Without subsequent reinforcements, this force would continue to lose members until no one survived in the combat. In addition, the US military controlled whether military materials could be leased, so the American Volunteer Group could only continue to fight if it was “restructured” and returned to the US military.

Certainly, under such an embarrassing situation, it was even more admirable for the American Volunteer Group to achieve such excellent records. The hard work of Chennault and the group members made both China and the US realize that this was a force that could not be overlooked. Although, most members of the American Volunteer Group were criticized for their mercenary nature since they left China without accepting being redeployed, according to scholars, most of the members who went back to the US returned to the front line to fight. ⁽¹⁰²⁾ It can be seen that the US military should accept most of the responsibilities for the failure of incorporating the American Volunteer Group.

Chennault’s desire for command during the reorganization process and resistance to the reorganization itself met with criticism from the US War Department and his colleagues. If Chennault failed to obtain the rank of general and was not assured of his commanding right, he might be assigned to other battlefields after being recruited by the Army. This undoubtedly had adverse effects on his display of talents and pursuit of future. ⁽¹⁰³⁾ It turned out that Chennault’s stay and command of the Chinese battlefield was of great benefit to both China and the US.

For the US military, reorganizing the American Volunteer Group was not only an inevitable requirement for unified command, but also facilitated the strategic deployment of the US in the Far East. At the beginning of the war, the US was unable to meet the needs of the battlefields of China, Myanmar and India in terms of military strength or material distribution. The American Volunteer Group had achieved unexpected results, (104) making the incorporation of this unit the least “invested” solution for the US. With both existing aircrafts and combatants, the reorganization of the American Volunteer Group became an “expedient measure.”

As far as China was concerned, in the case where the US could not send reinforcements from the Army, China’s demand for the Air Force assistance was extremely urgent. When the Magruder military delegation arrived in Chongqing in 1941, Chiang Kai-shek repeatedly emphasized that “What China urgently needs is still the Air Force.” (105) When Tse-ven Soong learned that the US wanted to make Bissell rank higher than Chennault, he pointed out that accepting Bissell was conducive to obtaining assistance from the US military. (106) While China understood that it was difficult for the US to change its strategy of “Europe first and then Asia,” asking “the US Air Force to send more units to China to assist in fighting” had also become became an “expedient measure.” (107)

In addition, the reorganization of the American Volunteer Group would help alleviate China’s financial pressure. By mid-January 1942, the funds of the Myanmar Central Aircraft Company were about to be drained, and the members of the American Volunteer Group did not receive their salary in December of last year. (108) On February 17, Qian Changzuo, the Supervisor of the Central Aircraft Manufacturing Company of Myanmar, wrote a letter to Tse-ven Soong requesting that another 400,000 rupees be paid to the Central Aircraft Manufacturing Company in Yangon, including the February salary of members of the American Volunteer Group. (109) Even Chennault himself also telegraphed Tse-ven Soong to ask about the issue of a 500- *yuan* bonus for per fighter the American Volunteer Group shot down. (110) If the American Volunteer Group had not been reorganized into the US military, its fund flow would obviously be a significant burden on the financially stretched Nationalist Government of China.

Judging from the results, the reorganization of the American Volunteer Group was not the best for both China and the US. For the US, most members of the American Volunteer Group chose to return to America instead of accepting being redeployed. As a result, the US had to dispatch personnel to China again to replace them. As far as China was concerned, solving the “problems of expansion and replenishment” of the American Volunteer Group was actually China’s lowest goal for China-US air force cooperation. “if we only focus on how to expand the American Volunteer Group, then China’s Air Force can never be brought up to its full strength.” (111) China hoped that while the US reorganized the Volunteer Group, it could also send more aircrafts, personnel and materials to assist the Chinese Air Force so as to fundamentally strengthen China’s air strength in the battlefield. However, when the US failed to deliver on its promises and left China in a difficult position, China became disappointed and conflicts then arose leading to cooperation troubles between the two countries. (112)

During the reorganization process of the American Volunteer Group, two factors had an impact on the subsequent China-US military cooperation.

The first one was the influence of the “Chennault factor” on China-US mutual trust. During the reorganization process, Chennault showed his need and desire for power and status. From the Chinese perspective, those were rewards for Chennault’s work in China for several years, and affirmation of the brilliant achievements of the American Volunteer Group led by him. Therefore, when Chennault strived to be the highest commander of the US Air Force stationed in China and asked for the rank of “Brigadier General,” Chiang Kai-shek and other Chinese officials showed consent and support. (113) However, from the perspective of the US military, even though Chennault had achieved great results, he was ultimately outside the “system.” In particular, Chennault had won the support of Chinese high-level officials. The US military was disgusted by this and also worried that it would not be able to control the reorganized Air Force in China. Therefore, it insisted that only military officers in the “system” could be the commander of the US Air Force in China.

Throughout the reorganization of the American Volunteer Group, the more pressure the US military exerted, the closer Chennault would be to Chiang Kai-shek; and the more the Chinese government “spoke” for Chennault in front of the US, the worse the US’ perception of Chennault would be. (114) Repeatedly, the US military’s prejudice against China was increasing. Chiang Kai-shek’s measures to gain independent command for Chennault were originally intended to enhance the combat effectiveness of the Air Force in the Chinese battlefield, but unexpectedly exacerbated the conflict between him and Stilwell, as well as misunderstandings held by the US military against him.

The second one was the impact of the “Air Force Model” on China-US Army cooperation. For the US, the “relatively smooth” cooperation in the Air Force had blinded the decision-making officials. In the process of the American Volunteer Group reorganization and the US-China Air Force cooperation, China had proposed that Chennault should serve as the Commander of US Air Force in China, and also train as well as lead the Chinese Air Force in coordinated operations. (115) The US military believed that when America’s military equipment, training tactics, and the quality of officers were better than China’s, China was willing to hand over its military leadership and build a Chinese army rebuilt and organized by Americans. (116) After Stilwell gained command of the Chinese Expeditionary Forces on the battlefield in Myanmar, Americans increasingly maintained that only by “gaining” the leadership could they help China to improve its army’s combat effectiveness. The interpretation of the “Air Force Model” into “one’s own wishful thinking” in the army level would undoubtedly offend the Chinese government and eventually lead to a greater crisis.

In summary, the reorganization of the American Volunteer Group in China was an “expedient measure” taken by all parties through continuous consultation. It had met the basic demands of all parties to a certain extent and resolved the lack of allied collaboration in the Chinese battlefield in the early stage of the Pacific War. However, as a prelude to the China-US wartime air force cooperation, this reorganization had implicitly demonstrated different interests and strategies of various parties. In more than 7 months since the American Volunteer Group’s first battle to its official reorganization, the interaction among Chinese high-level officials, the US military, and Chennault foreshadowed the “tortuous ups and downs” of China-US military cooperation in the following years.

(Translated by LUO Jing)

Footnote

[1]. (1) According to some scholars, during the Chinese War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression, the number of American troops stationed in China reached a maximum of more than 100,000, mainly air combat forces and air transport units. See Yan, J. *The Journal of Studies of China’s Resistance War Against Japan* (抗日战争研究),(3) (2007) . [\[^Back\]](#)

[2]. (2) Shortly after the end of the Second World War, Claire Lee Chennault published a book which was autobiography or memoirs in nature in 1949, namely Claire L. Chennault, *Way of a Fighter* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Son, 1949). Related biographies mainly include Martha Byrd, Chennault, *Giving Wings to the Tiger* (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1987); Jack Samson, *The Flying Tigers: The True Story of General Claire Chennault and the US 14th Air Force in China* (New York: Doubleday, 1987); Daniel Ford, *Flying Tigers: Claire Chennault and the American Volunteer Group* (Washington and London: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1991); Wanda Cornelius and Thayne R. Short, Ding Hao, *America's Air War in China, 1937–1945* (Gretna: Pelican Publishing Company, 1980); Sam Kleiner, *The Flying Tigers: The Untold Story of the American Pilots Who Waged a Secret War against Japan* (New York: Viking, 2018). [\[[^]Back\]](#)

[3]. (3) Main research papers include Gu, X. & Yao, B. *The Chinese Journal of American Studies* (美国研究), (4) (1989); Jin, G. in Wang, J. & Yan J. (eds.) *China, East Asia and World in Modern Time (Vol. 2)* (近代中国、东亚与世界(下卷)). Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press (2008); Wang, Y. master's thesis, College of Literature and History of Northwest Normal University (2009); Hideki Shinomachi in Wang, J. & Luan, J. (eds.). *Modern China: Politics and Diplomacy*(Vol. 2) (近代中国: 政治与外交(下卷)). Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press (2010); Xu, F. master's thesis, Department of History of Anhui University (2014). [\[[^]Back\]](#)

[4]. (4) Keith Ayling, *Old Leatherface of the Flying Tigers* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1945), p. 166. [\[[^]Back\]](#)

[5]. (5) Chi-Hsin Kang, The Military Modernization of China in the War against Japan: Impacts of American Aid and US-China Military Cooperation (Ph.D Dissertation, St. John's University, 2015), p. 46. [\[[^]Back\]](#)

[6]. (6) The China Aviation Commission was the highest commanding body of the Chinese Air Force during the Chinese War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression. Chiang Kai-shek was the chairman, and Zhou Zhirou, the director, was responsible for its daily work. [\[[^]Back\]](#)

[7]. (7) The contract stipulated that the monthly salary of the pilot was USD 600, the squadron leader USD 750, the ground crew not less than USD 250, plus USD 30 of allowance as well as travel expenses per month, 30 days of paid leave, and free accommodation. Those who destroyed one Japanese plane would be rewarded USD 500. See Chen, X. 陈纳德与飞虎队. Shanghai: Xuelin Press, 62 (1988). [\[[^]Back\]](#)

[8]. (8) Cao, J. 抗战时期中美租借援助关系. Shanghai: Orient Publishing Center, 110 (2015). [\[[^]Back\]](#)

[9]. (9) T. V. Soong to R. C. Chen, September 6, 1941, Hoover Institution Archives, T. V. Soong papers, Box 2, folder 2. [\[[^]Back\]](#)

[10]. (10) 蒋中正电询宋子文中国空军美志愿队经费可否由租借案内拨发抑由中国支付 (November 21, 1941), Taipei, “Academia Historica” Collection, Chiang Kai-shek “President” Cultural Relics Archives, 002/020300/00025/010. [\[[^]Back\]](#)

[11]. (11) 宋子文致蒋介石报告美航空志愿队开支浩大电 (November 22, 1941), in Wu, J. & Guo, D. (eds.) *Select Telegrams between Chiang Kai-shek and T. V. Soong (1940–1943)* (宋子文驻美时期电报选 (1940–1943)). Shanghai: Fudan University Press, 132 (2008). [\[[^]Back\]](#)

[12]. (12) Daniel Ford, *Flying Tigers, Claire Chennault and the American Volunteer Group*, p. 94. [\[[^]Back\]](#)

[13]. (13) Memorandum from Roosevelt for the Secretary of the Navy, September 30, 1941, Hoover Institution Archives, Lauchlin Bernard Currie papers, Box 2, folder 8. [\[[^]Back\]](#)

[14]. (14) Claire L. Chennault, *Way of A Fighter*, p. 120. [\[[^]Back\]](#)

[15]. (15) Jack Samson, *The Flying Tigers*, p. 91. [\[[^]Back\]](#)

[16]. (16) Marshall to Currie, August 30, 1941, Hoover Institution Archives, Lauchlin Bernard Currie papers, Box 2, folder 8. [\[[^]Back\]](#)

[17]. (17) Arnold to Currie, December 3, 1941, Hoover Institution Archives, Lauchlin Bernard Currie papers, Box 2, folder 5. [\[[^]Back\]](#)

[18]. (18) Certainly, when requisitioning these volunteers, the US military paid their salaries at the Central Aircraft Manufacturing Company in China until December 31, 1941. See R. W. Bonneville to Currie, December 22, 1941, Hoover Institution Archives, Lauchlin Bernard Currie papers, Box 2, folder 5. [\[[^]Back\]](#)

[19]. (19) Claire L. Chennault, *Way of A Fighter*, p. 124. [\[[^]Back\]](#)

[20]. (20) Currie was the administrative assistant and economic adviser to President Roosevelt from 1939 to 1945. In 1941 and 1942, he came to China twice as presidential representative to guide the implementation of the *Lend-Lease Act* in China. [\[[^]Back\]](#)

[21]. (21) Memorandum for the President, December 8, 1941, Hoover Institution Archives, Lauchlin Bernard Currie papers, Box 2, folder 2. [\[[^]Back\]](#)

[22]. (22) Memorandum for Lauchlin Currie, December 9, 1941, Hoover Institution Archives, Lauchlin Bernard Currie papers, Box 2, folder 2. [\[[^]Back\]](#)

[23]. (23) Currie to Magruder, December 12, 1941, Hoover Institution Archives, Lauchlin Bernard Currie papers, Box 1, folder 29. [\[[^]Back\]](#)

[24]. (24) Gordon K. Pickler, US Aid to the Chinese Nationalist Air Force, 1931–1949 (Ph.D Dissertation, The Florida State University, 1971), p. 162. [\[[^]Back\]](#)

[25]. (25) Daniel Ford, *Flying Tigers: Claire Chennault and the American Volunteer Group*, p. 107. [\[[^]Back\]](#)

[26]. (26) Chennault to C. J. Chow for Madame Chiang, December 16, 1941, Hoover Institution Archives, Chennault papers, Box 1, folder 13. [\[^Back\]](#)

[27]. (27) Jack Samson, *The Flying Tigers*, p. 129. [\[^Back\]](#)

[28]. (28) 马格鲁德致参谋长备忘录 (August 22, 1941) in Zhang, B. & Zhuang, J. (eds.) 抗日战争 Vol. 4, Diplomacy. Sichuan: Sichuan University Press, 490 (1997). [\[^Back\]](#)

[29]. (29) 宋子文电蒋中正美军官团决先派航空运输炮兵专家以麦克鲁德为领袖 (July 31, 1941), Taipei, “Academia Historica” Collection, “President” Chiang Kai-shek’s Cultural Relics Archives, 002/020300/00032/054. [\[^Back\]](#)

[30]. (30) 宋子文致蒋介石函稿 (September 4, 1941) in Wu, J. & Guo, D. (eds.) *Select Telegrams between Chiang Kai-shek and T. V. Soong (1940–1943)* (宋子文驻美时期电报选 (1940–1943)), p. 111. [\[^Back\]](#)

[31]. (31) 蒋介石、宋美龄与马格鲁德谈话记录 (October 27, 1941) in Qin, X. (ed.) 中华民国重要史料初编: 对日抗战时期 Vol. 3, Wartime Diplomacy (1). Taipei: Party History Committee of the Central Committee of the Chinese Kuomintang, 467–473 (1981). [\[^Back\]](#)

[32]. (32) 蒋介石与马格鲁德谈话记录 (October 31, 1941) in Qin, X. (ed.) 中华民国重要史料初编: 对日抗战时期 Vol. 3, Wartime Diplomacy (1), 474–478. [\[^Back\]](#)

[33]. (33) Chennault’s “colonel” title was originally an honorary title granted by the Governor of Louisiana, USA. See Sam Kleiner, *The Flying Tigers: The Untold Story of the American Pilots Who Waged a Secret War Against Japan*, pp. 175–176. [\[^Back\]](#)

[34]. (34) Chennault once recalled that during his return to the US in 1940, he had applied to return to the Army Air Force, but at that time General Arnold, the commander of the US Army Air Force, only provided him with a position as an artillery school instructor with a military rank of “Major,” which was not acceptable to Chennault. See Claire L. Chennault, *Way of A Fighter*, p. 95. [\[^Back\]](#)

[35]. (35) In his draft of telegram to Chennault, Magruder was also troubled by Chennault’s rank issue. He originally decided to allow Chennault back to the active duty under the rank of “Brigadier General or Colonel,” but deleted it before sending the telegram. See Daniel Ford, *Flying Tigers: Claire Chennault and the American Volunteer Group*, p. 107. [\[^Back\]](#)

[36]. (36) Chennault to C. J. Chow for Madame Chiang, December 30, 1941, Hoover Institution Archives, Chennault papers, Box 1, folder 13. [\[^Back\]](#)

[37]. (37) 美国志愿队空军编入美国军队条件译文 (January 19, 1942) in Qin, X. (ed.) 中华民国重要史料初编: 对日抗战时期 Vol. 3, Combat Process (3). Taipei: Party History Committee of the Central Committee of the Chinese Kuomintang, 555–556 (1981). [\[^Back\]](#)

[38]. (38) Chiang Kai-shek diaries (handwritten), December 31, 1941, Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford University, the same below. [\[^Back\]](#)

[39]. (39) 宋子文电蒋中正中国空军美志愿队改编为美国正式空军办法 (January 1, 1942), Taipei, “President” Chiang Kai-shek’s Cultural Relics Archives, 002/020300/00025 / 013. [\[^Back\]](#)

[40]. (40) Chennault to T. V. Soong, January 12, 1941, Hoover Institution Archives, Lauchlin Bernard Currie papers, Box 2, folder 4. [\[^Back\]](#)

[41]. (41) Jack Samson, *The Flying Tigers*, p. 135. [\[^Back\]](#)

[42]. (42) Lyu, F. (ed.) 蒋中正先生年谱长编 Vol. 7. Taipei: “Academia Historica,” 15 (2015). [\[^Back\]](#)

[43]. (43) General Wavell was the Highest Commander of the British Army stationed in India and Myanmar then. 蒋中正接见马格鲁德商谈中国空军美志愿队改编后仍用于中国一事 (January 19, 1942), Taipei, “Academia Historica” Collection, “President” Chiang Kai-shek’s Cultural Relics Archives, 002/020300 / 00025/015. [\[^Back\]](#)

[44]. (44) 蒋中正电示宋子文与美详商麦克罗德不适任中缅战区美国空军司令官 (January 20, 1942), Taipei, “Academia Historica” Collection, “President” Chiang Kai-shek’s Cultural Relics Archives, 002/010300/00047/009. [\[^Back\]](#)

[45]. (45) 蒋中正电宋子文请美国遴派中国战区统帅部联军参谋部长 (January 21, 1942), Taipei, “Academia Historica” Collection, “President” Chiang Kai-shek’s Cultural Relics Archives, 002/020300/00016 / 044. [\[^Back\]](#)

[46]. (46) “Major General” here is actually the rank of “Brigadier General” of the US military. [\[^Back\]](#)

[47]. (47) 蒋中正接见马格鲁德再度商谈美国空军志愿队改编事 (January 26, 1942). Taipei, “Academia Historica” Collection, “President” Chiang Kai-shek’s Cultural Relics Archives, 002/020300/00025 / 016. [\[^Back\]](#)

[48]. (48) Lyu, F. (ed.) 蒋中正先生年谱长编 Vol. 7, 21. [\[^Back\]](#)

[49]. (49) Magruder to Adjutant General forAMMISCA, January 29, 1942, quoted from Martha Byrd, *Chennault: Giving Wings to the Tiger*, p. 141. [\[^Back\]](#)

[50]. (50) Magruder had once demanded that Tse-ven Soong allocate the aid to China to the US military delegation, but his demand was rejected. See Cao, J. 抗战时期中美租借援助关系, 144. [\[^Back\]](#)

[51]. (51) Magruder to War Department, January 5, 1942, Foreign Relations of the US Series (Hereafter FRUS), 1941, Vol. IV, pp. 769–771. [\[^Back\]](#)

[52]. (52) Qi, X. 剑拔弩张的盟友: 太平洋战争期间的中美军事合作 (1941–1945). Beijing: Social Science Literature Press, 55 (2012). [\[^Back\]](#)

[53]. (53) Qi, X. 剑拔弩张的盟友: 太平洋战争期间的中美军事合作 (1941–1945), 63–83. [\[^Back\]](#)

[54]. (54) 史汀生致宋子文 (January 23, 1942) in Wu, J. & Lin, X. (eds.) *T. V. Soong: Important Wartime Correspondences* (宋子文与外国人士往来函电稿(1940–1942)). Shanghai: Fudan University Press, 171 (2009). [\[^Back\]](#)

[55]. (55) Letter from Soong to Mr. John J. McCloy, Assistant Secretary of War, January 6, 1942. Verifax File 2817, Item 2625, MFA, quoted from Qi, X. 剑拔弩张的盟友: 太平洋战争期间的中美军事合作 (1941–1945), 68. [\[^Back\]](#)

[56]. (56) 蒋中正电宋子文如美国此时无适当高级空军军官来华则暂由陈纳德充任 (January 28, 1942), Taipei, “Academia Historica” Collection, “President” Chiang Kai-shek’s Cultural Relics Archives, 002/020300/00025/017. [\[^Back\]](#)

[57]. (57) 史汀生致宋子文 (January 23, 1942) in Wu, J. & Lin, X. (eds.) *T. V. Soong: Important Wartime Correspondences* (宋子文与外国人士往来函电稿 (1940–1942)), p. 175. [\[^Back\]](#)

[58]. (58) Han, Y. 战时美国大战略与中国抗日战场: 1941–1945年. Wuhan: Wuhan University Press, 35 (2003). [\[^Back\]](#)

[59]. (59) During the Second World War, Hopkins was Roosevelt’s chief diplomatic adviser and played an important role in the formulation and implementation of the *Lend-Lease Act*. [\[^Back\]](#)

[60]. (60) Grace Person Hayes, *The History of the Joint of Staff in World War II, The War against Japan* (Maryland, The US Naval Institute Press, 1982), p. 89. [\[^Back\]](#)

[61]. (61) The Ambassador in China (Gauss) to the Secretary of State, March 7, 1942, FRUS, 1942, China, p. 27. [\[^Back\]](#)

[62]. (62) Wesley M. Bagby, *The Eagle-Dragon Alliance, America’s Relations with China in World War II* (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1992), p. 72. [\[^Back\]](#)

[63]. (63) Prior to the Pacific War, the US had not only dispatched volunteer groups to China, but also to Canada and the UK. These forces were incorporated into the regular army immediately after the US entered the war. See William M. Smith, *Mercenary eagles: American Pilots Serving in Foreign Air Forces Prior to US Entry into the Second World War, 1936–1941* (Ph. D Dissertation, University of Arkansas, 1999), pp. 226–230. [\[^Back\]](#)

[64]. (64) Currie to Chennault, February 4, 1942, Hoover Institution Archives, Lauchlin Bernard Currie papers, Box 1, folder 4. [\[^Back\]](#)

[65]. (65) Claire L. Chennault, *Way of A Fighter*, p. 171. [\[^Back\]](#)

[66]. (66) Jack Samson, *The Flying Tigers*, p. 151. [\[^Back\]](#)

[67]. (67) Stilwell, J. *The Stilwell Papers*. Lin, H. (tran.) Harbin: Northern Literature and Art Publishing House, 17, 39 (2014). [\[^Back\]](#)

[68]. (68) Martha Byrd, *Chennault: Giving Wings to the Tiger*, p. 142. [\[^Back\]](#)

[69]. (69) 宋子文致蒋介石密告美方嘱意俾索威担任联军最高空军职位电 (February 5, 1942) in Wu, J. & Guo, D. (eds.) *Select Telegrams between Chiang Kai-shek and T. V. Soong (1940–1943)* (宋子文驻美时期电报选 (1940–1943)), 147. [\[^Back\]](#)

[70]. (70) 宋子文致蒋介石密告美方嘱意俾索威担任联军最高空军职位电 (February 5, 1942) in Wu, J. & Guo, D. (eds.) *Select Telegrams between Chiang Kai-shek and T. V. Soong (1940–1943)* (宋子文驻美时期电报选 (1940–1943)), 147. [\[^Back\]](#)

[71]. (71) Daniel Ford, *Flying Tigers: Claire Chennault and the American Volunteer Group*, pp. 194–195. [\[^Back\]](#)

[72]. (72) Chiang Kai-shek diaries (handwritten), March 4, 1942. [\[^Back\]](#)

[73]. (73) Minister Soong to Chennault, February 10, 1942, Hoover Institution Archives, Chennault papers, Box 2, folder 9. [\[^Back\]](#)

[74]. (74) Chennault to T. V. Soong, February 15, 1942, Hoover Institution Archives, T. V. Soong papers, Box 61, folder 19. [\[^Back\]](#)

[75]. (75) 宋子文电蒋介石与马歇尔晤谈史迪威为其最有能力之将材谅蒙重用 (March 12, 1942), Taipei, “Academia Historica” Collection, “President” Chiang Kai-shek’s Cultural Relics Archives, 002/020300/00016/049. [\[^Back\]](#)

[76]. (76) Daniel Ford, *Flying Tigers: Claire Chennault and the American Volunteer Group*, p. 250. [\[^Back\]](#)

[77]. (77) In the US military system, among officers of the same rank, who is more superior is decided by the time order of promotion. [\[^Back\]](#)

[78]. (78) As far as Chennault could remember, he believed that Stilwell and Bissell insisted that the reorganization should be completed before April 30. This was probably Chennault’s deliberate defamation of these two people. See Claire L. Chennault, *Way of A Fighter*, p. 171. [\[^Back\]](#)

[79]. (79) 宋美龄与马格鲁德史迪威陈纳德等会商中国空军美志愿队改编之各项问题 (April 1, 1942). Taipei, “Academia Historica” Collection, “President” Chiang Kai-shek’s Cultural Relics Archives, 002/020300/00025/019. [\[^Back\]](#)

[80]. (80) 毕赛尔致蒋介石备忘录:美国空军援华及阻止日本切断对华空运计划等 (April 18, 1942), Taipei, “Academia Historica” Collection, “President” Chiang Kai-shek’s Cultural Relics Archives, 002/020300/00020/006. [\[^Back\]](#)

[81]. (81) Chiang Kai-shek diaries (handwritten), October 5, 1941, December 7, 1941. [\[^Back\]](#)

[82]. (82) Claire L. Chennault, *Way of A Fighter*, p. 152. [\[^Back\]](#)

[83]. (83) Martha Byrd, *Chennault: Giving Wings to the Tiger*, p. 138. [\[^Back\]](#)

[84]. (84) A total of 24 pilots, including six air combat heroes, submitted a joint letter and said that they, signers of the American Volunteer Group, hoped to terminate our contract with the Central Aircraft Manufacturing Company and end their duties with the American Volunteer Group. Daniel Ford, *Flying Tigers: Claire Chennault and the American Volunteer Group*, p. 300. [\[^Back\]](#)

[85]. (85) Xu, J. 飞虎雄风: 中国空军美国志愿援华航空队战史. Wuhan: Wuhan University Press, 147 (2015). [\[^Back\]](#)

[86]. (86) Daniel Ford, *Flying Tigers: Claire Chennault and the American Volunteer Group*, p. 304. [\[^Back\]](#)

[87]. (87) Jack Samson, *The Flying Tigers*, p. 192. [\[^Back\]](#)

[88]. (88) At that time, Stilwell instructed that the highest rank that Bissell could grant to the members of the American Volunteer Group was “colonel,” but Bissell did not do as he was told. [\[^Back\]](#)

[89]. (89) Daniel Ford, *Flying Tigers: Claire Chennault and the American Volunteer Group*, p. 362. [\[^Back\]](#)

[90]. (90) Jack Samson. *Chennault*. Shi, J. & Xu, Y. (trans.) Beijing: Oriental Press, 188 (1990). [\[^Back\]](#)

[91]. (91) James Larry Durrence, Ambassador Clarence Gause and US Relations with China, 1941–1944 (Ph. D Dissertation, University of Georgia, 1971), p. 109. [\[^Back\]](#)

[92]. (92) 蒋中正接见马格鲁德再度商谈美国空军志愿队改编事 (January 26, 1942), Taipei, “Academia Historica” Collection, “President” Chiang Kai-shek’s Cultural Relics Archives, 002/020300/00025 / 016. [\[^Back\]](#)

[93]. (93) Grace Person Hayes, *The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in World War II*, The War against Japan, p. 203. [\[^Back\]](#)

[94]. (94) Han, Y. 战时美国大战略与中国抗日战场: 1941–1945年, 127. [\[^Back\]](#)

[95]. (95) 外交部长宋子文自华盛顿呈蒋委员长报告与罗斯福及丘吉尔情形电 (June 22, 1942) in Qin, X. (ed.) 中华民国重要史料初编: 对日抗战时期 Vol. 3, Wartime Diplomacy (3), 163–164. [\[^Back\]](#)

[96]. (96) 蒋委员长在重庆接见中国战区联军参谋长史迪威谈话纪录 (June 26, 1942) in Qin, X. (ed.) 中华民国重要史料初编: 对日抗战时期 Vol. 3, Wartime Diplomacy (3), 168. [\[^Back\]](#)

[97]. (97) Todd Eric Jahnke, *By Air Power Alone: America’s Strategic Air War in China, 1941–1945* (Master Dissertation, University of North Texas, 2001), p. 27. [\[^Back\]](#)

[98]. (98) 蒋委员长在重庆接见史迪威嘱其将保持中国战区最低限度之需要三项编入中国战区军事活动总计书中谈话纪录 (June 29, 1942) in Qin, X. (ed.) 中华民国重要史料初编: 对日抗战时期 Vol. 3, Wartime Diplomacy (3), 171–172. [\[^Back\]](#)

[99]. (99) According to Chennault’s memories, the War Department concealed some disgraceful aspects of the reorganization process of the American Volunteer Group on the grounds of “military secrets.” For example, in January 1945, the War Department claimed in its report submitted to the Committee on Military Affairs of the House of Representatives that 220 of the original 250 members of the American Volunteer Group had joined the US regular Army. See Claire L. Chennault, *Way of A Fighter*, p. 178. [\[^Back\]](#)

[100]. (100) Claire L. Chennault, *Way of A Fighter*, p. 124. [\[^Back\]](#)

[101]. (101) Wang, Z. 抗战时期外国对华军事援助. Taipei: Universal Publishing House, 255 (1987). [\[^Back\]](#)

[102]. (102) According to the research, when the American Volunteer Group was disbanded, there were a total of 220 members, of which 187 returned to active service in the US military, accounting for 85% of the total number. See Daniel Ford, *Flying Tigers: Claire Chennault and the American Volunteer Group*, pp. 378–379. [\[^Back\]](#)

[103]. (103) In response to the refusal of the reorganization of members of the American Volunteer Group, Chennault pointed out that volunteers refused to be redeployed because they liked China and were afraid that the American Volunteer Group or the American Volunteer Group leader would be reassigned to another battlefield. See Chennault to T. V. Soong, January 12, 1942, Hoover Institution Archives, Lauchlin Bernard Currie papers, Box 2, folder 4. [\[^Back\]](#)

[104]. (104) Many military experts believe that the American Volunteer Group can last for up to three weeks in combat. See Wanda Cornelius and Thayne R. Short, Ding hao, *America’s Air War in China, 1937–1945*, pp. 119–120. [\[^Back\]](#)

[105]. (105) 蒋介石、宋美龄与马格鲁德谈话记录 (October 27, 1941) in Qin, X. (ed.) 中华民国重要史料初编: 对日抗战时期 Vol. 3, Wartime Diplomacy (1), 467–473. [\[^Back\]](#)

[106]. (106) 宋子文致蒋介石密告美方囑意俾索威担任联军最高空军职位电 (February 5, 1942) in Wu, J. & Guo, D. (eds.) *Select Telegrams between Chiang Kai-shek and T. V. Soong (1940–1943)* (宋子文驻美时期电报选(1940–1943)), 147. [\[^Back\]](#)

[107]. (107) 宋子文致蒋介石盼对史迪威万分忍耐以免耽擱时期电 (June 1942) in Wu, J. & Guo, D. (eds.) *Select Telegrams between Chiang Kai-shek and T. V. Soong (1940–1943)* (宋子文驻美时期电报选(1940–1943)), 170. [\[^Back\]](#)

[108]. (108) Chennault to T. V. Soong, January 19, 1942, Hoover Institution Archives, T. V. Soong papers, Box 2, folder 3. [\[^Back\]](#)

[109]. (109) C. T. Chien to T. V. Soong, February 17, 1942, Hoover Institution Archives, T. V. Soong papers, Box 2, folder 3. [\[^Back\]](#)

[110]. (110) Chennault to T. V. Soong, February 7, 1942, Hoover Institution Archives, Chennault papers, Box 2, folder 7. [\[^Back\]](#)

[111]. (111) 宋子文电蒋中正中国空军美志愿队改编为美国正式空军办法 (January 1, 1942), Taipei, “Academia Historica” Collection, “President” Chiang Kai-shek’s Cultural Relics Archives, 002/020300/00025 / 013. [\[^Back\]](#)

[112]. (112) Qi, X. 剑拔弩张的盟友: 太平洋战争期间的中美军事合作 (1941–1945), 55. [\[^Back\]](#)

[113]. (113) Even when Chennault obstinately rejected the reorganization plan proposed by the US, Madame Chiang helped justify his action that “Colonel (Chennault) is stubborn, but he has his own reasons. We have known him for five years, so we are very familiar with him. He does not care about his personal interests. However, if he has some propositions, he will stick to them.”See 蒋中正接见马格鲁德再度商谈美国空军志愿队改编事 (January 26, 1942), Taipei, “Academia Historica” Collection, “President” Chiang Kai-shek’s Cultural Relics Archives, 002/020300/00025 / 016. [\[^Back\]](#)

[114]. (114) As mentioned earlier, Chiang Kai-shek and the Chinese government did not insist that Chennault be the highest commander of the Air Force stationed in China, but the close relationship between the two sides still incurred the prejudice and repulsion of the US. [\[^Back\]](#)

[115]. (115) In early January 1942, T. V. Soong proposed that Chennault concurrently be the commander-in-chief of the Chinese Air Force, while commanding China-US Air Force operations. See T. V. Soong to Madame Chiang, January 6, 1942, Hoover Institution Archives, T. V. Soong papers, Box 37, folder 15. [\[^Back\]](#)

[116]. (116) Zou, D. *America’s Failure in China, 1941–1950*. Wang, N. & Zhou, X. (eds.) Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Publishing House, 36 (2016). [\[^Back\]](#)

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民国档案

(季刊 1985 年创刊)



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外国民众对中国抗战的支持（1937—1941）

——以国际宣传处档案为中心

陈红民 徐 亮

〔摘 要〕 全面抗战爆发后，中国为争取国际支持，以各种形式发动国际宣传，影响各国决策与国际舆论。中国第二历史档案馆所藏国民党中央宣部国际宣传处档案中，有一组外国民众寄呈蒋介石的信函，一定程度上反映了中国“民间外交”的宣传效果。这组信函来自不同国家、不同身份的普通民众，代表了各国民间人士对中国抗战的认识与立场，他们在信中用不同方式表达对中国抗战的声援与支持。民间的认知虽有所限，所提计策亦难切实，却真实反映了外国民间舆情，正是中国加入世界反法西斯同盟的基础。

〔关键词〕 外国民众 中国抗战 国际宣传 蒋介石

数星期来，于报端读得贵国击败日军之消息，日本侵略中国失败，余闻之甚为欣慰。余衷心愿望中国获得最后胜利而将日人逐出海外。……余于书中读悉中国为一美丽之国家，当余长大成人，有相当财力时，必来华一游。^①

中华民族的抗日战争与世界反法西斯战争，是用各种方式联接在一起的。以上引文摘自1939年8月9日一位波兰人致蒋介石的信，从其中“长大成人”表述判断，应该是青少年，信中表达了他对中国战胜日本的祝愿与对中国的仰慕之情。波兰在当时多数中国人眼中，是个遥远而陌生的国度。此信寄出不到一个月，写信者的祖国也遭到德国猛烈攻击，欧洲大战爆发。

1937年全面抗战爆发后，中国在积极争取各国政府支持之外，也以各种方式进行国际宣传，透过国际舆论影响各国民众，使其了解日本侵华暴行与中国抗战的意义。学界对中国战时对外宣传及效益的研究成果颇丰，侧重于对各国政府及主流媒体舆论产生的影响，而对各国普通民众对中国抗战同情与声援之研究略显不足。^②中国第二历史档案馆度藏国民党中央宣传部国际宣传处档案中，有一组外国民众寄呈蒋介石之信件，很有价值。本文拟以此组档案为基本史料与分析样本，探讨太平洋战争爆发前各国民众对中国抗战支持的相关问题，以弥补此方面研究之不足。

一、外国民众致蒋介石信函的基本分析

本文所依据的外国民众寄呈蒋介石的信函，没有完整的案卷，笔者在国际宣传处档案各案卷中，选

① 《波兰雪特雷斯劳上委座书》（1939年8月9日），中国第二历史档案馆藏国际宣传处档案（以下简称“二史馆藏”），七一八（4）/367。

② 代表研究有刘景修、张钊：《抗日战争时期国民党的对外宣传》，《档案史料与研究》1989年第1期；武燕军：《抗战时期国民党政府的国际宣传处》，《历史档案》1990年第2期；韩国庆：《抗战时期的中共民间外交》，《北京党史研究》1997年第2期；刘会军：《外交斡旋、非官方出访与舆论策应——国民政府抗战外交的特殊运作》，《民国档案》2005年第3期；朱蓉蓉：《抗日战争时期的民间外交研究》，吉林人民出版社2011年版；朱蓉蓉：《国际宣传处与战时民间外交》，《社会科学战线》2012年第1期；魏舒歌：《战场之外：租界英文报刊与中国的国际宣传：1928—1941》，社会科学文献出版社2020年版。

出所有在 1937 年至 1941 年底之间（即中国全面抗战开始至太平洋战争爆发前）的相关信件，合计 138 件。^①来信使用语言多为英文，但在档案中保藏的则为经由国际宣传处翻译后的中文稿，以便上呈蒋介石（少数附有英文原信与信封等）。这些信函所表达的支持中国抗战的感情是真实与诚挚的。

之所以将时间择定在太平洋战争爆发前，是因为此前中国孤军奋战，尚未得到主要西方大国政府的公开支援，各国民众的声援对中国抗战事业有着特殊的意义。

在进入内容分析之前，笔者对这组外国民众致蒋介石信函基本信息逐一甄别与研判，将写信人的国家与其身份（职业）统计列表如下：

致函蒋介石的外国民众国别与身份（职业）信息分类表

写信者国别	数量	写信者人员身份（职业）	数量
美国	79	社会组织	13
英国	13	出版社与媒体	11
法国	5	宗教组织	8
加拿大	4	青年与学生	19
菲律宾	3	教士	11
澳大利亚	2	普通军官	5
芬兰	2	曾为华服务人员	4
荷兰	2	商人	4
捷克	2	工人	3
缅甸	2	学者	3
新西兰	2	知名人士	3
比利时	1	医生	2
波兰	1	在华服务人员	2
朝鲜	1	律师	1
瑞士	1	外交人员	1
乌拉圭	1	普通民众（无法判定身份的）	48
意大利	1	合计	138
印度	1		
智利	1		
未确定国别	14		

从国别看，138 封信件中来自美国的最多，有 79 封，如果再将国际社会组织含有美国人以及在美机构涵盖在内，约占总数的三分之二，足见当时中国的对美宣传是重中之重。全面抗战爆发后，蒋介石便授权孔祥熙可编列每月十万美元的预算，在美国推展民间宣传活动^②，胡适等社会名流也随之到美国开展“民间外交”。中方的努力，得到美国媒体积极回应。美联社国外新闻部主任致信蒋介石，对中方关照其驻华记者予以感谢，“敝社关于贵国抗战新闻之公正报道，深蒙嘉许，尤资欣幸”^③。1941 年 8 月，美国全国广播公司主动向国际宣传处提出，重庆方面几次对美广播引起美国听众的良好反映，双方可以与旧金山、马尼拉接洽，希望建立机构，“转播重庆广播”^④。

① 本文所引部分信函未标注年份者，系根据内容判断在 1937—1941 年间，但不能确定具体年份。
② 齐锡生：《从舞台边缘走向中央：美国在中国抗战初期外交视野中的转变（1937—1941）》，社会科学文献出版社 2018 年版，第 42 页。
③ 《美联社国外新闻部主任约翰·伊文思上委座书》（1940 年 9 月 26 日），“二史馆藏”，七一八（4）/363。
④ 《曾虚白工作日记（三）》，《民国档案》2000 年第 4 期，第 21 页。

中国也曾竭尽全力争取苏、英、法等大国朝野的支持,但这些国家民众的反响并不如美国热烈,苏联民众反映最冷淡,在这组档案中,甚至未见苏联民众致蒋介石的信函。来自法国的信函也不多,可能与法国在欧战中很快陷落有关。蒋介石基于对各国的判断,提出在宣传上要采取不同的方法,对英、法需要不断表示好感,对苏联只需要表示出友好的态度,对美国则须竭力表示好感,“对于美国政治家同情中国的言论要随时予以赞扬,对于美国朝野同情我国的行为(如救济难民、继续白银协定及捐助中国红十字会医药)应随时予以广泛宣传”^①。各国民众的反应与蒋的设想基本一致。

一些“边远国家”民众致蒋介石的信,颇值得留意。南美的智利与乌拉圭,在民国外交史中无足轻重,但仍有民众来信支持中国抗战。一名智利工人表示,他热爱中国,“欲贵国成为大而康强,不愿其被日本侵犯”,愿意到中国当志愿兵参战,甚至要求加入中国籍,“为受灾之中国效劳”。^②乌拉圭报纸致信蒋介石称,他们所得的东方战事新闻甚多,“惟远道相传,有时恐多失实”,希望蒋能亲自撰写文章,以使该国读者了解真实的中国抗战。^③

写信人的身份、职业多样化,有着广泛的覆盖面与代表性,颇能代表各国民意。如美国贫苦妇人琼斯致信蒋介石,反对日本侵华行径,认为“日本所行之事既属残酷,复有违公理,故渴望彼等整个失败,并逐出中国之外”。她虽贫穷且在经济恐慌之下生活大为艰难,仍愿勉力捐赠少许衣物,帮助受难的中国人。^④一位曾任哈佛大学学生促进会干事的美国青年告诉蒋介石,美国大学生对中国抗战“均寄深挚之同情”,认为中国之安全,即为美国之安全,主张对日禁运军需品,援助中国。^⑤

外国民众提笔写信的缘由不同,各有故事。他们大部分是从本国报刊上,或者是中国驻外使馆组织的活动中得知中国抗战的消息,不少来信以“每日在报上见中国英勇抗战之消息,均极为关心”^⑥之类话开头。而在相关的宣传中,蒋介石是中国抵抗日本的领袖与代表。澳大利亚人马丁在该国报纸上读到文章,知道“蒋委员长及其夫人领导全国,驱向统一。中国人民坚决抵抗威胁全世界之侵略势力,故须予以援助”,决定写信向蒋氏夫妇及中国人民致意,相信蒋的“爱国之热忱、勇气与精神终归胜利”,中国人民“亦将自恐怖与黑暗中进入快乐和平之中”。^⑦

国际宣传处曾出版过不同文字的蒋介石传记^⑧,利用外国崇拜名人的习惯,宣传中国抗战,提示读者可以直接给蒋写信寄往重庆,有可能得到蒋介石的复信。邀请读者向蒋介石直接写信,也是中国对外宣传的一种策略与途径。有位美国小学生信中说,“读《蒋介石将军》一书,甚感兴趣云”^⑨。另一位15岁的美国青年亦称他的家人“均反对日本侵略中国”,关注中国抗战之进展,“数日前读得一文,敬悉投函重庆,可达左右,且阁下不惮答复”^⑩。

外国民众给蒋写信,也源于国外名人有乐于接受民众来信并回复的风气。如有封信中说,他读到别人征集名人回信的新闻,“阅之不觉大喜”,萌生了给蒋写信的念头,“若亦能得一二语回信,则予之欣

① 《国民党中央宣传部奉发蒋介石手定〈现阶段之军事、外交宣传要点〉》,中国第二历史档案馆编:《中华民国史档案资料汇编》第五辑第二编文化(一),江苏古籍出版社1998年版,第6页。

② 《智利路意斯巴地拉致蒋介石》(1939年8月23日)，“二史馆藏”，七一八(4)/363。

③ 《南美乌拉圭仇尔登氏上委座书》(1940年3月26日)，“二史馆藏”，七一八(4)/363。

④ 《美国琼斯夫人致蒋委员长夫妇书》(1939年4月16日)，“二史馆藏”，七一八(4)/367。

⑤ 《美国哈佛大学学士哥德曼上委座书》(1940年7月12日)，“二史馆藏”，七一八(4)/363。

⑥ 《美国娜斯阿金女士上蒋委员长函》(1938年3月8日)，“二史馆藏”，七一八(4)/156。

⑦ 《澳洲人马丁氏致委座书》(8月11日)，“二史馆藏”，七一八(4)/363。

⑧ 如国际宣传处董显光编写的英文《蒋介石传》(Tong, Hollington Kong: *Chiang Kai-shek, soldier and statesman*, London: Hurst & Blackett, 1938)。此外,还有德文、法文与意大利文的蒋介石传记在国外出版。

⑨ 《美国小学生列西尔上委座书》(时间不详)，“二史馆藏”，七一八(4)/247。

⑩ 《美国格雷漠上委座书》(7月10日)，“二史馆藏”，七一八(4)/247。

慰即无可言宣矣”。^①

蒋介石是否读过这些外国人的信，有无回应，这些信对中国抗战是否产生了实际效果？国际宣传处收集并保存这些信，至少有一部分是送蒋看过的。如法国哈瓦斯社远东社长白礼雅恳请面见蒋介石的信件上，有“拟请准予定期接见”“呈总裁蒋”等批字；美国基督徒哈定的来信上，有“请国宣处代拟酌谢稿”的建议。从本文后面引用的一些信件内容与前后关系看，蒋与某些写信人有互动。

国际宣传处对来自国外民众的信件十分重视，选择其中的一些交中央社编成新闻发表，以示中国抗战得道多助，鼓舞军民士气。以下是国际宣传处抄呈蒋介石“并送中央社”发表的芬兰牧师来信全文：

中国重庆蒋委员长钧鉴：

阁下领导贵国人民，奋勇抗敌，以保卫贵国古旧之河山，我人敬表竭诚之同情，深厚之关切。侧闻领导此奋斗之人，乃系信仰上帝万能，并虔诚祈求上帝保佑之基督教徒，尤感忻幸。余僻处小芬兰一内地无名之教区，今敬率本区自老至幼全体民众冒渎上书，藉申祝福之微意，并祈祷上帝，必帮助阁下为贵国人民获得最后胜利以奠定和平。此次战事或胜或败，不论结果如何，必予中国人民以福利，吾人且信，于上帝仁慈向导之下，贵国艰难奋斗，必有利于全体人类者也。

敬求上帝保佑阁下及中华民国。

芬兰某教区牧师爱立卡纳敬上

时为一九三八年十二月十六日（芬兰独立纪念日）^②

太平洋战争前外国民众致蒋的这组信函，寄信人国别不同，职业身份各异，内容丰富，均与中国正在进行的抗日战争有关。下文从中归纳出两个较为集中的主题，探究国外民众眼中的中国抗战及他们的态度。

二、外国民众对中国抗战的认识

太平洋战争爆发前，中国国际宣传主要目的是争取各国朝野对中日战争的关注，引导各国舆论与民众谴责日本侵华暴行，援助中国抗战。纵览各国民众致蒋的信函，此目标在一定程度上达成了。

中国的国际宣传对美国民间舆论产生的效果尤为明显。据盖洛普民意测验显示，美国公众对中国的同情逐年增高，从1937年的43%上升到了1939年5月的74%。^③许多民间机构和个人公开表示支持中国。这在美国民众致蒋介石的信中有所体现。如有的信中指出，将向罗斯福总统提出要求，“转请美国国会，通过法案，对日禁运军火及军输品，并停止一切货运，藉以援助中国”，希望中国“一跃而为世界上之强国，且与美国永奠敦睦友爱之邦交，共谋将来世界之福利。”^④不少美国民众对政府宽容日本的政策不满，“惟日本用以毁灭中国之军火原料，大半得自美国，每念及此，恒感愧惭”^⑤。“贵国目前或尚缺乏轰炸机，惟不久将来，当减少此种困难，愿好自为之。吾人所引为遗憾者，即敝国政府过去曾将军需品输日，否则战争当早告结束矣。”^⑥英国民众也委婉地向蒋介石表达对本国当局在远东面对日本侵略的绥靖态度的不满。一封信中指出，“整个英国均同情中国，如非与德国作战，当能作更大援助。希望

① 《新南威尔斯爱德娜女士上蒋委员长书》（时间不详，“二史馆藏”，七一八（4）/363。

② 《芬兰牧师爱立卡纳上蒋座书》（1938年12月16日，“二史馆藏”，七一八（4）/156。

③ George H. Gallup, *The Gallup poll: Public Opinion, 1935—1971* (New York: Random House, 1972), 1: 69, 159.

④ 《美侨权湛上蒋座书》（1940年6月19日，“二史馆藏”，七一八（4）/363。

⑤ 《美国长老会国外布道会干事史密司上蒋座函》（1939年9月5日，“二史馆藏”，七一八（4）/363。

⑥ 《美国都布尔夫人上蒋委员长书》（1940年9月3日，“二史馆藏”，七一八（4）/363。

吾人之战争即可结束，获得胜利。英国永为贵国之友人”。^①当英国政府宣布关闭滇缅公路，中国西南对外通道被切断时，有英国民众对蒋介石表示“实深歉憾”，声称“吾人认为英国此举，实为亲者所痛仇者所快。但兹敢为足下告者，即停闭滇缅路三月期满后，实必重行开放，以利贵国抗战。鄙人极愿中英两国国运，均得化险为夷，渡过难关”。^②

国际宣传处认识到，教会在国外有相当之势力，为此专门请美、英、法、比利时等国神父为其工作，使教会“助我宣传”。^③国民政府对外宣传时，充分利用蒋介石、宋美龄基督徒的形象，通过教会的印刷品宣传蒋介石作为基督徒与抗战的消息，不少信教人士读后欣然，“读悉阁下克服种种困难之勇敢与机敏”，因此给蒋写信的颇多。北平美以美会举行青年基督教友讲道大会，以“圣经与人生”为题，请蒋介石赐一短文，足见对蒋作为教徒的认可。^④加拿大牧师对蒋说，“钧座及尊夫人皆为基督教徒，自必能得上帝之佑护，使中国及早获得胜利而成一基督教国家”。^⑤一位笃信基督教的妇女给蒋的信中说：“日本军人政客之灵魂殆完全为恶魔所操纵指使，任何花言巧语皆为欺人之词。故予认此次战事实为善与恶之争，亦即为上帝与恶魔之争。予特虔诚祷告上帝启发各国之人，使知此次战争之重要性，并祝拥护基督及拥护民主政府之人民，能战胜反基督教之势力及世界上之独裁者。”^⑥芬兰牧师科尔赫伦自1910年起即在中国传教，1935年始离华回国，他在信中告诉蒋介石，在芬兰教友的盛大聚会中，当宣布凡愿拥护中国抗战之人皆可签名时，“与会人士当即热烈赞成，瞬即签成数纸”^⑦。

基督教之外，其他宗教也有支持中国抗战的表示。美国伊斯兰教反侵略组织“喀利法”，在传单指斥日本，声援中国抗战。^⑧美国佛教徒向蒋介石建言，“贵国如祈求我佛释迦之援助以抵抗日本，必获成功”^⑨。

所有来信并非都完全倒向中国。泛太平洋联盟会1939年十月号《泛太平洋季刊》中，刊载“满洲国”资料甚多，蒋介石以蒋辞去所担任的该会副主席一职表达不满。该会回复蒋时强调，他们“对一切国家及人民，寄以正大之同情，不存偏倚之私心。至于吾人刊印该期‘满洲国’专号者，其立场极易明了，盖因吾人采用作者稿件，素以机会平等为原则”。一番解释后，还恳请蒋改变辞意。^⑩

受信息来源的影响，写信给蒋介石的外国民众并不十分明了中国全民族抗战的局面，普遍认为蒋是领导中国抗战的人物。他们通过对蒋的了解，进而与中国，与中国的抗日战争联系在一起。有些外国媒体或出版社要求蒋介石赐稿，宣传蒋本人与中国的抗战事迹。菲律宾记录出版公司拟发刊“中菲经济关系专号”，详述三十年来中菲两国商业与文化之关系，希望蒋氏夫妇“各赐大作一篇，并乞附赐玉照”^⑪。另一家菲律宾杂志也希望蒋介石能够赐文，“对菲律宾人民及旅菲华侨与美国人士发表意见，则民间对中国之同情必更为热烈”。^⑫美国某报编辑给蒋介石的征文邀请中写道，他们征集的文字将供加拿大及美国报纸刊用，所征作品的条件是作者必具重要之世界地位，而言论足以引起读者极大兴味，蒋

① 《英国邱曼上委座书》（1939年11月23日），“二史馆藏”，七一八（4）/247。

② 《英人波斯吐姆上委员长书》（1940年8月21日），“二史馆藏”，七一八（4）/363。

③ 刘楠楠选辑：《1939年国民党中央宣传部国际宣传处工作报告》，《民国档案》2016年第4期，第32页。

④ 《美国基督徒哈定氏上委座书》（1940年5月24日），“二史馆藏”，七一八（4）/363。

⑤ 《成都全国基督教协会华西分会秘书诺林上委座书》（1940年6月6日），“二史馆藏”，七一八（4）/363。

⑥ 《加拿大爱理格牧师上蒋委员长书》（1939年6月21日），“二史馆藏”，七一八（4）/247。

⑦ 《美国娜斯阿金女士上蒋委员长函》（1938年3月10日），“二史馆藏”，七一八（4）/156。

⑧ 《芬兰科尔赫伦牧师致蒋委员长书》（1938年12月15日），“二史馆藏”，七一八（4）/156。

⑨ 《世界“喀利法”传单三页》（10月30日），“二史馆藏”，七一八（4）/363。

⑩ 《美国派洛克氏上委座书》（1940年6月8日），“二史馆藏”，七一八（4）/363。

⑪ 《火奴鲁鲁泛太平洋联盟会会长卡斯特洛上委座书》（1940年5月9日），“二史馆藏”，七一八（4）/363。

⑫ 《菲律宾记录出版公司阿维奥上委座书》（1940年2月19日），“二史馆藏”，七一八（4）/247。

⑬ 《菲律宾杂志明登君上蒋委员长书》，（6月6日），“二史馆藏”，七一八（4）/247。

被列入征集名单中,并询问蒋能否以《中国会向日本屈服吗》为题,为他们撰写长约 800 至 2000 字文章。^①一些出版世界名人录的出版社,如伦敦国际名人录、美国世界名人年鉴、泛太平洋名人录、伦敦国际名人年鉴出版社等给蒋介石写信,或请蒋审定相关条目,或请赐稿。美国一所大学提出,蒋介石已为“世界大国元首之一”,请求蒋“灌音或拍摄有声电影,以为本年来钧座及贵国人民对于将来世界人民之纪念”。^②美国纽约大学为举办辩论会征集当代世界伟人之签名照片,已得“罗斯福总统、林白大佐、英皇乔治、莱白伦总统、潘兴大将、爱因斯坦教授”等人回应,希望蒋介石也能惠赠照片。^③

更多的普通外国民众期盼蒋介石能赐予与中国相关的纪念品、签名或其他形式的帮助。如有美国小学生曾读《蒋介石将军》一书,“甚感兴味”,向蒋索取亲笔签名,“以资珍藏”。^④美国一位爱好集邮的医师,擅长收集名人题字之各国邮票,已获得罗斯福总统、潘兴大将、贝当将军、英前外相艾登等著名人物之题签,但尚无蒋题字之中国邮品,为“美中不足”,致信蒋索要。^⑤有人盼蒋介石能赐予中国国旗为纪念。^⑥美国一位 13 岁儿童,希望蒋介石能赐一亲笔签名,同时为其介绍一能读写英语的同龄中国人,结为笔友。^⑦最有趣的是一位比利时人,在信中支持中国抗战,更提出要蒋为之介绍,与中国军队中的女性英雄“缔结友谊”。^⑧一名澳大利亚小学校长代表该校千余名师生写信向蒋介石索要纪念品,内容甚是感人:

蒋委员长勋鉴:

贵国军队英勇抵抗武器优越之敌人,余敬表诚挚钦贺之意。贵国受陆空双方之攻击,仍屹立不动,实有不可克服之精神。日本崩溃之期,已非遥远。余以为本年年终即可结束战事。贵国旅澳侨民,对最后胜利,均有信心。余渴欲获得若干来自中国之纪念品,如阁下之信封,其上粘有邮票,而经邮局寄递者。倘荷俯允,则欣感无量。敝校学生对阁下之英勇抗敌,甚感兴趣,余每得消息,必向诸生讲解。

敝校有男女学生一千三百名,敬祝阁下及贵国军队成功胜利。

华尔侃 上

七月十一日^⑨

三、外国民众对中国抗战的支援

中国人民英勇的抗日战争,对西方民众产生了一定的吸引力。各国民间人士除在言论上谴责日本侵略行径支持中国抗战,还纷纷向蒋介石表达愿为中国抗战事业服务,或愿亲自来华参战,或为抗战建言献策。

一名美国青年 1937 至 1938 年在中国亲眼目睹日军侵略行径,立志为中国服务,但美国大使馆受国际法限定,不接受他的请求,建议他直接向中国领导人申请。他在信中向蒋介石表示,自己“在美国曾受四年良好之军事训练,擅长战术。美国甚为平清,故有此出国服务之意。且余愿为主义奋斗,亦即保卫中国,击败日本军人。美国至少在若干年内不致受人攻击,故余出国亦不负国家”。^⑩

① 《美国史梅特脱系新闻辛狄卡编辑史梅特脱上委座书》(8月2日)，“二史馆藏”，七—八(4)/361。

② 《美国佐治亚奥格沙布大学致 委座书》(8月8日)，“二史馆藏”，七—八(4)/363。

③ 《纽约大学辩论会干事鲍尔上委座书》(5月14日)，“二史馆藏”，七—八(4)/367。

④ 《美国小学生列西尔上委座书》(时间不详)，“二史馆藏”，七—八(4)/247。

⑤ 《美国海伦医师上蒋委员长书》(1939年4月3日)，“二史馆藏”，七—八(4)/247。

⑥ 《美国高克斯上委座书》(7月11日)，“二史馆藏”，七—八(4)/367。

⑦ 《美国西蒙斯上委座书》(7月3日)，“二史馆藏”，七—八(4)/361。

⑧ 《比利时纽坎斯上委座》(1939年2月22日)，“二史馆藏”，七—八(4)/36。

⑨ 《澳大利亚新南卫尔士高等小学校长华尔侃上委座书》(1939年7月11日)，“二史馆藏”，七—八(4)/361。

⑩ 《美国伍德上委座书》(1940年4月17日)，“二史馆藏”，七—八(4)/363。

抗战期间,中国空军飞行员最为缺乏,而国际上以空军志愿兵形式参与外国军队并不鲜见,也有外国青年愿来华充任空军飞行员。他们的情况不一,有的仅凭满腔热血,根本没有飞行基础,甚至提出要蒋介石教他飞行技术,“予深知战争为何物,但已决心躬冒一切危险,所愿钧座教予如何飞行,便可奋勇作战”^①。另有人对蒋表示,“余对于航空甚感兴趣,倘到贵国,在航空工作之任何部门,先事练习,余信最短期内必能自驾飞机”^②。一位21岁的美国空军预备队飞行员要求来华,称自己能驾驶各式飞机,“重轰炸机尤为专长,且尝作各种姿态之飞行表演,敝自知空中战斗而能胜任,或为贵国航空学生作教练亦可”,但同时又提出升官等待遇方面的要求,希望蒋介石代为布置赴华手续,“并赐知官阶、地位、职守及薪俸等事”。^③有两位18岁的美国青年,体格强健,有勇气及冒险性,对于空军尤有兴趣,听说蒋介石对外人之报酬每月为五百美金,战事结束时另付一千美金,他们盼望在同样条件下参加中国空军,“吾人均不怕死,若能如愿,决当为中国尽最大之努力”^④。

有一技之长的外国青年愿来华服务,施展自己的专长。如有位美国印刷工人向蒋介石表示,如果中国在印刷方面需用,他极愿“效劳”,他也能“使用来福枪以及刺刀手枪等各种武器”,可以直接上战场。^⑤甚至有人毛遂自荐,要以外国人的特殊身份为掩护,担任间谍为中国工作,“无论派赴日本,或留鄙国,或至贵土均无不可。鄙人对于日本之军事、宗教等项稍心得,且以一美国青年如鄙人者而任间谍工作,谅不至令人注目”^⑥。

还有不少外国民众在信中为中国对日作战献计献策,他们多数是不懂军事的外行,所提建议难免天马行空,欠缺操作性。如有位美国夫人向蒋介石建议,鉴于日寇猖狂残杀中国平民之暴行,应派遣飞机轰炸东京,以血还血,同时“即行轰炸日本各大城市,以快人心,以戢凶焰”^⑦。有人建议中国对日本滥行毒气战进行报复性对抗,“盖日人施放毒气,贵国亦可采用也”。方法是中国尽速从苏联购买毒气手榴弹数百万枚,再“自造五百万枚备用”,如此可歼灭日军百万人。^⑧有自称“发明家”之外国人,向蒋介石推荐其打击敌人军机的“新式发明”——制作一种射向空中的炸弹,爆炸后可放出浓密气体,阻滞或炸坏飞机汽油引擎,抑或毒毙敌机飞行员。^⑨

有的写信人愿为中国的战时建设事业贡献力量。一位美国军人表示,他可以利用美国人的冒险精神,突破政府的限制,帮助蒋介石于短期内获得急需的军火配备,方法是允许他在中国组织公司,开发矿业,获利后与中国平分。他试图说服蒋相信此为双赢之事,蒋有资金购买足够的军需配备,他还可帮助训练使用新式武器的官兵,“以推进阁下之计划”^⑩。一位从事石油开采事业多年的外国人说,中国的煤油自外国运来,花费甚多,不如自己开采,他愿为中国政府与蒋介石服务,代为开掘油井,可节省大量金钱而能获得中国所需汽油、煤油各种产品,“于国家必大有裨益”^⑪。

致信蒋介石要求到中国参与抗日战争的外国民众,痛恨侵略、热爱和平、同情中国是主因。但细读全部的138封信,其背后动机可说是五花八门。有人坦言来华参战是被传说中国支付给外籍服务人员的高薪所吸引。荷兰青年毕克的情况最为典型。他在信中向蒋介石介绍其家境:自己年方17,家中父

① 《美国马奇阿上蒋委员长书》(3月22日)，“二史馆藏”，七一八(4)/367。

② 《加拿大鲍兰德上委座书》(6月19日)，“二史馆藏”，七一八(4)/247。

③ 《美国李佛斯上委座书》(8月23日)，“二史馆藏”，七一八(4)/361。

④ 《美国青年摩莱及罗伯特上蒋委员长书》(7月4日)，“二史馆藏”，七一八(4)/247。

⑤ 《美国麦克克拉提上委座书》(12月27日)，“二史馆藏”，七一八(4)/247。

⑥ 《美国魏伦上委员长书》(1940年8月10日)，“二史馆藏”，七一八(4)/363。

⑦ 《美国都布尔夫人上委员长书》(1940年9月3日)，“二史馆藏”，七一八(4)/363。

⑧ 《印人阿富上委座书》(时间不详)，“二史馆藏”，七一八(4)/361。

⑨ 《约翰萨宾上蒋委员长书》(1940年7月3日)，“二史馆藏”，七一八(4)/363。

⑩ 《美国格林上校上委座书》(1939年12月25日)，“二史馆藏”，七一八(4)/247。

⑪ 《美国华尔登上委座书》(7月10日)，“二史馆藏”，七一八(4)/361。

已丧，有母亲待养，毕业后须挣钱补助家用，想在荷兰当军官谋生，但自知达不到要求，便想到中国服务挣钱。他坦率地向蒋说了自己的要求：“鄙人所愿者乃在钧座下充一少尉，因鄙人尚有老母在堂，故略需金钱，以供家用。故非谨充一士兵所能应付者也。”他在信末落款处直接署名“充任贵国少尉毕克”，可见其来华当军官心情之迫切。^①一些愿意来华参战的外国青年，希望蒋介石提供旅费资助，有人表示，“报酬之多寡在所不计，如蒙录用，请即惠寄旅费，予决即前来中国”^②。

部分外国民众对华同情，满腔热血愿意来华参加对日作战，同时又索取高薪，两者之间并不矛盾。国际上有对志愿者付相应报酬的惯例，中国政府为吸引有特殊技能的外国人来华，以应抗战急需，所提供的薪资不仅远高于中方人员的待遇，亦胜于外国薪酬。如著名的美国志愿航空队（“飞虎队”）其飞行员在华月薪为 300—750 美元，高于其在美国的薪资，但若与西班牙内战时期雇佣飞行员高达 1500 美元月薪，及欧战爆发初期美国飞行员参与英国空军 750 美元月薪相比，并不突出。^③

比前述口头表达对中国声援更进一步，一些外国民众在致蒋介石的信中，直接向中国捐赠，或报告民间捐款捐物行动。一位热诚信奉基督教的妇人，捐款 25 美金，她说愿献出此微款，“以表对中国抗战之信念”^④。美国华盛顿州一位同情中国士兵的寡妇，一次捐献多达四万美金。^⑤民间动员方面，加拿大有的地方拟采用发行奖券的方式，“每券美金一元，第一次定于本年十二月一日开奖，以后每隔三个月举行一次，其所得之款悉用以办慈善事业”，达成援助中国之“义举”。^⑥法国中华人民之友协会所办的《中国》杂志，得到蒋介石赐文后，“捐奉纯净金鸡纳霜三万七千五百格兰姆”，支持中国抗战，同时表示将竭尽所能，“在法国方面推进援华工作”。^⑦

1937 年至 1941 年间，中国在东方战场独立抗击日本侵略，中国政府竭力争取国际援助，在联络各国政府的同时，积极开展“民间外交”，使各国民众了解中国抗战真相，争取同情与支持。中国第二历史档案馆所藏这组外国民众致蒋介石的信函，从一个侧面表明，“民间外交”有一定效果，不同国家不同职业的外国民众表达了对中国抗战的声援，他们通过捐款等方式实际上帮助中国。这些信件说明中国的抗日战争并不孤立，在西方各国政府不敢公开表态的时刻，民间的不断声援弥足珍贵。外国民众声援的传播，又有增强中国军民抗战到底、抗战必胜信心的特殊作用。这也为太平洋战争爆发后中国与反法西斯各国结盟，共同取得世界反法西斯战争胜利奠定了基础。

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① 《荷兰人毕克致委座函》（1939年8月3日），“二史馆藏”，七一八（4）/363。

② 《美国马奇阿上蒋委员长书》（3月22日），“二史馆藏”，七一八（4）/367。

③ William M. Smith, *Mercenary Eagles: American pilots serving in foreign airforces prior to the United States entry into the Second World War, 1936—1941*, doctoral dissertation, University of Arkansas, 1999. p.67, 158.

④ 《叙府唐泽华医学博士上蒋委员长书》（1940年5月4日），“二史馆藏”，七一八（4）/363。

⑤ 《重庆英美会琼斯氏上委座书》（1940年11月29日），“二史馆藏”，七一八（4）/363。

⑥ 《加拿大桑斯特上蒋委员长书》（10月4日），“二史馆藏”，七一八（4）/363。

⑦ 《法国中华人民之友协会上委座书》（1939年7月31日），“二史馆藏”，七一八（4）/247。